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INTRODUCTION

IMS is a "financial services company1" in the loosest sense of the term. It invests in
litigation claims by paying for surgeries it arranges for plaintiffs who have claims in litigation
and charges them a substantial premium. Before investing in the claims of its clients, IMS
investigates the merits of the claim including evaluating liability, determining the existence
of liability insurance and obtaining a medical opinion from a doctor it has under contract to
support medical causation and necessity for surgery. IMS not only finances the surgeries,
it contracts with a doctor to perform the surgery at a location determined by IMS so that it
can control the costs. The premium IMS charges to finance these surgeries is described by
it as an amount which reflects "the nature and value of the financial services provided to
Client, including risk of capital loss and similar exposure undertaken by [IMS] on behalf of
Client."2 IMS primarily uses one orthopedic surgeon for this purpose and pays the surgeon
handsomely and repeatedly for these evaluations and surgeries. IMS' s finance charge for
arranging for the surgery and paying for it is secured by a lien on any 'judgment, settlement
or verdict" the client recovers in their "claim for bodily injury damages" 3 •

1

"Financial services company'' is the term IMS uses to describe itself in the
disclosure it provides to its clients. (See Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to
Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, at NESBITT 0036)
2

IMS Disclosure of Financial Services. Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to
Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, at NESBITT 0036.
3

IMS Service Provider Lien and Authorization at NESBITT 0036, in Addendum to
Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief.
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The reason IMS should be subject to discovery is because its finance charge is
cleverly disguised as a medical bill by its use of CPT codes and medical terminology. Its
clients, the plaintiffs in litigation, use IMS' s charges, or estimates in this case, as evidence
of their economic loss for past or future medical expenses. Because the finance charge is
two or more times the reasonable and customary charge for the medical services IMS
finances, the use of the IMS client invoice/estimate by plaintiffs as proof of the reasonable
and necessary medical expenses incurred raises questions about the legitimacy of the IMS
client invoice/estimate as evidence of the reasonable and customary medical expense for the
surgery. In addition, the way plaintiffs and the IMS contract surgeon are introduced together
with the mutually beneficial relationship between the surgeon and IMS, raises questions
about the objectivity of the surgeon's surgery recommendations.
This is a Tier 3 case arising from a low speed and minimal property damage three
vehicle accident which occurred on June 27, 2011. After three and half years, Ignacio had
incurred approximately $11,000 in medical expenses to treat what he claimed were injuries
suffered in the June 27, 2011 accident. His wife, Esther, had incurred approximately $12,000
in medical expenses over the same period of time to treat what she claimed were injuries
suffered in the June 27, 2011 accident4. In December 2014, their lawyer referred both
Ignacio and Esther to IMS which arranged for a medical evaluation by its contract doctor,

4

See Plaintiffs Rule 26 Initial Disclosures dated May 16, 2016 at NESBITT 0012 13 in Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of
Extraordinary Relief.
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Dr. Kade T. Huntsman, who saw both Ignacio and Esther once on December 15, 2014. After
this one examination, Dr. Huntsman recommended multiple level cervical fusion surgeries
for both Ignacio and Esther and opined in his report that the "need for surgery is due to the
motor vehicle accident." Three days later on December 18, 2014, IMS provided a statement,
on its Intermountain Surgical letterhead, to Ignacio advising him that it estimated the cost of
the surgery Dr. Huntsman recommended for him to be $75,000. On the same date IMS
provided a statement, on its Intennountain Surgical letterhead, to Esther advising her that it
estimated the cost of the surgery Dr. Huntsman recommend for her to be $65,000. Although
Dr. Huntsman told both Ignacio and Esther that they needed the surgery "as soon as possible"
due to the nature of their conditions, neither went under the knife immediately and neither
has had the surgery as of this date, nearly six and a half years after the June 27, 2011
accident. However, both Ignacio and Esther have used the surgical estimates as part of the
computation of damages contained in their Rule 26 Initial Disclosures 5 and have hired Dr.
Huntsman as their "retained expert" to provide a causation opinion to support their claim that
the surgeries are necessary because of the auto accident at issue and to support their claim

5

See Plaintiff's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures dated May 16, 2016 at NESBITT 0012 13 in Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of
Extraordinary Relief.
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that the surgical cost estimates from IMS are the reasonable and customary charges for the
surgeries they ardently believe they need because Dr. Huntsman recommended it6•
If the jury believes that the Buenrostros require expensive, risky and complicated
spinal surgeries as a result of the relatively minor auto accident in which they were involved
on June 27, 2011, the potential financial exposure from a verdict for damages increased
significantly because of the involvement of IMS in this case. It is not only relevant, but
logical, to question ( 1) the business model/plan of IMS to determine if it has acted as a
medical facilities provider or as a finance company in this case; (2) the factual foundation
for the estimated costs of surgery provided to the Plaintiffs by IMS to determine if the
estimate represents reasonable and customary medical expenses or collateral source evidence
about how the Buenrostros intend to pay for their medical expenses; and (3) the contractual
and financial relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman who provided causation opinions
and surgical recommendations at the request of IMS and who has been designated as a
"retained expert" by the Buenrostros to testify concerning causation, surgical necessity and
reasonable and customary charges for the medical treatment he recommended. 7

6

See Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures dated April 18, 2017 at NESBITT 0016 - 0019
and Dr. Huntsman's expert witness reports dated January 12, 2017 at NESBITT 0032 0033 (Esther) and dated April 20, 2017 at NESBITT 0030 - 0031 (Ignacio) in Addendum
to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary
Relief.
7

2017-06-01, Order on Non-Party's Motion for Protective Order.
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The discovery ordered by Judge Hansen is relevant to the claims and defenses at issue
in this case and is proportional to the significant involvement ofIMS in the development and
presentation of Buenrostros' damage claims. The Petition for Extraordinary Relief by IMS
should be denied and Judge Hansen's Order should be enforced. Even though this Court has
requested full briefing of the issues raised by IMS, the question to be determined before
considering the merits of the discovery order of May 31, 2017 is whether a petition for
extraordinary relief is appropriate based on what IMS has developed at the hearing on its
Protection Order and in its Brief.
The determination of relevance and proportionality is a matter entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Judge Hansen's reasoning has not been shown to be wrong, let
alone an egregious abuse of discretion. There is no significant legal issue identified by IMS
in its Brief. Judge Hansen's Order requires IMS to submit to a well defined and discrete
inquiry into its business practices to determine whether the "surgical estimate" it provided
to the Buenrostros is a collateral source and whether Dr. Huntsman is so inextricably
connected to IMS as to be subject to impeachment for bias. Any testimony and documents
IMS provides in response to Judge Hansen's Order are insulated from disclosure outside of
this litigation by what amounts to an "attorney eyes only'' protective order which prohibits
the disclosure of the information to anyone other than the attorneys representing the parties
to this litigation and limits the use of the information to this case only. IMS cannot show
irreparable harm under these circumstances.

Therefore, IMS is not entitled to an

extraordinary writ in this case.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE NESBITT - Page 5

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

IMS identifies a single issue for review, namely "Whether the District Court correctly
interpreted and determined the relevancy and proportionality standard of Utah R. Civ. P.
26(b) with respect to discovery requests to a non-party to the litigation?"
IMS misstates the standard of review for the issue it identifies. Nesbitt submits that
the correct standard of appellate review of Judge Hansen's discovery order is abuse of
discretion. This Court recently had the opportunity to address this very issue in RJWMedia
Inc. v. Heath, 2017 UT App 34, ,r 18,392 P.3d 956,960 where it explained:
While interpretations of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are questions oflaw
reviewedforcorrectness,Petev. Youngblood,2006UT App 303, if 7,141 P.3d
629, "we grant district courts a great deal of deference in matters of discovery
and review discovery orders for abuse of discretion," Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT
79, ,r 63. "Accordingly, we 'will not find abuse of discretion absent an
erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial
court's ruling.' "Id. (quoting Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ,r 37, 29 P.3d
638).
See also Williams v. Anderson, 2017 UT App 91, ,r 13 (While we afford trial courts broad
discretion in discovery matters, we review the interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for correctness). The issue presented by IMS does not involve "interpretation" of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but only a discovery issue, the review of which should be
determined using an abuse of discretion standard.
IMS ignores the real issue which must first be determined, namely whether
extraordinary relief is appropriate under the facts and circumstances of this case. The
standard for review of a Petition for Extraordinary Relief is identified in Snow, Christensen
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE NESBITT- Page 6

& Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, 122, 299 P .3d I 058, 1065 where the Supreme Court
of Utah held:
The question of whether to grant a petition for extraordinary relief lies within
the sound discretion of this court. Id. When considering whether to grant a
petition, we may consider a variety of factors such as "the egregiousness of the
alleged error, the significance of the legal issue presented by the petition, the
severity of the consequences occasioned by the alleged error, and additional
factors." Id. 1 But these factors are neither controlling nor do they wholly
measure the extent of our discretion. Id.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IMS is not licensed to provide medical services or medical facilities. IMS states
specifically in its Disclosure of Financial Services that it "is a financial services company,
and not a healthcare provider or medical services provider."8 Therefore, when IMS refers
to itself as a "facilities provider"9 and attempts to suggest that its charges are "similar to the
facility fees charged by other facilityproviders" 10 in its Brief, one must question the accuracy
of such claims. "Medical facility provider" is not a term of art used in the Health Care
Facility Licensing and Inspection Act, Title 26, Chapter 21, Utah Code. Therefore, IMS's
selfidentification as a "facilities provider" is nothing more than a play on words to create the
impression that it is something more or different than what it is.
IMS also attempts to give itself credibility by claiming that because it uses "CPT

8

See IMS Disclosure of Financial Services contained in the Addendum to Response of
Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief, at NESBITT 0036.
9

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 8.

10

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 8.
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codes" in its invoices it is similar to "other facility providers." 11 IMS did not immediately
identify who these "other facility providers" are in its Brief, but instead delayed until page
16 of the Brief of Petitioner/Appellant to suggest that it is like "IHC, St. Marks/Mountain
Star, IASIS, University of Utah Hospital, as well as other outpatient surgical centers." 12
According to the American Medical Association, the AMA holds the copyright in CPT
(Current Procedural Terminology) and the use or reprinting of CPT in any product or
publication requires a license. Hospitals, ambulatory clinics, physician groups and other
organizations involved in care delivery use CPT codes to report medical, surgical, and
diagnostic procedures and services to entities such as health insurance companies. Until IMS
submits to a 30(b)(6) deposition one cannot say with certainty whether IMS has a license to
use CPT codes in its invoices, but it is doubtful because IMS is not involved in care delivery
and is not a licensed health care facility 13 in the state of Utah.
IMS is a financial services company only in the sense that it invests in litigation by
financing surgeries in exchange for liens on the settlements, verdicts and judgments of its
clients who are plaintiffs in litigation. It markets itself to plaintiff firms. It carefully
investigates the cases it finances. Alan McDonald, the chief executive officer of IMS,

llBrief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 8
12

13

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 16

"Health care facility'' means general acute hospitals, specialty hospitals, home health
agencies, hospices, nursing care facilities, residential-assisted living facilities, birthing centers,
ambulatory surgical facilities, small health care facilities, abortion clinics, facilities owned or
operated by health maintenance organizations, end stage renal disease facilities, and any other
health care facility which the committee designates by rule. Utah Code§ 26-21-2.
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testified in a 30(b)( 6) deposition in the Vigueras case identified in the Addendum to the Brief
of Petitioner/Appellant about the investigation it conducts:
11 Q. Does Intermountain Surgical vet these
12 referrals, or does it take everyone that's referred?
13 A. Yeah. We vet the referrals.
14 Q. In what way?
15 A. We ask the attorney about the underlying -16 it's basically an intake process. In other words, we'll
17 ask the attorney about the underlying case, what
18 happened, what are the facts, and basically is there
19 insurance, ultimately, on the other end of this thing,
20 whether it's uninsured, underinsured, or bodily injury
21 coverage by a tortfeasor, and if the answer to those
22 questions is satisfactory, then we will go ahead and
23 green light a consult with one of the physicians that we
24 work with, that we contract with.
Alan T. McDonald Deposition, pp. 9 - 10
IMS chooses the doctors who perform the surgeries on its clients and the facilities
where the surgeries are performed. It rewards the medical professionals by paying their full
non-discounted or barely discounted fee. In this case, Dr. Kade T. Huntsman testified about
his billing protocol with IMS:
24 Q. When you do these surgeries for IMS, do you
25 discount your fee at all?
1 A. Slightly.

* * *
19 Q. Do you know whether the discount to IMS is a
20 greater discount or a smaller discount than what you give
21 to Blue Cross, Aetna, or Cigna?
22 MR. KELSON: Same objections.
23 THE WITNESS: I would make the assumption that
24 it's less, but I would have to actually look at the
25 amounts.
Dr. Kade T. Huntsman Deposition, pp. 36 - 37
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE NESBITT - Page 9

IMS makes a substantial profit for its investment, approximately 2 - 3 times its
monetary outlay for a surgery, in exchange for assuming the "risk of capital loss and similar
exposure" 14 on its investment. It is a very profitable business model, but it is the business
model of an financier, not a medical services or medical facilities provider.
On February 22, 2017, Nesbitt served IMS with a Notice of Rule 30(b)(4) and
30(b)(6) Deposition Duces Tecum requesting that IMS designate a witness or witnesses to
testify on March 8, 2017 about well-defined and circumscribed topics and produce the IMS
business records which document or would be used to form the basis for the answers to the
questions on those topics 15•
IMS claims that it is unfair and disproportionate for it to have to respond to this kind
of discovery because it did not finance the surgeries Dr. Huntsman recommended, obtained
no lien rights and has no contractual agreement with the Buenrostros. However, IMS admits
that it referred the Buenrostros to Dr. Huntsman and provided them with an estimate of what
it would charge to finance the surgeries he recommended which they, in turn, have used it
to develop their damage case against Nesbitt 16 •

This extra-contractual help for the

Buenrostros is part of the IMS business plan for cultivating and maintaining relationships

14

See IMS Disclosure of Financial Services contained in the Addendum to
Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief,
at NESBITT 0036.
15

2017-06-01, Order on Non-Party's Motion For Protective Order attached as
Addendum I to the Brief of Petitioner/Appellant.
16

B rief of Petitioner/Appellant, pp. 8 - 9.
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with personal injury lawyers and law firms. Chief Executive Officer Alan T. McDonald
explained in his 30(b)( 6) deposition in the Vigueras case that IMS has only three employees
and marketing and cultivating relationships with lawyers and law firms is their primary
ffilSSIOn:

14
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) What does Tyson DowDell do
15 for IMS?
16
A. Tyson's description is a -- is a market
17 manager, and Tyson markets to personal injury lawyers and
18 law firms, cultivates and maintains those relationships,
19 works as a liaison with our physicians and their
20 scheduling people, their staff, the staff at Canyon Crest
21 Surgical Center, and their scheduling people, et cetera,
22 to just make the Intermountain Surgical process go.
Alan T. McDonald Deposition, p. 12
The arguments by IMS that it had only minimal involvement in this case ignores that
by providing an estimate of the cost to finance future surgeries which had not yet been
performed, IMS increased the Buenrostros' claim for economic/medical expense damages
from approximately $11,000 for Ignacio to over $85,000 and from approximately $12,000
for Esther to over $75,000. The input by IMS dramatically changed the nature of the case
against Nesbitt.

The CEO of IMS, Alan T. McDonald, is experienced in and fully

understands the litigation arena in which IMS invests. On the IMS website McDonald
represents that he received his law from the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at BYU in 1992;
that he is licensed as a lawyer in Arizona, Idaho and Utah; that he has over twenty years of
experience in the practice of law; that his focus has been primarily in the areas of personal
injury and law firm management; and that he previously served as the Chief Operating
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE NESBITT- Page 11

Officer at one of Utah's largest personal injury firms.

The conduct which subjects IMS to

discovery is its referral of selected plaintiffs to a surgeon in cases involving an accident
caused by a defendant with sufficient insurance coverage to justify its investment plus its
active participation in their lawsuit by disguising its charges to finance the surgeries as
medical bills. If left unchallenged, the IMS claim that it is a "facilities provider" 17 makes it
more likely that its surgical estimate will be admitted into evidence to establish the
reasonable and customary cost of medical treatment. If the surgical estimate is admissible,
the defense should have the right to show that it is actually a financing arrangement which
explains why it is so significantly higher than other evidence that may be available to
establish the reasonable and customary charges for these surgeries in this locality 18 •

It is clear in this case that IMS' s role is far greater than the limited role IMS describes
in its Brief at pages 8 - 9. On April 18, 2017, Buenrostros served Expert Witness Disclosures
disclosing Dr. Huntsman, the IMS contract doctor, as their retained expert to testify on

17

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 8.

18

See NESBITT 0049 and 0060 in that Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to
Intermountain Surgical' s Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief
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causation, medical necessity and reasonable and customary charges for medical treatment 19 •
Dr. Huntsman's disclosure contains an opinion that the cost of future surgery for the
Buenrostros is in the same approximate amounts as those contained in the IMS surgical cost
estimates. Although one might argue that he developed that opinion independently, in his
deposition in this case Dr. Huntsman admitted that his cost opinions were based on what he
vaguely described as his "experience seeing patient bills and so forth," and that he would not
be able to produce the "patient bills" on which he claimed to have relied for his opinions:
4
Q. In other words, if I wanted to see the bills
5 that you are relying upon to make that cost range, would
6 I be able to find them?
7
A. No.
8
Q. I mean, could you produce them?
9
A. No. We'd have to pull varying bills and see
IO what the average is, but I don't know exactly what that
11 amount is. That's my estimation.
12
Q. All right. So to come up with this amount, you
13 didn't go pull particular bills; this is just something
14 that you had off the top of your head; am I following
15 correctly?
16
A. Yes. With some experience.
17
Q. Well, I understand that. But, I mean, ifwe
18 wanted to see the source of this, I can't go have you
19 pull the same bills that you used; these are just numbers
20 that you kind of came up with over time; is that right?
21
A. Yes.
Dr. Kade T. Huntsman Deposition, p. 40

19

See Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures dated April 18, 2017 at NESBITT 0016 - 0019
and Dr. Huntsman's expert witness reports dated January 12, 2017 at NESBITT 0032 0033 (Esther) and dated April 20, 2017 at NESBITT 0030 - 0031 (Ignacio) in Addendum
to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary
Relief.
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Although IMS claims that it "has not been designated as an expert in this case, is not
qualified as an expert, and has no intention of testifying as an expert"20 IMS has supplied
David Gillies as an expert in another case to opine that its finance charges "are within what
is reasonable and customary for similar surgeries"21 and its contract doctor, Dr. Huntsman,
is identified in this case as a "retained expert" for the Buenrostros to support their claim that
the surgical costs estimated by IMS are the reasonable and customary charges for the
surgeries Dr. Huntsman recommended22 •

In its Disclosure of Financial Services, IMS

represents that "Services charged to client shall be usual, customary and reasonable for the
community, and shall be set at the sole discretion of the Company."23 Finally, in its Brief
IMS claims that "invoices to patients include facility fees and CPT codes that are similar to
the facility fees charged by other facility providers."24

20

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 26

21

Exhibit "A" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition for
Writ of Extraordinary Relief From Order of the Honorable Royal I. Hansen, Third District
Court Judge, Utah Case No. 16090213 7.
22

See Plaintiffs Expert Disclosures dated April 18, 2017 at NESBITT 0016 - 0019
and Dr. Huntsman's expert witness reports dated January 12, 2017 at NESBITT 0032 0033 (Esther) and dated April 20, 2017 at NESBITT 0030 - 0031 (Ignacio) in Addendum
to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary
Relief.
23

See IMS Disclosure of Financial Services contained in the Addendum to
Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief,
at NESBITT 0036.
24

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 8.
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To determine if the IMS surgical estimate is entitled to be treated as evidence of the
reasonable and customary charge for the surgeries recommended by Dr. Huntsman, topics
eight through fifteen on which Judge Hansen ordered IMS to produce documents and a
30(b)( 6) witness require IMS to disclose the foundation and other information relied upon
by IMS to formulate the surgical cost estimates it provided to the Buenrostros. Requiring
IMS to produce and explain the factual foundation for the estimated costs of surgery
provided to the Buenrostros to determine if the estimates represent collateral source evidence
about the cost of financing the Buenrostro' s medical expenses is relevant and proportional
based on the degree IMS has involved itself in the development of the Buenrostro' s medical
economic loss damages.
This is not a fishing expedition to harass and annoy IMS. This discovery was not
sought until after the defense had developed substantial reliable evidence that the finance
charges which IMS will charge to finance the surgery are not the same as the reasonable and
customary cost of surgery. Dr. Brent Clyde, a Board Certified neurosurgeon practicing in
Ogden, has provided expert opinion that the reasonable and customary charges for the two
level ACDF surgery Dr. Huntsman recommended for Esther is much less than the IMS
surgical cost estimate:
The estimated facility costs for a two-level cervical discectomy and fusion(and
exclusive of surgeon/assistant fees) of$65,000 is not usual and customary. At
Davis Hospital(an inpatient facility) the average full-fee non-negotiated
charges for this procedure are $31,600.
(Nesbitt 0049 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition
for Writ of Extraordinary Relief)
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Dr. Clyde has also provided expert opinion about that the reasonable and customary
charges for the three level ACDF surgery Huntsman recommended for Ignacio is much less
than the IMS surgical cost estimate:.
The estimated facility cost (exclusive of surgeon/assistant) of a three-level cervical
discectomy and fusion of $75,000 is not usual and customary. At Davis Hospital,
the average full-fee non-negotiated charges were $31,600 fora two-level and$27,400
for a single-level fusion. The expected full-fee charges for this procedure (a three
level fusion) would therefore be about $36,000.
(Nesbitt 0060 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's Petition
for Writ of Extraordinary Relief)
Based on Dr. Clyde's testimony, the IMS estimates are approximately double the
reasonable and customary charges for the surgeries Huntsman has recommended. Before this
case goes to trial, Judge Hansen will have to determine whether the IMS surgical estimate
is admissible evidence of reasonable and customary medical expenses or inadmissible
collateral source evidence about how the Buenrostros chose to finance their medical care.
When entering the Protective Order in this case, Judge Hansen understood that to get this
evidentiary ruling correct it would be critical to understand the unique IMS business model25 •

25

Judge Bates similarly understood that the IMS business model is sufficiently different
from the traditional model that discovery into the IMS business model was appropriate: "Were
this a traditional case involving, you know, payments by Select Health or Blue Cross or
something like that, I think the answer would be a little different here, because we've got - we've
got some well established practices, we've got lots of case law that generally you don't get too far
in the night. Simply take the bills as they are, and then you compare them to what is allowed in
the- what is reasonable in the community. This case is a little different because we all know,
sitting here, that there is a financial arrangement and that IMS is - appears to me, at least there is
some evidence that IMS is augmenting these costs to account for the fact that they're covering the
plaintiffs bills and providing essentially a collateral source for him. So it seems to me in this
unique case, that it is appropriate to allow the defense to get behind that initial bill and look a
little bit deeper." (Judge Bates oral remarks at 11/8/16 hearing on IMS Motion for Protective
Order in Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, No. 160903969, 3rd Dist. Utah)
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The first three topics on which Judge Hansen ordered IMS to produce documents and
a 30(b)( 6) witness in the Protective Order require IMS to disclose the licenses and
accreditations IMS holds to operate a medical facility. A lack of licenses and accreditations
is relevant evidence that IMS is not a "facilities provider." Under the unique circumstances
of his case, it is not disproportional for IMS to be required to disclose its licensing,
accreditation and the data, documentation or other information relied upon by IMS to prepare
the surgical cost estimate.
However, cost is not the only disputed fact issue in this litigation. The causation
opinion of Dr. Huntsman, IMS's contract doctor, is also at issue. After seeing Esther once
on December 15, 2014, Dr. Huntsman diagnosed herniated discs with severe spinal stenosis
at C5/6 and C6/7 with radiculopathy and myelopathy. Dr. Huntsman recommended a two
level ACDF and related the necessity of such to the auto accident in 2011. Dr. Clyde, who
regularly performs multi-level cervical fusion surgeries, conducted a comprehensive review
of Esther's medical records and performed a Rule 35 medical examination. He concluded:
In summary, there is no clear evidence for a disc related or other substantial structural
neck injury from the accident on 6/27 /11 based on the medical record and my
examination today. There is not a good indication for surgery in this patient and I
would strongly advise against it. The likelihood of any benefit is remote and the
consequences associated with a multi-level cervical fusion outweigh the benefit.
(Nesbitt 0060 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intennountain Surgical's Petition
for Writ of Extraordinary Relief)
After seeing Ignacio once on December 15, 2014, Dr. Huntsman diagnosed cervical
myelopathy and severe canal stenosis with contusion of the cord in the cervical spine and
recommended a three level ACDF at C3/4, C4/5 and C5/6 which he causally related to the
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"motor vehicle accident." Dr. Clyde conducted a comprehensive review oflgnacio's medical
records and performed a Rule 35 medical examination. He concluded:
The medical record is clear that the prior accident in 2010 resulted in ongoing cervical
symptoms and on 8/2/10 Dr. Erasmus found that Ignacio had a displaced cervical disc
"confirmed by MRI" and ongoing cervical complaints, but was at MMI. Dr. Bova
clearly documented that the neck was only aggravated and had returned to baseline,
per his history with the patient. He reports this as a first person account from
Ignacio. The MRI findings in 2010 did not change on subsequent studies. Based on
these facts
alone one would have to conclude that nothing changed structurally
from the accident on 6/27/11 and symptoms were only temporarily aggravated. . ..
Based on the totality of the medical record, and my own examination today, the
6/27/11 accident resulted in a temporary aggravation of cervical, and possibly leftarm,
symptoms, which were back to baseline by 7/13/11.
(Nesbitt 0048-0049 in the Addendum to Response of Nesbitt to Intermountain Surgical's
Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief)
The significant history of symptoms and structural damage to Ignacio's cervical spine
which pre-dated the subject auto accident on June 27, 2011, is well documented in Ignacio's
medical record. Even Dr. Thomas Berg, the radiologist who read a cervical MRI performed
on November 18, 2014, just days before Dr. Huntsman examined Ignacio for the first and
only time, compared it with a cervical MRI performed on June 15, 2010.

He concluded

Ignacio had the same problems Dr. Huntsman opined were caused by the accident on June
27, 2011, for at a least a year before the accident on June 27, 2011.
Dr. Huntsman is the "go to" orthopedic spinal surgeon when IMS is evaluating
whether it should invest in a litigated case.
12
Q. Okay. How many patients do you see for
13 Intermountain Surgical a year?
14
A. I've -- I don't keep track of that. I'd have
15 to go back and sort through it. But I would guess 60,
16 70, 80 patients a year.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE NESBITT- Page 18

17
Q. And then do you perform surgeries on at least
18 some of those patients that you see?
19 A. Yes.
20
Q. Do you have an estimate of how many surgeries
21 you've performed on patients that Intermountain Surgical
22 is involved in?
23
A. Same thing. I've never counted, but I would
24 guess that it's maybe on half or two-thirds of those, so
25 probably, I don't know, 40, 50.
Dr. Kade T. Huntsman Deposition, p. 6
The consults and surgeries he performs for IMS are a significant source of income for
Dr. Huntsman which creates a significant financial incentive for Dr. Huntsman to make a
case for causation in those cases where IMS is considering investing.

IMS and Dr.

Huntsman have mutually beneficial financial interests. Topics four and five in the Protective
Order require IMS to produce documents and a witness to explain the number of surgeries
and how much IMS paid Dr. Huntsman in 2016. It is not disproportionate to require IMS to
respond to discovery on these issues because of the relationship which exists between IMS
and Dr. Huntsman. Dr. Huntsman did not consider the information proprietary and has
already estimated the number of surgeries he performs for IMS. The requirement of the
Protective Order simply adds certainty to the numbers Dr. Huntsman estimated.
IMS is significantly involved in this case by arranging for and providing evidence for
the Buenrostros on the issues of diagnosis, necessity for medical treatment, causation and
cost of treatment. It is not disproportionate to permit the defense to conduct discovery into
the IMS business model to prove that its "surgical estimates" are really finance charges. IMS
argues that Judge Hansen's Protective Order "diverged from the interpretations of Judge
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Bates and Judge Scott."26 Actually, the orders in this case and in the Vigueras-Amezcua v.

Shoeman case27 are more similar than dissimilar. Both decisions provide IMS with the
significant protection of what amounts to an "attorney eyes only" protective order and both
decisions recognize that the collateral source rule does not bar discovery into costs incurred
and the augmentation of those costs by IMS. Because of the restrictions imposed in Judge
Hansen's Protective Order, IMS cannot seriously claim that production of the requested
information will cause it irreparable harm by granting "unprecedented and expansive access
to lntermountain's confidential proprietary business information, processes and trade
secrets."28 All of the evidence developed during the 30(b)(4) and (6) deposition ofIMS can
only be used in this case and any similar evidence will have to be developed independently
in any other case to be used by the defense in those other cases. That hardly places an undue
burden on IMS, especially given its significant involvement in this case.

26

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 11.

27

The undersigned was not involved in the Salisbury v. The Living Planet case is
not familiar with the arguments which were presented for and against the Motions by IMS
and Canyon Crest. It does not appear that the issue of "collateral source" was a
significant issue in Salisbury like it was in Vigueras-Amezcua and like it is in this case.
That difference makes the Salisbury decision of limited importance in evaluating Judge
Hansen's order in this case.
28

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 11.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is not appropriate for extraordinary relief for an abuse of discretion by Judge
Hansen because extraordinary circumstances do not exist. The issues involve a discovery
dispute over the appropriate scope of discovery into the business practices of IMS and its
relationship with its contract doctor, Kade T. Huntsman, M.D., to determine if IMS is a
collateral source and whether its relationship with Dr. Huntsman limits his objectivity as an
expert witness for the Buenrostros. Judge Hansen entered an order allowing discreet and
limited discovery on these issues and provided that any information obtained from the
discovery would be restricted from disclosure by a strict attorney eyes only protective order
and could be used only in this case. Because of the issues raised by the Buenrostros in this
litigation this discovery is both relevant and proportional. Judge Hansen did not abuse his
discretion in ordering the discovery protected, as it is, by a restrictive protective order.

ARGUMENT
1.

IMS HAS NOT SHOWN ENTITLEMENT TO EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF
In Snow, Christensen & Martineau v. Lindberg, 2013 UT 15, if 22,299 P.3d 1058,

1065 the Supreme Court of Utah held:
The question of whether to grant a petition for extraordinary relief lies within
the sound discretion of this court. Id. When considering whether to grant a
petition, we may consider a variety of factors such as "the egregiousness of the
alleged error, the significance of the legal issue presented by the petition, the
severity of the consequences occasioned by the alleged error, and additional
factors." Id. ,r But these factors are neither controlling nor do they wholly
measure the extent of our discretion. Id.
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The determination of relevance and proportionality is a matter entrusted to the sound
discretion of the trial court. IMS argues that Judge Hansen abused his discretion because he
failed to properly determine whether the information sought by discovery is relevant to any
claim or defense and suggests that how IMS determined the cost estimate for the surgeries
is irrelevant to determining the value of medical services 29 • The common method of proving
medical damages is by offering a bill for the medical procedure into evidence with minimal
foundation. The Buenrostros have made clear their intention to use the IMS estimate to
prove their medical expenses by including it as part of their Rule 26 Initial Disclosures. The
defense seeks through this discovery to prove that the IMS estimate is an inadmissible
collateral source which only identifies the cost of financing the surgery. Judge Hansen
reasoned that the discovery seeks material which is relevant to the determination whether the
IMS cost estimate is a collateral source or is evidence of reasonable and customary charges
for medical services. IMS argues that the reasonableness of medical expenses is detennined
by the "customary charges for services in a similar geographic area in which the services are
provided"30 but ignores that this is exactly how its surgical cost estimate is being used in this
case.

Judge Hansen also reasoned that understanding the contractual and financial

relationship between Dr. Huntsman and IMS is relevant because Dr. Huntsman is acting in
the dual capacity of an adviser to IMS on whether surgery is necessary and causally related

29

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 14.

30

Brief of Petitioner/Appellant, p. 16.
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to the subject accident and also in the capacity of a retained expert for Buenrostros on
medical necessity, causation and reasonable and customary charges for medical services.
In a case involving a claim that the trial court erred in preventing the plaintiff from
presenting damages-related evidence at trial because ofthe failure to disclose "a computation
of any damages claimed" for purposes of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules ofCivi~ Procedure, this
Court held in Williams v. Anderson, 2017 UT App 91,113,400 P.3d 1071, 1074 that "We
will not find an abuse of discretion 'absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there
is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling."' In this case Judge Hansen's reasoning
that discovery about the factual foundation for the estimated surgery costs was relevant to
a determine whether the estimated surgery cost documents were evidence of a collateral
source has not been shown to be erroneous, let alone an egregious abuse of discretion.
Similarly, Judge Hansen's reasoning that discovery into the contractual and financial
relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman is relevant to whether Dr. Huntsman is
conflicted and biased as an expert has not been shown to be erroneous, let alone an egregious
abuse of discretion. State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200,203 (Utah 1987) (evidence of bias or
motive is always relevant to discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his
testimony).
The suggestion that IMS has been on the receiving end of different discovery orders 31

31

IMS has attached as an Addendum to its Brief the Orders from three trial courts
addressing the extent and scope of discovery into its business of financing surgeries for
litigants.
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from different trial courts is not a reason for granting IMS' s petition for extraordinary relief
in this case. Achieving uniformity and predictability of discovery under Rule 26 will
necessarily be difficult, if not impossible, because of the myriad facts and circumstances
presented by different cases 32 • Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes (Any system
of rules which permits the facts and circumstances of each case to inform procedure cannot
eliminate uncertainty.). This is why trial judges are cloaked with broad discretion to
determine what is and what is not proportional. This Court recently explained in Ford v.

Ford, 2016 UT App 127, 379 P.3d 14, 15:
discovery requests are proportional, however, if they meet a
number of criteria, including ( 1) reasonability considering the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues; (2) the benefit of the discovery when compared with the
burden or expense it imposes; and (3) its furtherance of a ''just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of the case," among other things. Id. R. 26(b)(2).
A district court "has broad discretion in deciding whether a discovery request
is proportional."
IMS has been ordered to submit to a well defined and discrete inquiry into its business
practices to determine whether the "surgical estimate" it provided to the Plaintiffs is a
collateral source and whether its contract doctor is an unbiased expert witness on the issues
ofmedical necessity, causation and reasonable and customary medical costs. IMS' s response
is protected by what amounts to an "attorney eyes only" restriction which prohibits the
32

The fact that Judge Bates, Judge Scott and Judge Hansen arrived at different
protective orders is not an indication that trial judges are struggling to apply
proportionality standards which requires intervention by the Utah Court of Appeals to
bring uniformity and predictability to proportionality decisions, but rather it is a testament
to the fact that these cases involved different facts and circumstances.
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disclosure of the information to anyone other than the attorneys representing the parties and
limits the use of the information to this case only. IMS cannot show severe adverse
consequences to its business under these circumstances. Therefore, IMS is not entitled to
extraordinary relief insulating it from discovery in this case.
2.

THE DISCOVERY REQUIRED BY JUDGE HANSEN'S ORDER IS
RELEVANT AND PROPORTIONAL

Discovery which seeks to determine whether evidence is inadmissible evidence of
collateral source or admissible evidence of future anticipated medical expenses is clearly
relevant in a negligence case of the kind involved here.
Only by characterizing itself as a "health care facility" can IMS make the argument
that its profit margins, contracts, costs, etc. are irrelevant to a determination of the reasonable
amount of the Buenrostros' future anticipated medical expenses. Medical bills from health
care providers and facilities are generally accorded a great deal of deference as evidence of
reasonable and customary medical charges. However, IMS is not a medical provider or a
health care facility and its finance charges should not be accorded the same deference. Yet,
because of the way it presents its estimates and charges for financing surgeries, they are
easily mistaken for a medical bill. Because IMS refuses to acknowledge that its estimate is
nothing more than its estimate of what it would charge to finance the Buenrostros' surgeries
and because the Buenrostros persist in presenting the IMS estimates as medical bills, it is
necessary to expose the estimate for what it really is, namely what IMS would charge to
finance the surgeries for the Buenrostros in exchange for a lien on their lawsuit.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE NESBITT- Page 25

The amount IMS proposes to charge is well in excess of its monetary outlay and well
in excess of the reasonable and customary charges for such surgeries. Once its actual costs
are identified and disclosed, it will be apparent that the estimate is an estimate of financing
charges, not an estimate of medical expenses. That makes the discovery permitted under
Judge Hansen's May 31, 2017 Order relevant and proportional.
IMS' s argument that the defense in this case did not demonstrate how IMS' s business
information was relevant to determining the Buenrostros' damages misses the point. Judge
Hansen determined that IMS' s business information is relevant to determine whether IMS
is a medical service provider, as it claims, or a financier of the costs of surgery. This is a
relevant inquiry to determine if the IMS cost estimate is a collateral source. Ordering such
discovery is not an egregious abuse of discretion.
IMS' s argument that the reasonableness of medical expenses is determined in the
marketplace and that the defense has access to witnesses to establish and/or rebut the
reasonable and customary charge for surgeries also misses the point. Medical bills carry
more weight than an academic evaluation of market place economics and that is why it is
relevant and proportional to subject IMS to discovery for the purpose of proving that its
surgical cost estimate is not a medical bill. This endeavor is even more necessary when the
IMS contract doctor acts as an expert witness to prove that the IMS cost estimate is the
reasonable and customary charge for the proposed surgeries. It is well-understood by trial
lawyers that a treating surgeon's opinion on necessity, causation and cost is likely to be better
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received by a jury than that of an "independent" evaluator whose only connection is being
hired to testify as an expert. That is, unless the jury is fully informed about how and why the
"treating surgeon" became the treating surgeon and why Dr. Huntsman's opinions on
necessity, causation and cost may not be objective because he is hired repeatedly by IMS
whose primary motivation is to eliminate the risks associated with investing in the very
litigation in which Dr. Huntsman is testifying.
IMS argues that Judge Hansen was persuaded to "go off into the weeds" when he
concluded that discovery related to collateral source, reasonable and customary charges for
medical services and the relationship between IMS and Dr. Huntsman were relevant. IMS 's
arguments that because it did not finance the Buenrostros' surgeries its status as a collateral
source or medical provider is not an issue ignores that it provided a surgical cost estimate that
the Buenrostros claim represents the reasonable and customary charge for the future medical
treatment its contract doctor, Dr. Huntsman, recommended they have as soon as possible.
IMS is front and center involved in the Buenrostros' damage claim and it is relevant and
proportional that it be subject to discovery on the discreet and limited issues identified in
Judge Hansen's May 31, 2017 Order.
Judge Hansen addressed each of the proportionality factors identified in Utah R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(2) and identified the reasons why the information is needed in this case. IMS does
not claim that Judge Hansen's decision is without an evidentiary basis, it just claims he got
it wrong. That does not rise to the level of abuse of discretion. For example, IMS argues that
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its business information is not necessary to determine if its surgical cost estimate represents
the reasonable and customary charge for the surgeries because evidence of the reasonable and
customary charge for the surgeries can be obtained from experts and other medical providers.
The argument ignores that the issue is collateral source and its business information is
relevant to show that IMS is acting as a collateral source. Judge Bates reached a similar
conclusion in Vigueras case, where he concluded that because it looks like IMS is a collateral
source for the plaintiff, "it is appropriate to allow the defense to get behind that initial bill."
(Judge Bates oral remarks at 11/8/16 hearing on IMS Motion for Protective Order in

Vigueras-Amezcua v. Shoeman, No. I 60903969, 3rd Dist. Utah).
IMS overstates the burden it claims is imposed on it by the discovery order. It has
previously produced its Chief Executive Officer as a 30(b)(6) witness to answer similar
questions in the Vigueras case. IMS is not an involuntary participant in this case. It
voluntarily injected itself into this case by deciding to evaluate the possibility of investing
in the Buenrostros case, providing a referral to Dr. Huntsman for a surgical consult,
providing an estimate of what it would charge to finance Buenrostros' surgery and remaining
supportive of Buenrostros' efforts to use the cost estimate to prove their future medical
economic loss damages. Discovery is both relevant and proportional under the circumstances
of this case.
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Nesbitt submits that IMS 's petition for extraordinary relief
should be denied and this matter remanded to the District Court for further discovery in
accordance with the May 31, 2017 Protective Order.
DATED this l0Jt-L day of November, 2017.
COOPER & LARSEN
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-o0oIGNACIO BUENROSTRO,
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Case No. 160902137

vs.

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE/
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

WHITNEY A. NESBITT,
Defendant.

-o0o-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 9th day of May, 2017,
commencing at the hour of 1:35 p.m., the above-entitled matter
came on for hearing before the HONORABLE ROYAL I. HANSEN,
sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the purpose of
this cause and that the following proceedings were had.
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;
.
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* * *

1
2
3

4
5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

(Transcriber's Note:

7

8

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

9

10

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, Counsel.

This is Judge

11

Hansen.

And this is the time and place for the telephone

12

conference with regard to the issues that are before the Court

13

in the Nesbitt matter.

14

Appearances of the parties and counsel.

15

MR. EVANS:

Scott Evans on behalf of the non-party.

16

THE COURT:

Great.

17

MR. COOPER:

18

Thank you.

Gary Cooper on behalf of Nesbitt and

Loveland.

19

THE COURT:

And let's see, do I have Mr. Boulton

20

here as well?

It doesn't sound like it.

21

had been active in briefing this matter.

I don't know that he

22

Is that fair from Mr. Cooper, Mr. Evans?

23

MR. EVANS:

24

if he did,

25

DepornaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

in fact,

I can't remember if he--I can't remember
file--

MR. COOPER:

This is Gary Cooper.

I don't have any
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1

record that he filed anything.

2

THE COURT:

3

And let's see, the issues that we're addressing here

4

Okay.

Thank you.

are largely between the non-parties and the Nesbitts.

5

Tell me current status, Mr. Cooper.

6

And then, Mr. Evans,

7

status report from you.

8
9

10

MR. COOPER:

Your Honor, the current status is that

the--is that the 30(b) (6) depositions that were scheduled of
IMS have been delayed pending the outcome of this.

11
12

I'd like to get a current

Dr. Huntsman's deposition, as the treating physician
was taken about ten days ago.

13

And that's the current status.

14

THE COURT:

15

And Mr. Evans,

16

Okay.

Good.

any update that you have from the

non-parties?

17

MR. EVANS:

No,

your Honor.

Mr. Cooper was accurate

18

and the--the only issue here now is that which we're--that was

19

briefed and--

20

THE COURT:

Good.

And I--the Court's reviewed the

21

pleadings that have been filed by the respective parties in

22

the case and--

23

MR. EVANS:

Oh,

24

THE COURT:

Yeah.

25

MR. EVANS:

--there is one.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MR. EVANS:

In our briefing, we made reference to

3

another case, the Garretts, and in that case, the plaintiff

4

and the defendant settled their claims and so that case went

5

the way of the world.
THE COURT:

6

Okay.

And are you saying it's another

7

one where we had a trial court ruling like we did from Judge

8

Bates and Judge Scott?

9

MR. EVANS:

I--it was Judge Bates.

10

THE COURT:

Oh.

11

MR. EVANS:

That--that case has been--

12

THE COURT:

So--

13

MR. EVANS:

--settled.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. EVANS:

By the parties.

16

THE COURT:

And tell me if that has any bearing on

17

It was Judge Bates's case.

Okay.

Great.

what you're doing here today, Mr. Evans.
MR. EVANS:

18

I don't--I don't think so, it was just

19

referenced in the briefing and whether the Court had a

20

question regarding that or not.

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

MR. EVANS:

I don't think it has anything to do with

23

this hearing today.
THE COURT:

24
25

Good.

And let's see, let me hear from

the parties with regard to the motion.
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gentlemen,

2

submit a proposed order as if there--this were a current

3

discovery dispute and dealing with the issues that we

4

currently address in doing so.

5

is inviting you at the close of your argument to

And--and then the Court would--would look at the

6

proposed orders and in all likelihood sign one or--as opposed

7

to the other, but I can't guarantee that, but that's my, at

8

least, initial reaction to it here today.

9

MR. EVANS:

Okay.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

11

And let's hear from the moving

party with regard to this and then proceed on that basis.

12

MR. EVANS:

Okay, your Honor, this is Scott Evans.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

14

MR. EVANS:

I represent IMS,

Intermountain Surgical.

15

And Intermountain Surgical's involvement in this case is

16

minimal at best.

17

Dr. Huntsman.

18

weeks ago.

19

didn't receive any payment of any kind,

20

except arrange for this.

21

They arranged for a surgical consult with

Dr. Huntsman's deposition was taken a couple

IMS

IMS did not do anything other than that.

it didn't do anything

We don't know if the plaintiff had surgery or any

22

other treatment subsequent to,

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. EVANS:

And the--the discovery, as outlined in

25

I believe it was 2014.

the 30(b) (6) deposition notice is--is significant.
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normal circumstances, even if Intermountain Surgical was

2

involved as a treating party to provide services for the

3

plaintiff, the--the discovery that was requested or noticed

4

goes far beyond the pale of what would normally be discovery

5

in a personal injury case such as this.
THE COURT:

6

Tell me, Mr. Evans, how, if--if I were

7

filing a personal injury case and I wanted to get IMS involved

8

to assist me in, what, putting together a package with regard

9

to special damages and future medicals and potentially a--a

10

treating physician, would I check in with you at IMS?

11

what--how that works.

Tell me

MR. EVANS:

Okay.

14

THE COURT:

Well,--

15

MR. EVANS:

--the plaintiffs here--

16

THE COURT:

--your--your clients, yeah.

17

MR. EVANS:

Right.

18

If you were--if you were the plaintiff's attorney--

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

20

MR. EVANS:

--what would occur is, first of all,

12
13

You wouldn't check in with me,

but the--

Right.

Right.

21

they would contact Intermountain Surgical, let them know what

22

the case is about and then provide them with the information

23

that--you know, who the patient is and what--what treatment

24

will be requested and the type of accident and--and so on.

25

And IMS would review it and make a determination of whether or
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not it would want to take on the case.

2

If--if a sur--if a doctor is necessary, if the

3

plaintiff, in fact, doesn't already have one, then they can

4

refer the patient to a doctor.

5

what happened and nothing else happened thereafter.

And in this instance, that's

6

THE COURT:

And did--and did--

7

MR. EVANS:

If, in fact--

8

THE COURT:

--does Dr.--

9

MR. EVANS:

Go ahead.

10

THE COURT:

--does Dr. Huntsman, is he a physician

11

with IMS or does he have his own--

12

MR. EVANS:

No.

13

THE COURT:

--sole practice or practice some place

MR. EVANS:

Dr. Huntsman is a surgeon at the Salt

14

else?

15
16

Lake Orthopedic Center, which is out of St. Mark's Hospital.

17

He is among, oh, a dozen or--or more surgeons in a partnership

18

of some sort, I don't know what their arrangement is per se,

19

but it's like a clinic, they're a clinic.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

MR. EVANS:

And they--they're not associated with

22

Intermountain Surgical, there's no ownership, there's no--

23

there's no shares or anything.

24

you had--if you have neurosurgical associates out there doing

25

surgeries at Intermountain Medical Center, they may or may not
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be employees of IMS--or Intermountain Medi--Intermountain

2

Medical Center, but they're a separate clinic and there's--

3

well, there's no association on it.

4

surgeries wherever they want.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

They can go perform

And so IMS, as I understand it,

6

when they get a--when they arrange for a physician for--for

7

the plaintiff, it--it needn't be a physician from Salt Lake

8

Surgical; is that right?

9

MR. EVANS:

No, it can be--there are several

10

physicians that are--that do surgeries with Intermountain

11

Surgical.

12

can't remember if he's out of TOSH or I can't remember.

For example, Dr. Rich, who's a neurosurgeon,

I

13

THE COURT:

I think he is out of TOSH.

14

MR. EVANS:

Several other doctors, there's a few

15

doctors at Salt Lake Orthopedic that do it, there's a Dr.

16

Winterton, who is not associated, it's just whoever, you know,

17

there's--there's several doctors that regularly do these

18

surgeries--

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

So it's--

20

MR. EVANS:

--by referral.

21

THE COURT:

--on a case-by-case basis, no--no

22

arrangement with a physician or a group of physicians, they

23

make it on an ad hoc basis, the determination?
MR. EVANS:

24
25

Well,

I mean, they have a--a handful of,

you know, maybe--I don't know how many they have on what I
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would call a quote, panel, to choose from, but they're not--

2

you don't have to choose them.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. EVANS:

But they may--

5

THE COURT:

--then if I'm--if I'm the plaintiff and

And then--

6

I decide that I won't get surgery right now, I've at least got

7

a--an estimate as to what my future medicals are going to be

8

if, in fact,

I need surgery at some time in the future.

MR. EVANS:

9

It depends on if the plaintiff's

10

attorney asks for an estimate.

11

and Mr. Cooper knows this, he's taken depositions,

12

Intermountain Surgical is not an expert and doesn't provide

13

expert testimony with respect to how much things will cost in

14

the future, whether it's reasonable and customary.

15

the plaintiff is required to go get the appropriate foundation

16

for that.

17

And recognize this that--and--

That's--

IMS submits bills and using the CPT codes of what it

18

believes is reasonable and customary but it doesn't provide

19

the--the testimony for it, you know.
THE COURT:

20

And tell me, what's the advantage of

21

doing this as opposed to simply going out and--and getting

22

your own physician and--and having them do a medical exam and

23

see if you need further treatment?

24

plaintiff?

25

that they get?
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MR. EVANS:

Well, what the benefit is,

is this:

the

2

services that IMS provides,

3

the ability for people who don't have health insurance to get

4

the treatment they need after an accident.

5

So, for example,

IMS provides financial backing and

if you have a--somebody who's in a

6

car accident and they're seriously injured, they need a back

7

fusion or, you know, a shoulder repair or whatever, but they

8

don't have any health insurance.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

10

MR. EVANS:

That leaves them in a bind and they

11

either have to settle with the--with the opposing party and

12

get the funds needed for surgery or figure out how--what

13

doctors may or may not be able to perform the services for--on

14

a lien basis, what facilities would do it on a lien basis.

15

For the most part, you know, most of the hospitals around

16

usually don't do that.

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

18

MR. EVANS:

So IMS provides--they--they lease a

19

surgical suite from Canyon Crest, which is a surgical center,

20

IMS pays for and purchases the equipment for the surgeries

21

that are performed on these, it would be plaintiffs, but

22

patients.

23

ahead and--I don't know if it's a contract, but the doctor

24

will then perform the surgery, submit the bill, the doctor is

25

paid and--and then the--the anesthesiologist is paid,
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professionals are paid immediately and then a lien is taken on

2

the other stuff, including the amounts paid to the

3

professionals.

4

THE COURT:

So you would--

5

MR. EVANS:

They--

6

THE COURT:

--IMS would finance that and--

7

MR. EVANS:

Correct.

8

THE COURT:

--for, say, the surgery, the costs were

9
10

$10,000, they pay those up front and then either charge some
kind of-MR. EVANS:

11
12

They hold a lien for--they--they don't

charge any interest or anything.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

14

MR. EVANS:

They--they hold the lien and--and then

15

at the end of the case, they're repaid.

And what happens is,

16

because of their relationship with vendors and stuff like

17

that, they can--and they provide the facilities at a

18

contracted rate and so on, they are able to then charge,

19

themselves, as Judge Bates indicated, you have a hybrid here

20

where they're a provider and they also indicate that they help

21

finance, which is not uncommon with medical--

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. EVANS:

--health facilities anyway, so--

24

THE COURT:

And so if--if--

25

MR. EVANS:

So that--none of that's happened here.
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THE COURT:

Okay.

That's--that's simply an option

2

that you could have.

3

MR. EVANS:

(Inaudible) I just--

4

THE COURT:

--I could go in and get surgery and

So I could go--

5

things were set up to do that and assuming the surgery costs

6

$10,000 to pay the anesthesiologist and the--and the

7

neurosurgeon or the orthopedic surgeon and the Canyon Crest

8

and it costs $10,000 total, I have a lien for $10,000, with no

9

interest on that and if it takes three years to finish the

10

case and--and get a recovery, the first ten thousand goes to

11

me--goes to IMS?

12

MR. EVANS:

1
:

Well, it's whatever they were--yes.
I-

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

14

MR. EVANS:

There's a lien that the patient signs as

15

well as the attorney who then--IMS foregoes any kind of

16

collection until after the case is over, so--

17

THE COURT:

And if--if in fact there was no cause or

18

no recovery with regard to the plaintiff's case, is the

19

plaintiff still on the hook for the cost of the surgery at the

20

end of the litigation?

21

MR. EVANS:

Yes.

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

23

MR. EVANS:

There's a contract there that says even

24

if you don't get anything--

25
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MR. EVANS:

--you have a legal obligation to pay.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

Number one, that's helpful for me to sort of get

4

that understanding as to how things work from your

5

perspective.
Tell me what else I should know with regard to the

6

7

protective order and--and the discovery.
MR. EVANS:

8

9

Well, going back to what the discovery

has been requested, what--what they're asking for is stuff

10

that--that has no bearing on--on what--whether the charges are

11

reasonable and customary.

12

And as in the other cases that we've been involved

13

in, the reality of it and in fact,

14

affidavit, what is the basis for reasonable and customary is--

15

is an objective basis, based upon what's been charged in the--

16

in the area.

17

I think we submitted an

So going in and finding out what IMS charges as--

18

what IMS's overhead is or what they pay wholesale for parts or

19

instruments or hardware, has no bearing on whether or not the-

20

-the medical charges that they give are reasonable and

21

customary.

22

THE COURT:

And if I'm an--

23

MR. EVANS:

So--

24

THE COURT:

--if I'm an insurance adjustor, do I

25

care whether the plaintiff gives me a IMS estimate or a--you
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know, costs of medi--future medicals or do I--do I want to

2

have somebody that is a--sort of a third party, has no

3

contractual relationship that--that can give me a medical exam

4

and tell me what future meds are and maybe there's no

5

difference in the costs or the--in the amounts.
MR. EVANS:

6

Well, I mean, there are differences as--

7

as Mr. Cooper will--Cooper will argue, that be--because of the

8

situation where there's no health insurance and because, you

9

know, there's risks involved here, there is no discount given,

10

you know.

If you want to get into the, like the--like the HMO

11

and the PPO and stuff like that, it--Blue Cross, everybody,

12

all the insurance companies have different contracts with

13

different providers saying it doesn't matter what you charge

14

us, we will pay you this amount.

15

THE COURT:

Yeah.

16

MR. EVANS:

And--but none of that's relevant for

17

purposes of trial.

18

pays ten cents on the dollar or IHC gives 90 percent on the

19

dollar from Select Health, the jury doesn't need to know and

20

shouldn't know what that is, that's the collateral source

21

rule.

22

Whether, you know, Medicare or Medicaid

So what--what--what the--the defendants and Farmers

23

are trying to do here is get behind and find out what our

24

business, you know, confidential business records, what our

25

overhead is, how we come to determine what is reasonable and
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customary, when the reality is, all they need is their own

2

expert, which they have, to review the bills and review the

3

records and say this is reasonable and customary, this isn't

4

reasonable and customary, it's too high, you know, but they

5

don't need our confidential, you know, proprietary information

6

that we've compiled to get that--

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

And tell--

8

MR. EVANS:

(Inaudible)

9

THE COURT:

--tell me one other thing.

Tell me

10

about the number of cases.

You've referenced two cases at

11

least that I saw, one that Judge Scott issued a protective

12

order in and another one that Judge Bates ruled on.

13

are you in this kind of litigation regularly or are these the

14

first two and only cases--

And are--

15

MR. EVANS:

Not regularly.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

17

MR. EVANS:

What--what happens is periodically an

18

insurance company gets a burr under their saddle and decides,

19

hey,

20

you know,

21

of the charges and--and the charges are not Medicaid--they're

22

not Medicaid charges or paid by Medicaid and they go in and

23

well, they're really over-charging and so we really want to

24

find out how much it costs them and see what their profit

25

margin is.

Intermountain Surgical is doing it differently than say,
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The reality of that is completely and utterly

2

irrelevant and like we said, but this happens--it happened,

3

oh, about in 2015, Liberty Mutual did that and then a couple

4

of years before, State Farm decided to do that and--and the

5

rulings have all been quite consistent in that, no, collateral

6

source is collateral source.

7

get the overhead information.

8
9

You don't get to go behind and

Judge Bates wiggled a little and allowed them to get
some information about the--the lease between IMS and Canyon

10

Crest but--and that's subject to debate in the order that was

11

given, but the fact of the matter is, this doesn't occur

12

often, it just occurs in flurries when it happens, so--

13

THE COURT:

And do you--did you have a--a ruling and

14

a written opinion from the trial court judge in the Liberty

15

Mutual case or the--the State Farm?

16

MR. EVANS:

That was Judge Scott.

17

THE COURT:

That was Judge Scott.

18

And what about the State Farm case?

19

MR. EVANS:

20

it--it--

21

[Call interruption - unrelated matter]
THE COURT:

22
23

The State Farm one, yeah, we--we did,

Okay.

Mr. Cooper, you were telling me

State Farm had a written opinion--

24

MR. EVANS:

Your Honor, this is Mr. Evans.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
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MR. EVANS:

There is a written--there was a written

2

opinion and I have it--I could, you know, if the Court wants

3

to look at it.

4

Mutual opinion is not applicable because they weren't a party

5

to that action and you know, I can understand what they're

6

saying.

But I could get that to you if you wanted.
THE COURT:

7

8

Farmers has argued that even the Liberty

Well, would it be helpful?

I mean, I'm- ·

-this is a--

9

MR. EVANS:

It's basically the same.

10

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Well, and--and with the same

11

questions--you're telling me what are the same questions, I'm

12

getting different, a little different rulings from the judges,

13

so maybe the--the State Farm ruling may be a little different

14

than Judge Scott or Judge Bates.

15

MR. EVANS:

But in none--in no case did the judge

16

say that they could have the information that they were

17

requesting.

18

they're asking for even tax returns and--and 1099s and

19

things--

20

For example, in our case, my recollection is that

[Call interruption - unrelated matter]

21

MR. EVANS:

Your Honor?

22

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

23

Go ahead, Mr. Evans.

24

MR. EVANS:

25

I think we can--I can brief this down a

little bit more, so that, you know, we're not going to be
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going over lots of stuff that's in the briefing, but the court

2

uniformly says:

3

not relevant; and (2) even if they're a little bit relevant,

4

they're not proportional; and (3) any information that the

5

Court requires Intermountain to produce is protected by a--a

6

confidentiality protective order so it's not disclosed outside

7

of the case, which makes sense, because these are private

8

matters--

Your requests Farmers are not,

(1) they're

9

THE COURT:

Sure.

10

MR. EVANS:

--and--and additionally, beside it being

11

a health care situation where the patient wants to keep their-

12

-their information as private as possible, the--IMS has its

13

own proprietary information that--that shouldn't be disclosed

14

first--in the first place and then if, for some reason it was

15

disclosed or required to be disclosed, it shouldn't be

16

disclosed to anybody else outside of this litigation.

17
18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Good.

And--and I think I

understand your position with regard to that.

19

Let me hear from Mr. Cooper and then give you a

20

chance to respond by way of rebuttal, Mr. Evans, to any other

21

issues that we need to deal with.

22

Mr. Cooper?

23

MR. EVANS:

24

MR. COOPER:

25

Can you all hear me okay?
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the road and I flipped to--from my phone to the speaker system

2

in the car, so I--and I don't know how to get it back off of

3

that.

4

MR. EVANS:

Yeah.

5

THE COURT:

We're just fine,

6

MR. COOPER:

7

All right.

yeah.

Thank you.

Go ahead.
Let me know if

there's a problem.

8
9

I can hear you.

To try to boil this down to the essence, this
discovery is directed at the estimates that Intermountain

10

Surgical, IMS, provided to both of the Buenrostros as to what

11

they would charge, what IMS would charge to finance their

12

surgery and (inaudible)
IMS is a finance company.

13

It's not a medical

14

provider.

15

heard this matter, no discovery had taken place and so he's

16

never seen the fruits of discovery that was undertaken under

17

his order.

18

services that are provided by IMS.

19

possibly three employees, all of which are salesmen.

20

are no medical providers that are on staff for IMS.

21

When Judge Hansen--excuse me, when Judge Bates

That determines that there's absolutely no medical
IMS consists of two,
There

IMS pays the expenses in providing the surgery and

22

then up charges those expenses significantly, two to three

23

times what the actual charges are.

24

interest, it has a significant fee within this estimate or

25

within the bills that it provides if it does actually finance
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the surgery, that more than accounts for interest and as this

2

calls it in its lien papers, the risk of financing these kinds

3

of surgeries.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. COOPER:

6

THE COURT:

So you're telling me-What we're---you're telling me, Mr. Cooper, that if

7

in fact,

I went to Dr. Huntsman and he performed a surgery, it

8

cost a thousand dollars to--for the facility,

9

surgery and for the anesthesiologist and any other personnel,

to--for his

10

that the lien would not be a thousand dollars, but it would be

11

double or triple that amount; is that right?

12

MR. COOPER:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. COOPER:
THE COURT:
MR. COOPER:

That's correct.
Okay.

And how do you know that?

That--that's exact-How--how do you know that?
I--I know that--I know that from having

17

taken the depositions of Dr. Huntsman, IMS and Canyon Crest

18

Surgical Center where they rent the surgical suite for the

19

surgeon to do these surgeries and other cases.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. COOPER:

Okay.
I can't use those depositions in this

22

case, that's why I have to take them in this case because of

23

the protective order entered by Judge Bates in that case.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. COOPER:
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1
2

THE COURT:

--you were allowed to engage in that

discovery by all the courts that you have approached?

3

Did Judge Scott allow you to do that as well?

4

MR. EVANS:

5

MR. COOPER:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. COOPER:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. COOPER:

10

involved in that case,

11

case.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. COOPER:

He wasn't involved in-Your Honor,
Oh,

I--

just--

--haven't been involved-Okay.
--in the other cases.

I was not

I wasn't involved in the State Farm

Okay.
I'm involved in three cases involving

14

Farmers, the one, which is the Garrett case, which is Judge

15

Bates case, this case which involves two plaintiffs and

16

another case, the Bahina case, and I'm sorry, I don't recall

17

the judge off the top of my head.

18

cases.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. COOPER:

21

issued a ruling yet.

22

THE COURT:

23

Those are the only three

And what-The judge in the Bahina case has not

Okay.

So it's under advisement there;

is that right?

24

MR. COOPER:

No.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
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MR. COOPER:

1
2

been scheduled so--

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. COOPER:

5

Okay.
--yours is the second hearing that's

been held in cases that I'm involved in.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. COOPER:

8

It's been briefed and no hearing has

Okay.
And I know of no other cases that

Farmers is involved in.
THE COURT:

9

Thank you for that background.

10

MR. COOPER:

Yeah, absolutely.

11

So we know from those depositions that if allowed to

12

proceed with the 30(b) (6) depositions that were scheduled and

13

that were vacated, I will be able to find out what is the

14

underlying basis for this estimate that IMS provided as the

15

cost of the surgery.

16

no way of knowing.

Until I take those depositions,

I have

I do, however, know that the plaintiff intends to

17
18

use this estimate as the reasonable and customary charges with

19

this kind of surgery that he believes that his clients were

20

going to need in the future.

That's the problem.
'

21

Now, I'm going to make a motion that none of that

22

should come into evidence because it's a collateral source,

23

but unless you have the background, unless I'm entitled--

24

allowed to do the discovery and provide you with the

25

background, you aren't going to know whether this is a valid
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1

medical bill or if it is, as I suggest, simply a financing

2

statement that contains a significant up charge above and

3

beyond the actual cost of the medical treatment.

4

THE COURT:

Well, now, would you know already, Mr.

5

Cooper, if--if say, this was a herniated disc and they were

6

going to trim that disc back and I went to the University or

7

to IHC and had that procedure, it would all be coded and I

8

would know exactly what it is and what the charge is and I

9

would say that's what's reasonable and necessary.

10

Is that

fair?

11

MR. COOPER:

It's a little more complicated than

12

that because--because of anti-trust concerns.

Medical

13

providers, including hospitals, can't exactly share their

14

charges with each other to avoid any charges of price-fixing,

15

but yes,

16

reasonable and customary charge is.

17

that is completely unfair in normal litigation because the

18

plaintiff is simply going to come in and say, well, here's the

19

bill or here's the estimate and they're going to use the IMS

20

estimate.

21

that is not a medical bill, that's a financing charge, the

22

judge or the jury, if it's allowed to go to a jury, is never

23

going to understand the difference between the two.

24

that's why it's important to do this.

I can come up with evidence of what I believe the

25
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1

the Utah Supreme Court or whatever, that these IMS bills are

2

not admissible in evidence, we're going to go through this

3

fight and we're going to have different judges that are going

4

to view this differently and I don't think a judge can make a

5

decision on this unless I'm allowed to do the discovery and

6

get the underlying facts so that the judge has a full picture

7

of what--what the background is and what the underlying facts

8

are for it.
THE COURT:

9

Sounds like all the judges that have

10

addressed this have granted a protective order in some--to

11

some extent, is that true?
MR. COOPER:

12

Well, I know that Judge Bates did.

I

13

know that I've seen the one that came from--the decision that

14

Scott has alluded to in this case, I'm sorry, the name escapes

15

me.

16

idea.

I have never heard of the State Farm case so I have no

17

The problem with those protective orders is that

18

they were done before any discovery was conducted and so

19

nobody had the benefit of understanding what it is.

20

no need for a protective order in this case because the things

21

that are produced by IMS and presumably, it's the same type of

22

information which will be used by IMS to support their

23

estimate here, are simply some bills that they paid.

24

nothing secret about those.

25
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1

discount from somebody, they've never produced any

2

documentation which supports that.

3

then, you know, maybe that's a valid argument but I've never

4

seen the proof of that.

5

Now, if they produce that,

Furthermore, the--the protective order that was

6

entered by Judge Bates, which is completely unworkable, is

7

that it was essentially attorney eyes only.

8

person on the defense side, and my co-counsel, that could even

9

see this information.

I was the only

It made it very cumbersome and very

10

difficult to use it with experts and the like, it required us

11

to go back to court and do that.

12

At the outset, he didn't know what it was that he was going to

13

uncover in discovery.

14

Judge Bates to relieve us from that protective order based on

15

what we actually determined; unfortunately,

16

fortunately,

17

so he never ruled on it.

18

it is wrong and inappropriate to just be restricted, or the

19

information be restricted to essentially an attorney eyes only

20

protective order where me, my staff and my co-counsel are the

21

only people that can see the information.

And we had a motion pending before

the case--or

the case settled before he was able to hear that
But I just absolutely believe that

22

THE COURT:

23

briefed this and--extensively.

24

MR. COOPER:

25

THE COURT:
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1

MR. COOPER:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. COOPER:

--perhaps one---and appreciate.
Yeah.

Perhaps one other thing.

I

4

don't know how significant it is in making your ruling, but

5

Dr. Huntsman is associated with IMS.

6

whatsoever about it.

7

indicated that he goes along with that, that he is a part of

8

their network of physicians.

9

made to him by IMS, that his job is number one, make a

There isn't any question

IMS has testified and Dr. Huntsman has

He knows that when a referral is

10

determination whether the person needs surgery; number two,

11

make an opinion on causation, that is that it's caused by the

12

particular auto accident that has in--insurance associated

13

with it; and third, that he provide all of that in writing as

14

a part of the due diligence that IMS uses in determining

15

whether they're going to finance the surgery.

16

He's testified that he does as many as 60 to 80

17

surgeries for IMS a year and these are full-fee, non-

18

discounted fees.

19

determine causation and necessity of surgeries in these

20

matters.

21

in, there is significant dispute about whether the surgery is

22

even necessary and whether it's even caused by the auto

23

accident in question.

24
25

It's a significant financial incentive to

And in every one of these cases that I'm involved

And so there is a significant association there and
I think that that's something that we're entitled to develop
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1

and use as a part of cross-examination of Dr. Huntsman when he

2

provides these defendants

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. COOPER:

(?) at trial.

And you--I assume, if you had-Thank you, your Honor.

:'

;

THE COURT:

5

6

MR. COOPER:

Well,

I would be at two experts who

were counter to each other but have-THE COURT:

9

10

I

guess, if you did that, where would you be?

7

8

--the old IMEs, the Rule 35 exam now,

That--that's true all the time,

isn't

it?
MR. COOPER:

11

--the plaintiff--well, that's true, but

12

the plaintiff's defense would be to our experts is that, hey,

13

these guys are essentially defense whores.

14

for the defense and they do everything they can to make out

15

the defense case.

They only testify

On the other side of the coin, in this particular

16
17

case,

I should be able to establish that Dr. Huntsman has a

18

significant financial relationship with IMS and that he

19

profits significantly from finding causation and necessity in

20

these cases.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. COOPER:

Good.
Now, when you hear the evidence, you

23

may decide, no, that's unfair; but I should be able to--this

24

is discovery,

25

that I can present it properly to defend my client.
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THE COURT:

1

Okay.

Let's see, you know, my thought

2

is that I want to do two things, one, give Mr. Evans a chance

3

to briefly respond and two, invite the parties to submit

4

proposed orders now that we've honed in a--to some extent as

5

to what the issues are and how we should approach them.

6

Mr. Evans, any rebuttal that you have?

7

MR. EVANS:

8

Yes, a couple of things, I'll jump

around so I don't get terribly redundant.

9

First, as in our briefing, IMS is not going to be an

10

expert in this or any other case.

That's something that has

11

been--is a red herring.

12

not an expert and would not be giving expert testimony with

13

respect to reasonable and customary charges.

IMS has already testified that it's

14

So that if he needs to take the deposition of IMS to

15

get into the underlying whatever with regard to this estimate,

16

it--it's not necessary and it won't matter because they're

17

going to have to provide--"they" being the plaintiff, they're

18

going to have to provide the expert testimony to--for the

19

support of the reasonable and customary.

20

to be IMS.

21

other cases and it's the representations to this Court in our

22

briefing and during this hearing.

23

And it's not going

And--and that's been the testimony of IMS in the

So that--to suggest that they're entitled to dive in ,

24

to IMS's confidential information and--and processes and--and

25

so forth is somewhat internally inconsistent,--
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MR. EVANS:

--for them to say that.

3

THE COURT:

And so--and tell me--tell me with regard

4

to that, Dr. Huntsman, it's been proffered to me that--does

5

approximately 60 to 80 of these cases for IMS a year.

6

MR. EVANS:

Correct.

7

THE COURT:

It sounds like there--

8

MR. EVANS:

That's what he says.

9

THE COURT:

Yeah, that's what he says, right.

10

And--and it sounds like he's at least--has some kind

11

of basis for saying there's a financial relationship between

12

the two, between Dr. Huntsman and IMS.

13

than any of us with regard to that relationship.

14

MR. EVANS:

And you may know more

Well, if I--if I may, there has been

15

representations, both in affidavit and during depositions, by

16

Dr. Huntsman, by IMS, that Dr. Huntsman does not have any

17

ownership interest whatsoever in IMS or Canyon Crest.

18

Now, that doesn't mean that--I mean, you could talk

19

to any orthopedic surgeon and say, well, he does all his

20

surgeries at St. Mark's, therefore, he has a--an association

21

or a relationship with St. Mark's.

22

doesn't need to take our guy's deposition for that, he's got

23

it already from Dr. Huntsman, who has testified that he does a

24

certain number of surgeries, I believe he said 40--whatever,

25

40 to 60, but out of how many surgeries has he done in a year,
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1

I can't remember, but I think it was hundreds and hundreds and

2

hundreds, maybe even a thousand,

3

what he testified to and that--that's not private information,

4

that's not protected by any protective order, it was taken in

5

this particular case only a few weeks ago.

I don't remember specifically

6

THE COURT:

And so--

7

MR. EVANS:

So he can--he already--

8

THE COURT:

--so if--

9

MR. EVANS:

10

THE COURT:

11

Oh, sorry.
And so if Dr. Huntsman appears for a

deposition and would he have all the cases--

12

MR. EVANS:

He already did.

13

THE COURT:

Yeah.

I know--I know that.

Would--was-

14

-would he have in his disclosures, a list of all the cases

15

that he's done in conjunction with IMS that was tendered to

16

the other side?

17

MR. EVANS:

If--if he's a retained expert, then he

18

would have to do that.

I--it depends on if the plaintiff

19

decides to use him as a retained expert or a non-retained

20

expert.

21

THE COURT:

I see.

22

MR. EVANS:

And so--

23

THE COURT:

--what are they using--what's the

24

plaintiff doing here?

25
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. COOPER:

Okay.
They've retained him as an expert and

3

Dr. Huntsman testified that he doesn't even know what his fee

4

for this kind of surgery is and we'd have to take somebody

5

else's deposition.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. COOPER:

Okay.
Then we have to take a 30(b) (6)

8

deposition of one or more people at IMS to get that kind of

9

information--excuse me, at Salt Lake Orthopedics to get that

10

kind of information.

11

THE COURT:

Thank you.

12

MR. EVANS:

Did he--did somebody testify that he was :

13

a retained expert?

14

MR. COOPER:

15

MR. EVANS:

16

the treating expert.

17

18

MR. COOPER:

He's even issued a report.

(Inaudible) said he was--well, that's

He's issued a specific report in this

case and--and represented to be a retained expert.

19

MR. EVANS:

20

MR. COOPER:

21

MR. EVANS:

22

MR. COOPER:

23

Yeah.

deposition.

By plaintiffs?
Yes.
I haven't seen that.
Well,

I hadn't seen it until I took his

It surprised me.

24

THE COURT:

But--well, and I'm--

25

MR. EVANS:

But in any event, then he just--if he is
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1

actually a retained expert then, you know, plaintiff has

2

retained him and they have to obey the rules--the Rules of

3

Civil Procedure, but that has no bearing on this--this hearing

4

because IMS has not been retained as an expert and IMS is not

5

going to be giving expert testimony in this case.

6

So let me--

7

MR. COOPER:

But Dr. Huntsman is relying on the

8

estimates from IMS as the basis for his testimony that that's

9

the reasonable and customary charge for such surgery.

10
11

MR. EVANS:

Well, that's--that has noth--your Honor,

,

that has nothing to do with IMS, that's Dr. Huntsman.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. EVANS:

If they want to impeach--

14

THE COURT:

I--I--

15

MR. EVANS:

--Dr. Huntsman, they can--

16

THE COURT:

I think I understand your respective

17

positions with regard to that.

18

Anything else, Mr. Evans, that I should know?

19

MR. EVANS:

Okay.

Yeah, there was a couple--your

20

Honor, there was a couple more issues--there's about three

21

more items that I needed to--to clarify.

22

With regard to the CPT code question that you asked

23

counsel, of course, you can go and get the CPT codes and--and

\

,

;

24

then ask IHC what they would charge under the CPT code or St.

25

Mark's or--or any other hospital,
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defense attorney and as a plaintiff, and as a patient,

2

frankly.

3

they already have their own experts and they can do their own

4

due diligence anyway.

And it can be done readily and--and easily, so--and

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

And if it--

6

MR. EVANS:

So--

7

THE COURT:

--if that figure's different than IMS,

8

you just have--or Dr. Huntsman, you just have to accept

9

whatever he says-MR. EVANS:

10

No.

What you do is if--if Dr. Huntsman

11

and I don't know this to be true, but if Dr. Huntsman or any

12

other expert for the plaintiff is going to testify that a

13

thousand dollars for this surgery is reasonable and customary,

14

then Farmers has an expert who will testify, no,

15

it's--reasonable and customary is this, or that's way far--

16

that's way higher than what's reasonable and customary.

it's not,

17

THE COURT:

And if Dr. Huntsman--

18

MR. EVANS:

And then--

19

THE COURT:

--if Dr. Huntsman doesn't know what the

20

expenses are and says, you've got to talk to IMS to find that

21

out, what should I do?
MR. EVANS:

22
23

Dr.--all the plaintiff has to do is retain their own expert-THE COURT:

24
25

Well that's actually quite easy because

I have--we--we've talked about that, we-

-we understand that there may be a--
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MR. EVANS:

1

If--if Dr.--if Dr. Huntsman refers to

2

IMS, saying, well, I'm just relying on their estimate and if

3

IMS says, well, we're not an expert here, then the plaintiff's

4

counsel and their expert--or not plaintiff's now, but defense

5

counsel and their expert can impeach Dr. Huntsman quite

6

readily, saying, well, there's no basis for it.

7

own expert who actually is qualified to give the opinions--

8
9
10

THE COURT:

We have our

And is your--your own expert, is that

Dr. Huntsman that said they--he couldn't tell you what any of
the charges are?

Who's the expert?

MR. EVANS:

I'm saying that defense counsel,

13

THE COURT:

Yeah, they've got their--their Rule 35--

14

MR. EVANS:

--they have their own expert--

15

THE COURT:

--exam, okay.

16

MR. EVANS:

Right.

11

12

Farmers--

They have--they have their own

17

expert who is going to comb through the CPT codes, comb

18

through the charges and say, look, in the Salt Lake area,

19

these--this--this surgery, the 75th percentile or whatever

20

they want to call it, is such-and-such an amount and that's

21

what's reasonable and customary by comparing all the hospitals

22

and all the surgical centers--

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MR. EVANS:

--that perform this surgery.

25

THE COURT:

--but if I wanted to find out what the
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1

numbers were behind the IMS services and Dr. Huntsman, Dr.

2

Huntsman's been deposed and it's at least been represented to

3

me by Mr. Cooper, that Dr. Huntsman didn't know what the

4

charges and expenses would be associated with the procedures

5

in this matter and that you would have to ask someone else

6

other than him.

Who would that someone else be?

MR. EVANS:

7

Well, first of all,

I disagree with what

8

his--his argument is, if Dr. Huntsman doesn't have the ability

9

to testify to what's reasonable and customary, you'll have to

10

talk to somebody else, then Dr. Huntsman's--I mean, he's not

11

the expert.

12

and--nor will we be designated--

13
14

THE COURT:

And that--I understand that.

I

understand that.

15
16

We have not been designated as a retained expert

MR. EVANS:

Therefore, the estimate is just an

estimate.

17

When somebody comes to our client, IMS, and says,

18

you know, how much do you think this will cost in the future?

19

It's an estimate, it's not--it's an estimate based upon our,

20

you know, our experience and how we do things, but--

21

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

MR. EVANS:

--we are not experts and I just don't

23

understand the logic of, well, Huntsman says that you'll have

24

to go somewhere else and he's relying on--on this other--this

25

estimate, then that means he's not really an expert in
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reasonable and customary.

That's just--I--I just don't--it

2

doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. EVANS:

That--that they would then need to go

5

depose--they could go depose IHC or St. Mark's, for that

6

matter, because if--if Dr. Huntsman says, well, I think that

7

St. Mark's charges about a thousand dollars, you might want to

8

ask them, well, does that give them the right to go depose St.

9

Mark's or IHC or--

10

THE COURT:

Yeah.

11

MR. EVANS:

I don't--I don't think that works.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

I've gone a half hour more than I should have on this--

14

MR. EVANS:

15

THE COURT:

17
18

And you know, I--I'm probably--

MR. EVANS:

There's just one more.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Tell me what it is quickly if you

would, please.
MR. EVANS:

19

I--IMS is a facilities provider.

20

There's a difference between medical professional and medical

21

care providers and a facilities provider.

22

that they are a facilities provider and can make those

23

charges.

24

without merit.

25

And it is clear

So the argument that they're not a provider is

THE COURT:

So they are a facilities provider like a
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1

surgical center or like a hospital?

2

MR. EVANS:

Yeah.

And--and there's an affidavit of

3

a guy in our--our reply brief, who has--David Gilles, who is

4

an expert in the field of medical billing and--and charges and

5

that's all he does and he does it for the Utah Medical

6

Association and--and many others and in his affidavit-[Call interruption]

7

MR. EVANS:

8

9
10

--his affidavit is--his affidavit is

very telling and--and explains the difference between the
facilities and the medical providers, so ...

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Good.

12

Let me ask you, gentlemen, if you'd do this for me.

13

If I gave you a week--do you need more time than that to

14

prepare--

15

[Call interruption]

16

THE COURT:

--to prepare a proposed order with

17

regard to the proportionality of the discovery issues and the

18

protective order?

19
20

MR. EVANS:

I would be able to do it within a week,

your Honor.

21

22

THE COURT:

Okay.

[Call interruption]

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. COOPER:

25

THE COURT:

Other side?
(Inaudible)

Counsel?
1,

I can't-1,
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1

MR. COOPER:

2

THE COURT:

I can, your Honor.

Yes,
Okay.

So if we said that you would

3

submit those proposed orders and they would be filed on or

4

before May 16th at 5:00 p.m.

5

MR. EVANS:

Okay.

6

THE COURT:

Great.

7

MR. EVANS:

Thank you.

8

THE COURT:

Thanks, Counsel.

9

MR. EVANS:

Bye-bye.

10

THE COURT:

Court's in recess.

11

MR. COOPER:

12

THE COURT:

13
14
15

Thank you, your Honor.
Court's in recess on the 1:30 matter.

[Operator:
MR. COOPER:

Leaving the meeting:

Gary Cooper.

[Operator:

Leaving the meeting:

16

MR. EVANS:

Scott Evans.

17

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

18
19
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 8, 2016)
THE COURT: We're back on the record.

3

Counsel and the

4

parties-- I guess Counsel's present.

5

here, do we?

6

I've looked at the exhibits, I've considered some of the case

7

law.

We don't have any parties

All right, I have -- I read through the briefing,

I've heard argument.

8

This is a really, really interesting issue.

9

I understand has made its way around the courthouse a little

It's one

10

bit.

11

gets appealed, but I think it would be really interesting to

12

see this one get in front of one of our appellate Courts,

13

because I think we really have found a somewhat novel niche

14

in the collateral source rule in the way we conduct discovery

15

in these cases where there are some medical bills that need

16

to be dealt with.

17

It's one I -- I mean, I've never really hope something

So I am

I am going to grant the statement of

18

discovery issues in part and I'm going to deny it in part.

19

I'm going to allow some limited discovery that is on these

20

subpoenas; and first, let me make a record of sort of how I

21

view things and how I'm applying facts in the law of this case.

22

Then what I'd like to do is just walk through each of these

23

subpoenas and I'll identify what I'm going to allow and what

24

I'm not going to allow.

25

Mr. Cooper, since this is -- this is kind of your
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1

burden, and you're the one seeking discovery, I'll ask you to

2

put together an order when we're all done with this.

So --

3

MR. COOPER: Okay, I'll try --

4

THE COURT: -- you need to pay a little more attention

5

than they do.

6

MR. COOPER: -- I'll try to follow closely.

7

THE COURT: Okay, so if we start with Rule 26, Rule 26

8

allows discovery into any matter that is relevant to a claim or

9

defense and that is not privileged.

As I understand the word

10

"privileged" as it's used there, I don't believe we've had any

11

claims that this is privileged in that sense; that it's a, you

12

know, Rule 500 privilege or fits the privilege that's in Rule

13

26.

14

of defense, and then is it proportional.

So it's just -- the question is, is it relevant to a claim

15

Under that analysis

it seems there are sort of two

16

big things that the Court considers in determining whether or

17

not this is relevant to a claim or defense and whether it's

18

proportional.

19

is sought would be excluded by the collateral

20

source rule at trial.

21

not necessarily a per se of reason not to allow in discovery,

22

but it seems to weigh against allowing it where it puts a

23

burden on the non-parties.

24

25

The first is whether any of the evidence that
collateral

The fact that it would be excluded is

The other aspect is simply a Rule 26 proportionality
analysis.

Looking at the fact that these are non-parties, and

-3-

1

looking at the factors in Rule 26(b), you know, whether it's

2

reasonable in the case weighing the benefits and the burdens,

3

whether it's consistent with the case management order, whether

4

it's not duplicative, whether the defendants can get it from

5

some other source and whether they've had any opportunity to

6

get it from somewhere else.

7

I've looked at.

8
9

So those are kind of the two areas

With respect to the collateral source rule, this is a
rule that basically states that the tort fees or may not reduce

10

his damages by the amount that a plaintiff will receive from

11

some other source.

12

agree that IMS is a collateral source; that they are providing

13

a benefit to the plaintiff in this case.

14

ing a way for him to pay for these injuries and the costs --

15

and the costs he's incurred.

In that sense I think the parties seem to

That they are provid-

16

It's different than -- different than you have other

17

insurance and I'll get into that difference a little bit, but

18

IMS is collateral source; and really what the collateral -- the

19

most primary collateral source evidence here, which I think has

20

already really been disclosed, is the evidence of a financial

21

relationship -- of the financial relationship between IMS and

22

the plaintiff in this case.

23

That is really the collateral source evidence here

24

that should not come in at trial when we get there, because I

25

don't think the jury needs to know or should know, just as they
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1

don't -- shouldn't need to know that insurance paid for some-

2

thing, they don't need to know about whatever the financial

3

arrangement is between IMS and the defendant, whether that bill

4

will ever be paid, whether it's paid in installments, whether

5

interest is accruing or not, and the fact that IMS has a lien

6

on the judgment -- any judgment that's obtained so that they

7

can get their -- their money back.

8

real primary collateral source evidence.

9

That seems to me to be the

Of course, as I said, it seems like some of that has

10

already been discovered.

11

fit that category, some of these bills, in the right context,

12

might lead to the inference that there is a financial relation-

13

ship between the plaintiff and IMS, but I think that's some-

14

thing that can be dealt with, if needed, with, you know, pre-

15

trial orders and motions in limine or whatnot.

16

Other -- other evidence that might

So as far as the bulk of these -- of what's requested

17

here in these two subpoenas, I don't find that the collateral

18

source rule by itself bars really any of this from discovery

19

at this stage in the litigation.

20

trial, but as far as discovery goes, I don't find that that

21

rule by itself bars it.

22

It certainly may bar it come

However, when it comes to the question of the burden

23

that is being put on non-parties, I think that's a different --

24

a different question, a little more difficult question.

25

subpoenas do ask for a great deal of very expansive information

These
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1

including tax records for the entire year of 2015.

2

when I weigh the proportionality and the relevance of those,

3

I don't find that discovery on those issues is proportional or

4

necessary in this case.

5

Those,

The real question here is I think the extent to which

6

the defense is allowed to dig into the costs and sort of behind

7

the scenes numbers of a medical provider.

8

is a collateral source, it also is a medical provider.

9

they seem to say that they aren't in their financial disclosure

Here, IMS, while it
I know

10

but the fact is they're telling me that they -- that they have

11

a leased surgical space, that they own the equipment in that

12

surgical space.

13

ple roles in this.

14

or at least coordinate medical services, and the other is to

15

provide financial services.

So I think IMS appears to have a mul -- multiOne of which is to provide medical services

16

So the question is under Rule 26, to what extent can

17

the defendants dig into the costs and whatnot that IMS incurs

18

in providing these services.

19

involving, you know, payments by Select Health or Blue Cross

20

or something like that, I think the answer would be a little

21

different here, because we've got

22

blished practices, we've got lots of case law that generally

23

you don't get too far in the night.

24

they are, and then you compare them to what is allowed in the

25

-- what is reasonable in the community.

Were this a traditional case

we've got some well esta-

Simply take the bills as
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1

This case is a little different because we all know,

2

sitting here, that there is a financial arrangement and that

3

IMS is

4

IMS is augmenting these costs to account for the fact that

5

they're covering the plaintiff's bills and providing essenti-

6

ally a collateral source for him.

7

appears to me, at least there is some evidence that

So it seems to me in this unique case, that it is

8

appropriate to allow the defense to get behind that initial

9

bill and look a little bit deeper.

10

analogy with

11

was somewhat helpful.

12

This seems to me -- the

that Mr. Kendall provided with Select Health

I mean, it seems to me that if the defense came in

13

and simply laid out the Select Health bill and said, "That's

14

all we're -- that's all we should have to pay," that when in

15

reality the bills behind the Select Health bill that the

16

providers had charged were much greater than that, you know,

17

that we wouldn't be -- nobody would be showing the Select

18

Health bill to the jury.

19

bills.

20

the collateral source bill is allegedly higher than what was

21

charged by the providers.

22

We'd be looking at the providers'

I think that the same reasoning applies here, where

So with that in mind, here's what I'm going to allow.

23

Starting with the subpoena to Canyon Crest Surgical Center,

24

in paragraph No. 1, I am -- I am going to order Canyon Crest

25

Surgical Center to turn over any invoice or bill they may have
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1

given to IMS for a charge for the surgery that was performed on

2

the plaintiff on the date in question here.

3

What I'm essentially going to be ordering as we go

4

through these is I'm going to order the non-parties here to

5

basically turn over their file as it pertains to Mr. Javier

6

Vigueras Amezcua, the plaintiff in this case.

7

to allow that second one there.

8

the check be turned over right -- I don't know that that's

9

pertinent or necessary.

10

So I am going

I'm not going to require that

I think it's sufficient that the bill

was sent, and that should be the defendant (inaudible).

11

With No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, I'm going to grant that

12

the motion -- the objections and the protective order and the

13

discovery statement with respect to those, I'm not going to

14

order Canyon Crest to turn over any of its financial documents

15

beyond what is pertinent to the plaintiff in this case.

16

of the tax records that have been requested for 2015 I'm not

17

going to require them to turn over.

18

MR. COOPER: Did you say 2 through 7, Judge?

19

THE COURT: Nos. 2 through 7.

So all

I am not going to order

20

those to be turned over.

21

subpoena.

22

be rather un-burdensome to turn over, if in fact they exist.

23

They do go somewhat to the bias that the defendant is alleging.

24

I assume that these are stock forms, again if they exist, that

-25

Canyon Crest keeps around and shows to a patient when they come

I'm going to strike those from the

With respect to 8, 9, 10 and 11, those seem to me to
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1

in.

2

relationship, but to the extent that those forms may exist,

3

I'll direct that they be turned over to the -- to the defense.

They may not exist if there is no ownership or investment

4

Then No. 12, again, I don't see a huge burden on

5

Canyon Crest in turning over its licenses, just copies of its

6

licenses.

7

doesn't seem to me to be terribly burdensome to have them do

8

that.

9

Mr. Cooper -- I'm going to direct the defense in this case to

I don't know how relevant that is at trial, but it

Again, I am also

and if you'll please include this,

10

pay -- to pay reasonable costs in copying this material.

11

you will be -- you will be paying a little bit for -- a little

12

bit for this.

13

So

Moving onto the subpoena for Dr. Huntsman, I'm going

14

to make essentially the same order.

15

he turn over his invoice or bill that he gave to IMS for the

16

surgery.

17

require 2 through 8.

18

I'm going to require that

I'm not going to require the check.

I'm not going to

I'll note with that that at this point where there's

19

been a very clear statement from Dr. Huntsman that he does not

20

have any ownership interest in IMS or Canyon Crest, I don't

21

I think that the burden of digging into his tax records and

22

the invasion of privacy and the burden it would put on him to

23

retrieve and copy those outweighs the -- what I think is really

24

kind of nominal probative value here.

25

If the defense can later on get some evidence to show
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1

that there is some financial relationship beyond just being

2

a doctor and an independent contractor, I will absolutely re-

3

consider that, but for now I'm not going to let anyone get into

4

his tax records or Canyon Crest's tax records.

5

6

Then the same as I did for Canyon Crest, I'm going to
allow 9 and 10 --

7

MR. COOPER: Does that include 8?

8

THE COURT: Yes, so I said 2 through 8 on the subpoena

9

10

to Dr. Huntsman will not be allowed.

Nos. 9 and 10 will be

allowed.

11

MR. COOPER: Well, that was my point. I think it's --

12

No. 8 is the form used to disclose ownership. So it's 2 through

13

7 that are the financial --

14

MR. KENDALL: Not from my notes.

15

THE COURT: My No. 8 says it's a 1099 received --

16

MR. KENDALL: Right.

17

THE COURT: -- by the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic.

18

MR. KENDALL: We're on Huntsman.

19

MR. COOPER: I'm using the ones that he put in, and

20

it's in the other case.

Okay.

21

THE COURT: So and I should be clear.

22

MR. COOPER: I apologize, I'm looking at the wrong

23
24
25

number.
THE COURT: I'm looking at the copies that were
provided in the binder.
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1

MR. KENDALL: Right.

2

THE COURT: At the very beginning, your subpoena duces

3

tecum requesting production.

4

at, but I think I got it from

These are the copies I'm looking

5

MR. COOPER: Yeah.

6

THE COURT: -- plaintiffs and -- or Mr. Evans, were you

7

the one that provided that?

8

MR. EVANS: Yes, and

9

THE COURT: Thank you.

10

those.

That was very helpful to have

Appreciate that.

11

MR. EVANS: You're welcome.

12

THE COURT: Okay, so No. 8 will not be allowed.

No. 9

13

and 10 will be allowed, and then No. 11 and 12 I don't see any

14

relevance in providing those, so I'm not going to allow those.

15

MR. KENDALL: So if I

16

THE COURT: Yes.

17

MR. KENDALL:

my understanding that you were saying

18

No. 9 was not allowed for now unless they can show -- because

19

of the affidavit from Dr. Huntsman saying he doesn't have --

20

THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to let them get into

21

his tax records, but if there is a document that discloses a

22

financial relationship --

23

MR. KENDALL: Oh, okay.

24

THE COURT: --then I'm going to allow that with respect

25

to Intermountain Surgical Center and Canyon Crest.

I think the
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1

defense is entitled to have that.

2

it should not take much to get that document if it exists.

Again, it's a very simple

3

MR. KENDALL: Right.

4

MR. COOPER: Then no on 11 and 12?

5

THE COURT: I think you have it attached to clipboards

6

in the lobby, so --

7

MR. KENDALL: Right.

8

THE COURT: Then what was that?

9

MR. COOPER: Then no on 11 and 12?

10

THE COURT: No on 11 and 12.

Lastly, with the subpoena

11

to Intermountain Surgical, as I understand it, the first three

12

bullets under No. 1 have already been provided.

13

MR. KENDALL: Yes.

14

THE COURT: I'm going to order that -- and now I've

15

got to count here, one, two, three, four, five, six -- so the

16

seventh bullet down, the Canyon Crest Surgical invoice bill

17

for the facility charge, that that be turned over.

18

bullet down, the Salt Lake Orthopedic Clinic, Dr. Kay T. Hunts-

19

man bill, be provided.

20

The ninth

The -- on the next page, which I think now we're at

21

the eleventh bullet point, the anesthesiologist invoice or

22

bill; the thirteenth bullet point which is the physician's

23

assistant invoice or bill; and the fifteenth which is the

24

invoice or bill for any medical services or supplies paid by

25

Intermountain Surgical.

I'm going to order that to be turned
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1

over as well.

2

order that two, three, four or five be turned over.

3

I will not require that -- I'm not going to

So essentially what I'm ordering is that the non-

4

parties turn over their file as it relates to the plaintiff,

5

and I think that the defendants, at least for purposes of

6

discovery, are entitled to at least look at the costs that

7

IMS incurred in coordinating those services for the plaintiff.

8

We're not getting into the tax records at this time, but I

9

think they get to just look at the costs.

10

I am also going to grant the motion for a protective

11

order to the extent that it is seeking to just deem these

12

documents private, and protect -- prevent the parties from

13

disclosing them or using them outside of this litigation.

14

Mr. Evans, I'll ask you to draft up a separate order on that

15

point, a protective order.

16

What I'd like to see is an order that, first off,

17

deems these private, and if they were filed with the Court,

18

they were to be done -- they are to be filed under seal, and

19

the clerk is to be directed to mark them "Private."

20

we usually do that with a motion at the time they are filed.

21

Second, that --

I think

22

COURT CLERK: They're automatic --

23

THE COURT: Are they automatically pre (inaudible)?

24

COURT CLERK: They can put them in prior to putting

25

them in the file.
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1

2

THE COURT: Right, you put them in prior, there's a
motion that's filed, I grant it --

3

COURT CLERK: Right.

4

THE COURT: -- and then they're deemed -- and then

5
6
7

they're marked "Private."
COURT CLERK: You guys mark them "Private."

Don't rely

on me to do that.

8

MR. COOPER: Right.

9

THE COURT: Yeah, okay.

Second, that the documents

10

are not to leave the possession of the attorneys without prior

11

order of the Court.

12

them to an expert or someone like that, then you need to do so

13

by a motion to the Court, Mr. Cooper, okay?

14

15
16

So if you decide that you need to give

MR. COOPER: That's going to be all of these documents
that are produced here?
THE COURT: Yes, all the documents that are produced

17

here, okay?

18

gets these documents, okay?

19

in the case of who is getting these documents. So I'm not going

20

to put up a bit fight if you want to have one of your medical

21

billing experts look at this document, but I want to know, and

22

I want there to be an order in place that protects it when they

23

get it, and that we know who has it.

Essentially I want to make sure that we know who
I want to publi -- I want a record

24

MR. COOPER: That will be part of the protective order?

25

THE COURT: That will be part of the protective order.
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1

MR. COOPER: Okay.

2

THE COURT: Yeah, so the parties are not to disburse

3

these documents outside of their own law firms, their own --

4

their own attorneys.

5

side of this litigation without prior order of the Court, okay?

6

Then once the litigation is concluded, the parties will be

7

directed to either return the documents to the non-parties or

8

to destroy them.

9

10

They are not to be used in any way out-

Anything I missed?

MR. KENDALL: Question on the Intermountain Surgical
subpoena.

11

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

12

MR. KENDALL: We addressed bullet points one, two,

13

three, we've already satisfied.

14

nine, I think eleven, thirteen and fifteen said yes, I'm going

15

to allow it.

Then you went through seven,

16

THE COURT: Yeah.

17

MR. KENDALL: I take that to mean, then, for example,

18

four,

five, six --

19

THE COURT: Yes.

20

MR. KENDALL: -- you're not allowing?

21

THE COURT: So basically I'm allowing the invoices for

22

Canyon Crest, Dr. Huntsman, the anesthesiologist, the physi-

23

cian's assistant, and then sort of the catchall here for any

24

medical services.

25

I'm not going to require that the checks be turned
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1

over, and I'm not going to require that they provide invoices

2

for any of the medical -- the Med Ser supplies or the DME

3

supplies.

4

seems to me to be something that is commonly used across the

5

board with lots of providers.

6

Part of the reason for not requiring those is that

I'm sure there is plenty of information out there

7

about what these generally cost.

Your experts probably know

8

what they cost.

9

IMS turn over its invoices on that -- on that particular point.

10

I think the relationship between IMS and Canyon Crest,

11

Salt Lake Orthopedic, the anesthesiologist, I think the defense

12

does need to at least see the bills, the invoices that went

13

back and forth, so they can see what's going on.

So I don't think we need to -- we need to have

14

Okay, anything else?

15

MR. COOPER: Two things.

Because this motion to compel

16

did not result in the provision of the medical records them-

17

selves, because I've already disbursed those to experts --

18

THE COURT: Okay, and that's fine.

19

MR. COOPER: -- so I'm assuming that that's not --

20

THE COURT: That's fine.

21

MR. COOPER: -- considered to be a violation, your

22
23

Honor?
THE COURT: No, what I'm worried about here are what I

24

see as the non-parties proprietary business records.

25

records that given -- given their business model, I suspect

These are
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1

they have some interest in keeping quiet how much they're

2

paying their partic -- you know, Canyon Crest and the doctor.

3

That's something they -- those are relationships they've devel-

4

oped, and I think that while you're entitled to look at them, I

5

don't want them disbursed outside to anybody else without them

6

knowing who it's going to and having a protection in place.

7
8

MR. COOPER: The next issue really is just to prevent
us from having to come back here, and that is this

9

THE COURT: Oh, we're coming back here, I'm sure, but--

10

MR. COOPER: Well, with this

11

THE COURT: -- let's minimize the number of times we

12

can.

13

MR. COOPER: Exactly, and I mean, we've already heard

14

that as between Canyon Crest and IMS, I think they're telling

15

us that there is no bill.

16

it by subpoena, am I going to be prohibited from deposing some-

17

body at Canyon Crest and IMS to try to et to the difference

18

between the costs and the finance charges?

So even though I'm not going to get

19

THE COURT: Right.

20

MR. COOPER: This is the biggest issue in the case.

21

THE COURT: Right.

22

You're kind of asking me to sort of

pre-rule

23

MR. KENDALL: Right, I was going to say --

24

THE COURT: -- on something?

25

MR. KENDALL: -- we don't give advisory opinions, do

-17-

1

we?

2

THE COURT: Well, they don't.

3

MR. KENDALL: Okay.

4

THE COURT: I sometimes do just to help move the case

5

along.

6

MR. KENDALL: We would object, of course --

7

THE COURT: Sure.

8

MR. KENDALL: -- for the same reasons.

9

THE COURT: Sure.

10

MR. KENDALL: Yeah.

11

THE COURT: Sure.

I imagine you probably would.

My

12

intent with this ruling today was to allow Mr. Cooper and his

13

client to at least understand a little bit the costs.

14

want them getting down onto a line-by-line, but at least know,

15

you know, this is how much it costs -- it actually costs IMS to

16

have that surgical room.

I don't

17

As I was looking at the subpoenas and looking at the

18

briefing, it occurred to me that there may not be a charge or

19

an invoice for this particular surgery, especially when you

20

told me that this was -- they had exclusive use of a surgery

21

room at Canyon Crest.

22

MR. KENDALL: Right, it's a lease.

23

THE COURT: It's probably a year-long lease, is what I

24
25

would guess, or a lease.
MR. KENDALL: Whatever it is.
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1

THE COURT: So I-- here's what -- what I would probably

2

be inclined to rule, just so you know.

3

front of me is I would -- I would likely allow Mr. Cooper to

4

ask an IMS witness

5

I would allow him to inquire into if there is a cost associated

6

-- if there's an identifiable cost related to this specific

7

surgery.

8

something like that, then I would definitely allow that.

Based on what I have in

maybe if it was like a 30(b)-6 witness

So if this was leased for a few hours or a day or

9

If the question -- if there's no way to separate that

10

out -- and what we're talking about is a lease for a period of

11

time -- we'll probably have to come back and have a chat about

12

that.

13

I'm not sure how to rule on that.
So maybe -- hopefully the two of you can talk a little

14

bit about this, and you know, maybe -- maybe Mr. Evans could

15

proffer what might be said so we know whether or not we need

16

to come back and have another statement of discovery issues.

17

MR. KENDALL: Okay.

18

MR. COOPER: Okay.

19

THE COURT: So I'll leave that to the two of you; but

20

that's -- that's where I'm leaning now, and that was -- that

21

represents sort of the intent of my ruling today, is just to

22

allow Mr. -- if it's -- if there's a very simple bill that

23

Mr. Cooper can look at where he can see the difference between

24

IMS's Canyon Crest's cost and bill and IMS-- not Canyon Crest's

25

costs, but Canyon Crest's costs and IMS's, you know, total
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1

bill, then I think he's entitled to know that.

2

to get more complicated than that, then I think we need to come

3

back and discuss it.

If it's going

4

MR. KENDALL: Okay.

5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

MR. COOPER: No, your Honor.

7

MR. KENDALL: Thank you.

8

THE COURT: Okay, thank you, and enjoy the rest of your

9

day.

All right, anything else?
Thank you.

We'll be in recess.

10

MR. KENDALL: You, too, your Honor.

11

(Hearing concluded)
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PROCEEDINGS
(Exhibit-) O, Exhibit-11, Exhibit-) 4,
Exhihit-15, Exhibit-) 6, Exhihit-17, Exhibit-18,
Exhihit-19, and Exhibit-20 were marked for
identification.)
KADE T. HUNTSMAN, M.D.,
having been first duly sworn to tell the truth,
was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
BY MR. COOPER:
Q. The record should reflect that this is the time
and place for taking the deposition of Dr. Kade Huntsman.
It's being taken pursuant to notice and Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and may be used for all purposes
consistent with those rules.
Would you state your name and professional
address for the record, please.
A. Yes. It's Kade, middle initial T., Huntsman.
And Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic, 1160 East 3900 South,
Suite 5000, Salt Lake, Utah.
Q. And you're an orthopedic surgeon practicing
here in Salt Lake, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen either Ignacio or Esther
Buenrostro in your capacity as an orthopedic surgeon?
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A. Yes. I've seen them both.
Q. I'm going to show you what's been marked as
depositions Exhibit- l Oand -11.
Do you recognize those documents?
A. Yes.
Q. And what do you recognize these as?
A. These - it's a statement of account for
Intermountain Surgical indicating a bill of $500 for
seeing me in consultation, one for both Esther and
Ignacio.
Q. So did you understand, when you saw these two
people, that you were seeing them as a result of a
referral by Intermountain Surgical?
A. I don't know who referred the patient to see
me, but I assume that we knew that there was involvement
of Intermountain Surgical at the time I saw the patient,
but I don't know who referred them to me.
Q. And I asked you to bring your files today and
you've brought those. You have one on Ignacio and one on
Esther, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you saw them, did you see them together or
separately?
A. I don't recall. I think I saw them on the same
day, but I don't know if I saw them together in the same

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q. Do you perform all of those surgeries at Canyon
Crest Surgical Center?
A. No. The vast majority of them are done there.
Q. When you say "vast majority," can you give us
an idea?
A. 90-plus percent.
Q. Why?
A. Why what?
Q. Why do you perform them at Canyon Crest rather
than some other facility?
A. I would assume that Intermountain has a
relationship with Canyon Crest, and so they have a
complete setup for me to do spinal surgery out there; so
we take the patients out there for those cases that we
deem appropriate for that setting. If it's a bigger
case, then we'll take that patient to a hospital.
Q. And if you take it to a hospital, do you
generally do it here at St. Mark's or does it vary?
A. Generally here at St. Mark's.
Q. What is the relationship when you see these
patients on a consultation basis when you do this
surgical consult? Do you -- are they your patients at
that point, or are you just doing it to perform a
consultation for Intermountain Surgical?
A. They're my patients at that point.

Page6

Page8

room or not.
Q. What is your relationship with Intermountain
Surgical?
A. I see some patients that they pay the bills
for, and we do some surgeries that they pay the bills
for.
Q. So these bills that I've marked as Exhibit- I0
and -11, based on those bills, do you believe that
Intermountain Surgical paid your consultation fee of $500
and then billed somebody else for it?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. How many patients do you see for
Intermountain Surgical a year?
A. I've -- I don't keep track of that. I'd have
to go back and sort through it. But I would guess 60,
70, 80 patients a year.
Q. And then do you perform surgeries on at least
some of those patients that you see?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have an estimate of how many surgeries
you've performed on patients that lntermountain Surgical
is involved in?
A. Same thing. I've never counted, but I would
guess that it's maybe on half or two-thirds of those, so
probably, I don't know, 40, 50.

Q. When you performed the evaluations on Ignacio
and Esther Buenrostro, did you understand that the
3 purpose was to determine whether or not surgery would be
4 performed?
A. When I'm seeing any patient, including patients
5
6 Esther and Ignacio, I see them and make recommendations
7 as to treatment options. That's the purpose of the
8 visit. So if - that includes, you know, surgery, if
9 needed.
10
Q. Do you understand that Intermountain Surgical
11 finances surgeries for people?
12
A. I don't know exactly what their business
13 arrangement is, but I know that they pay these bills.
14
Q. And so do you know that your surgical
consultation
is a part of their vetting process or due
15
diligence
to
determine
whether or not they're going to
16
17 finance the surgery for these people?
18
A. I don't know how that works.
19
Q. When you see a patient for lntermountain
20 Surgical, you know that as a part of that evaluation is
21 to make a causation opinion, correct?
22
A. Yes.
23
Q. And so when you saw Ignacio and Esther, you
24 knew that part of the request from lntermountain Surgical
25 was that you evaluate whether or not this was related to

~lin-U-Scri pt ~i~;

801.484.2929

1

2

Q & A Reporting, Inc.

(2) Pages 5 - 8

BUENROSTRO v.
NESBITT

KADE T. HUNTSMAN
April 27, 2017
Page9

Page 11

an accident that they were involved in on June 27th of
2011?
3
A. That's accurate.
4
Q. Okay. How do you get this infonnation in
5
advance of the surgical consultation?
6
A. I don't get the information myself in advance
7 until I'm about to walk into the patient's room and my
8 office staff, who schedules appointments, will let me
9 know that this is a patient that I need to make that
10 determination on, a causation determination.
11
Q. Okay. So in this case, the accident in
12 question is one that happened on June 27th of 2011, and
13 you were seeing them over three years later, on
14 December 15th of2014; so did you know that that -- that
15 it was an accident that happened on June 27th of 201 I
16 that you needed to evaluate causation?
17
A. Yes.
18
Q. And that's -- again, how did you know that?
19 Was there a form or something that came with the patient
2 o so that you knew that this was the accident?
21
A. I'm notified by my office, as I'm going in the
22 room, that the patient is here and needs me to determine
23 causation. And so as I go in to see the patient, I find
24 that information out. And I go in, and I talk to the
25 patient and sort through all of those issues, and then

A. I don't.
Q. Do you still have those records?
3
A. I'm sure that my office does. I don't know.
4
Q. Who provided those records to you?
5
A. I believe they're the attorney for Esther or
6
Ignacio.
7
Q. When?
8
A. I'm not certain. Within the last month or so.
9
Q. Okay. Did you issue a report on either one of
10 them with those records?
11
A. I did.
12
Q. And is that record in the file?
13
A. No, it's not. It's not in the office chart.
14
MR. COOPER: Do you have that?
15
MR. BOULTON: Do I have his report?
16
MR. COOPER: Yes.
17
MR. BOULTON: Yes.
18
MR. COOPER: Can I see that?
19
MR. BOULTON: Sure. I'm surprised you don't
2 o have these.
21
MR. COOPER: Yeah. Me, too.
22
MR. BOULTON: I believe we've disclosed those.
23
MR. COOPER: I don't remember seeing these, so
24 whatever. Are these copies that I could mark as
25 exhibits?

1

2

1
2

Page 10

Page 12

come to a determination.
Q. In the case oflgnacio and Esther, were you
3 provided records from any other providers?
4
A. Not at the time that I'd seen them, with the
5
exception of Brent Felix, who works in this office as
6 well. His chart and my chart are the same, and Esther
7
had seen Dr. Felix in the past; so I had his records.
8
Q. So on Esther's file that you brought with you,
9
do you have Dr. Felix's records as well?
10
A. Yes.
11
Q. Okay. Are these your original files or did you
12 make copies?
13
A. These are original files.
14
Q. All right. I'm going to mark those. After the
15 deposition, we'll make arrangements to make copies, and
16 I'll mark them as exhibits at that time.
17
So to get back to my question, I'm not sure I
18 totally understood it, did you get records from any
19 providers other than Dr. Felix on Esther?
2o
A. At the time of that visit, no, I did not.
21
Q. Did you at any other time?
22
A. I did get some records later on, and I can't
23 remember ifit was on Ignacio or Esther, about some
24 previous conservative treatment that they had had.
25
Q. Do you have those records in your file?

MR. BOULTON: Yeah. I have copies, obviously,
at my office. Those are the only ones I have today, but
3
we could use them as exhibits.
4
MR. COOPER: Okay. Great.
s
(Exhibit-21 and Exhibit-22 were marked for
6
identification.)
7
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Okay. I've marked two
8 reports here, one as Exhibit-21, which is on Esther, and
9 the other, which is Exhibit-22, which is on Ignacio.
10
Are those the two reports that you authored
11 recently on the Buenrostros?
12
A. Yes.
13
Q. If you don't mind, if I can just take a look at
14 these real quick. Thank you.
15
Did you use interpreters or an interpreter when
16 you evaluated either or both of the Buenrostros?
17
A. I don't recall. It's fairly common with
18 Spanish speakers that we have an interpreter help us, but
19 I don't recall specifically here.
20
Q. Did the Buenrostros fill out a history form or
21 any kind of thing like that to help you in evaluating the
22 history?
23
A. Yes. They both did.
24
Q. Okay. Do you know whether they filled it out
25 or somebody else helped them fill it out?

1
2
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1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20

21

22
23
24
25

A. I don't know how that was filled out.
Q. Could I see it in their files?

Page 15

A. No.
Q. It's the same sort of form that you have on
Esther?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Is that the only intake history form
that you have for both of them?
A. Yes. There's a questionnaire and then there's
another page; so there's basically two forms.
Q. Okay. I've marked the report that you prepared
as Exhibit-14. I think you have it there in front of
you. You can -- and this is on -- we'll take Esther
first. How much of this was taken from the forms as
opposed to getting a verbal history from them?
A. I get the verbal history from them, and then
that information is combined with the information on the
form. I don't know what percentage it is, but it's
basically a -- both sets of information that are included

from a pinched nerve in their neck that shoots down into
their arm. If it gets a little bit more severe, that can
3 become numbness, and that can become weakness as well.
4
So we're looking at three different things: pain,
5 numbness, and weakness.
6
Q. And in her case, did you understand that it was
7 pain rather than numbness or weakness that was the
8 primary complaint that she had?
9
A. I documented in my note that she had some
10 numbness as well. But my understanding was that her
11 biggest complaint was the pain.
12
Q. And where did you understand that she had
13 numbness, or where did you document that she had
14 numbness?
15
A. On page 3 of my note it says sensation in left
16 arm decreased in the C6 and C7 nerve root distributions.
17
Q. In that same note you say, "She is very clearly
18 decreased in C7. 11
19
What does that mean versus decreased? What's
2 o the significance?
A. We're trying to make sure that what we're
21
22 seeing on an MRI scan or X-ray is consistent with what
23 the complaints of the patient are. And she was
24 complaining of a very specific distribution of the pain,
2 5 which correlated well with the C7 nerve root.
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1
2

A. Yes. This is Ignacio's. And there's a few
pages behind that first page that the patient fills out.
Q. The handwriting on that form, is it all
Ignacio's?
A. I don't know.
Q. Is it any of it yours?

1

here.

1

2

Q.

2

3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Would you just explain how you prepared that,
then? Is this you dictating this report, or is there
somebody else that incorporates some of this information
into your report?
A. Some of this information gets put into the
report based on that form in the back, and then as I
dictate, it fills in the rest of the template. So I
dictate certain boxes on an electronic medical record
that then creates the report.
Q. Under "Chief Complaint" in Esther's, you state
that she had a sudden onset of, I guess, symptoms. When
you say "sudden onset" in relationship to this accident
that happened on June 27, 2011, what does that mean?
A. It means that shortly after the accident she
began to have pain; so it isn't something that happened
slowly over a period of time. It was relatively soon
after the accident.
Q. Did she tell you how soon after the accident
that she had the onset of pain?
A. I don't recall.
Q. In your report, you state that she had pain.
And then down lower under "Chief Complaint" you say "no
arm numbness." Can you explain that?
A. It's very possible for patients to have pain
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Q. But when you say it's clearly decreased in C7,
does that mean some really significant decrease?
A. It means it's significant, yes, but it also
means that it's very clear-cut, that it's not - the
opposite of the situation would be somebody that says,
you know, "My arm is numb," butthey can't really tell
you exactly where on the arm it's numb.
Q. Okay. In the records that you were provided
recently, did you get a copy of the ER report from
August 1st of 2011?
A. I believe I did, yes.
Q. Okay. I'm going to show you what's been marked
as Exhibit-15. Is that a document that you've seen
previously?
A. Yes.
Q. You, then, read the portion of Exhibit-15 that
relates to "History of Present Illness"?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you ascribe any significance to the fact
that she said that after a chiropractor visit last
Thursday, which would be the Thursday before
August 3rd -- or August 1st of 2011, that two days later
she had much worsening symptoms in the left arm,
especially pain in the left neck?
A. Yes. I see that.
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Q. Is that significant to you in terms of
causation?

1
2

A. It indicates that she had some symptoms prior
to this emergency report.
Q. Yes, but it also indicates that they became

severe enough now that she went to the emergency room
after a chiropractor visit. Is that significant in terms
of causation?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And why is it significant?
A. It just indicates that she had had some pain,
like I said, after going to the chiropractor; so it's
another contributing factor to her having neck and arm
pain.
Q. The chiropractor adjustment is?
A. Possibly, yes.
Q. Okay. And so in terms of determining whether
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something is related to the auto accident, how did you
take this into account?
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A. Well, she had the auto accident. I'm trying to
see the date of that accident.
Q. It's June 27th of 2011.
A. So my understanding, from discussing this with
her, was prior to that she didn't have any problems.
After that she's having problems and she's seeking
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A. Ifshe...
Q. If she hadn't complained of left hand and arm
symptoms until after the adjustment or adjustments?
A. That could be significant information, yes.
Q. Okay. And why would it be significant?
A. If that's the case and she truly didn't have
any, then it would make me think that possibly the
chiropractor did more aggravation.
Q. At page 2 of your report, you identified and
described her neck rotation and forward flexion.
A. Yes.
Q. Are those all normal?
A. Her neck rotation is a little bit less than
normal but not much, and the forward flexion was normal.
Q. And then am I not seeing it? Was there -- did
you evaluate her extension?
A. No.
Q. Why?
A. I did evaluate it. I should clarify. Part of
the next line there it says "Spurling's test." And the
Spurling's test is where you extend the neck and put
compression on it to see if you can pinch the nerve root.
And in her case, it was strongly positive. In other
words, if I put her into extension, her arm would hurt.
Q. And was it her left arm that did?
Page 20

Page 18

3

treatment. And a chiropractic visit made those symptoms
worse.
Q. And so could the chiropractor have aggravated

4

her condition?

4

5

A. Yes. It's possible that the chiropractor
aggravated her condition.
Q. Okay. Were you able to determine this late in
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the game how much of her present condition was due to
that aggravation versus the auto accident?
A. Well, I think it's a minor contributor because,
of course, she's seeking treatment from the chiropractor
in the first place because of the problem. And now he's
made it worse. And then any of these injuries like this
wax and wane; so they get worse, they get better, they
get worse, they get better. That's just routine. And so
I take all that into consideration. And there's a slight
possibility that the chiropractor made her situation
worse, but my understanding was that that would be for a
short period of time.
Q. And did you review the chiropractor's records?
A. I did.
Q. And do you recall that she didn't complain of

any left arm or hand symptoms to the chiropractor?
A. I don't recall that.
Q. Would that be significant to you?
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A. I would assume so, but all I said in that
section was that it was positive; so it was causing arm
pain.
Q. On the next page under "Reflexes," you identify
the Hoffmann's test, and you say it's strongly positive.
Explain how you detennine a finding on a Hoffmann's test?
A. So what we're looking for in a situation like
this with severe stenosis is if there are any reflex
changes, and she had definite reflex changes. A
Hoffmann's test is where you flip a finger- kind of
flick the finger and watch for a reflex in the thumb.
And I could make her thumb jump quite easily by just
flicking a different finger. That's a reflex that's
pathologic.

Q. For irritation where?
A. Of the spinal cord.
Q. At the time you saw Esther, did you have
Dr. Felix's notes -A. Yes.
Q. -- available?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. I marked what I think are Dr. Felix's records
as Exhibit-16. Are those the same records that you had?
So Dr. Felix saw her, what, about three years before you
saw her?
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A. Correct.
Q. When he saw her, one of the things that he

1
2

noted was that her ann pain is in the entire ann and
radiates to the hand, including the ring and small
s finger. Now, that's somewhat different than what she
6 complained to you because it was middle and ring finger
7 when she saw you, correct?
3

3

4

4

8

A. Correct.
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Q. What's the significance of that, if any?
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A. It's a little bit of a different nerve
distribution. It's very close to the same, but just a
slightly different nerve distribution.

10
11
12

Q. So in her case, is it significant that this is
changed over a period of three years?
A. No. I would expect it to change over that much

13

time. And she has problems at multiple levels; so it's
not surprising that she's got some different levels of
nerve impingement at different times, depending on which
nerve root happens to be irritated at that point.

16

Q. And then he also noted that she reports
numbness in the inside of the ann and in the outside of
the hand, and she does not report any weakness. Is that
similar to the findings that you made?
A. Yes. It is similar.
Q. He also discussed her sensation findings. He

14
15
17

A. It depends. So a nerve conduction study it,
early on, will be negative, and then later will become
positive. And it's only good to measure how much motor
loss there is. So there has to be gross loss of motor
function before they're able to pick anything up. So you
can have a lot of pain and numbness before -- excuse me
- and still have a normal EMG and nerve conduction
study.

Q. So when you got these records recently, did you
see this EMG report of January 24th of 2012?
A. Yes.
Q. And it does show that there is no evidence of

active or chronic denervation changes that are sometimes
observed in cervical radiculopathy, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Did she have another EMG/NCV later?
A. Not that I'm aware of.

Q. And I think Dr. Felix detennined that she
needed additional -- or he needed additional information
2 o to determine if surgery was necessary to treat her
21 condition. Last sentence of his report.
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A. Yes. He indicates that he discussed surgical
and nonsurgical treatments, and that he had requested the
EMG to see if she was a candidate for the surgery, and
asked her to return if her symptoms were getting worse.
Page 24
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said "Sensation in the neck was intact, but decreased on
the left at C8."
A. Yes.

A. Slightly, yes.
Q. Well, slightly. You didn't find any decrease

8

in sensation at CS?
A. Correct. When I saw her it was more in the C7
distribution.
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Q. So, again, is that significant when you're
evaluating causation?

injury of the kind that you think that she had, would you
expect that that would show up on an EMG or NCV test?
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A. Not when you have injury at multiple levels in
14 the neck. She has injury at multiple levels. And the
15 significance here is that it's not just a nerve being
16 pinched but the spinal cord itself. And when you're
1 7 pinching the cord, you can get all kinds of different
18 symptoms. So when I saw her, her biggest complaint was
19 in the C7 distribution. When Felix saw her three years
2 o prior, her biggest complaint was in the CS distribution.
21 Both of those fit with the findings on her MRI scan of
22 severe central spinal stenosis.
23
Q. So when a person has severe stenosis in an
24

Q. And did she ever return?
A. Not to Dr. Felix, no.
Q. And did Dr. Felix get this EMG/NCV report that

3

Q. Now, that's different than what you found,
correct?
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we marked as Exhibit-] 7?
A. It's in the chart; so I would assume so.

Q. Okay. Did he make any recommendation after
seeing that?
A. Not that I saw.
Q. If you had been the surgeon instead of
Dr. Felix, would you have recommended surgery at that
point when -- based on the results of this EMG-NVC study,

Exhibit-17?
A. It would be difficult for me to say whether or
not I would have recommended surgery. At that stage she
hadn't had a whole lot of conservative treatment. I
think he indicated no injections and things like that.
So we probably would have treated her conservatively, and
if the conservative treatment failed, then moved to
surgery.
Q. And have you seen the treatment that she had

after she saw Dr. Felix?
A. I have seen some of that treatment, yes.
Q. What have you seen?
A. I'd have to go back to my report.
Q. Is it going to be in -- referenced in your
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report that we marked as Exhibit what?
A. This is Exhibit-21. And I noted in that report
when I reviewed the records, I reviewed some from Injury
Recovery Center; lntermountain Medical Center; Salt Lake
MRI; Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic-Dr. Felix; and my own
records; records from Dr. Joseph Watkins; Dr. Stewart
Porter; Shannon Nelson, who's a chiropractor; Alta Sports
and Pain Medicine; Michael Chen; and Patrick Garcia. I
don't have specific recollections of each of those
reports, but that's what I reviewed at the time.
Q. And if we want to see those reports, you have
them somewhere here; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. When we finish this deposition, would you ask
your office to make a copy of those reports?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. We'll mark those as a separate
exhibit as well.
Back to your report on Esther, you make a
reference under "Assessment" to something called
hyperreflexia.
A. Yes.
Q. What are you referring to there? In other
words, what findings supported your indication of
hyperreflexia?
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Q.

Did you have the actual films?

A. I had the actual films of the 2014 study, and I
don't recall ifl had the 2011 actual films or not. I
know that I had the report.
Q. Have you ever had the opportunity to compare
the two?
A. Yes. I have had the opportunity to compare the
two.
Q. I'm talking about the films.
A. The - I don't specifically recall reviewing
the films of the 2011.
Q. And so when you compared, what did you compare,
then?
A. I - the two reports. So the report from 2011
and the report from 2014, I had both of those at the time
I saw her. I had the 2014 films, but I don't recall if I
had the 2011 films.
Q. The reason I'm asking this is because you made
a diagnosis of progressive myelopathy.
A. Yes.
Q. And I assume that that was based upon a
comparison of the 2011 scan with the 2014 scan; am I
correct?
A. Correct. But it also includes comparison of
Dr. Felix's exam and then my exam.

Page 26

A. The positive Spurling's test that we talked
about earlier. Excuse me. That's not indicative of
3 hyperreflexia. It's the Hoffmann's test that was
4 strongly positive. That is indicative of hyperreflexia.
5
Q. Would you expect somebody that had a positive
6 Hoffmann's test, that they would continue to have that
7 even up to the present?
8
A. It can wax and wane, but it usually - once you
9
have it, it usually persists.
10
Q. If she doesn't have it now, would that be
11 significant to you?
12
A. No. Because really what it is is just
13 indicative of what we see on the MRI scan, which is that
14 she has severe stenosis impinging on her cord. And if
15 the cord is irritated at that moment in time that you're
16 examining her, you should see reflex changes. So it's
17 significant, but not as significant as what you see on
18 the MRI scan.
19
Q. The MRI scan that you were looking at, is that
20 the one of September 30,2011?
21
A. I have both the scan from 2011 as well as the
22 scan from November of 2014.
23
Q. Well, I guess my question is: Did you have
24 both of those scans when you saw her in December of 2014?
A. Yes.
25
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Q. Okay. So help me understand what it was from
both the films and Dr. Felix's exam that you felt
supported the finding of progressive myelopathy.
A. On the MRI scan of 2011, she has a description
ofQ. Let me just stop you for a second. Is that the
one I marked as Exhibit-18?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. She - that report shows that she has stenosis
secondary to a disc herniation, broad-based at C4-5, at
CS-6 with just a millimeter of cord compression, and at
C6-7. So at multiple levels in her neck she's got some
disc herniations and some stenosis.
Then when you compare that with the MRI scan of
2014, she now has severe central spinal stenosis. And
the canal measurement there should be at least 10 or
greater, and hers is 7.3 at C5-6 and 7 millimeters at
C6-7. So that indicates it's very tight on the spinal
cord itself, and it's the pressure on the spinal cord
that causes myelopathy. And my examination confirmed
what I saw on the MRI, which is she had a positive
Hoffmann's test, which is one of the indications of
myelopathy.
Q. And she didn't have that when she saw
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Dr. Felix?
A. He didn't note that, no.
Q. Well, ifhe didn't note it, do you believe he
tested it and it was negative?
A. Yes.
Q. Based on these two scans, what was it that
caused the difference in compression between 2011 and
2014? Was it-- let me just ask a little bit further.
Was it advancement of the disc herniation, or was it bony
growth, or a combination?
A. A combination of both. She developed - on the
first MRI scan, she had soft disc herniations. On the
later examination, she has disc herniations with bone
spurs, which are typical to see in progression after you
have a disc herniation.
Q. Did you feel in her case that any more testing
was necessary -A. No.
Q. - for making the determination to recommend
surgery?
A. No. With that MRI scan and some hyperreflexia,
by definition she has myelopathy, and she's a surgical
candidate at that stage.
Q. Let's go to Ignacio, if you would, please. And
I marked his report as Exhibit-19, if you want to just

Page 31

1
2
3

4
5
6

7

8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

accident. But you didn't indicate what motor vehicle
accident. I assume you meant the June 27, 2011,
accident; is that correct?
A. Yeah. My note indicates he was involved in a
motor vehicle accident in 2011.
Q. Were you aware that he was involved in an
accident on April 19th of 20 IO?
A. I don't have a recollection of that.
Q. You got records later. Did you get records
that indicated that he had been involved in this auto
accident on April 19th of 20 IO?
A. I don't recall seeing that accident, but I'm
not certain.
Q. Okay. So you weren't aware that he had a neck
injury in the April 19, 20 I 0, accident?
A. At this time, I don't recall that. No. I
don't believe I did.
Q. If you had the additional history that he had
an auto accident on April 19th of 20 I 0, and that he
treated for a neck injury, and that at least part of his
symptoms were left-handed numbness, would that be
significant in determining causation in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. How would that be significant?
A. It may indicate possibly that there were other
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compare the two and make sure they're the same.
A. Yes. That's the same.
Q. So you saw him on the same day?
A. Yes.
Q. In his case, you recommended a -- well,
let's -- I'm sorry. Let's go back to Esther for a
second.
You recommended what on her?
A. I recommended surgical intervention on her.
Q. And the -- it was a two-level surgical fusion;
is that right?
A. Yes. She's got problems at more than hvo
levels, but those two levels are very severe, and I felt
like they were the major contributors to her problem.
Q. And, I'm sorry, the two levels that you felt
needed fused were what?
A. 5-6 and 6-7.
Q. All right. On Ignacio, you recommended a
three-level cervical fusion, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6?
A. Correct.
Q. And you indicated in your report that his need
for that surgery and the symptoms that he was exhibiting
when you saw him were all due to this motor vehicle
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factors that contributed to his current level of
stenosis.
Q. I'm going to hand you what I have marked as
Exhibit-20. This is a report from a Dr. Bova.
Have you ever heard of Dr. Bova?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Okay. What do you know about Dr. Bova?
A. He does conservative spinal treatment. I think
I've actually seen this report.
Q. Okay. If you would tum to page 2.
A. Yes.
Q. At the top of that, he is evaluating this
accident, which happened on June 27th of 20 I I. And he
makes this note, at the end of that second paragraph,
"Mr. Buenrostro reported that following this
treatment" -- that is, the treatment from June 28th to
July 7th of 201 I -- "his symptoms from this accident
improved to his pre-June 27,201 I, condition."
Were you aware of that history when you made
your causation opinion?
A. When I made my second report, yes, I was aware
of that. Prior to that, I was not.
Q. And, again, I just got that report today; so I
haven't had a chance to review it.
How did you evaluate this information from
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Dr. Bova in detennining causation in Mr. Ignacio
Buenrostro's case?
A. It is one small bit of information. And like I
said earlier, the natural history of these is for the
symptoms to wax and wane. And so if he gets treatment,
you would expect him to get somewhat better, but that
doesn't mean that the anatomical injury has gone away.
It just means that it's settled down at that point in
time; so you would expect the pain to return.
Q. And as you read Dr. Buenrostro -- or Dr. Bova's
report, it's clear that Ignacio had the same or similar
symptoms from the April 20 IO accident.
A. It's - my understanding of this report is that
he has -- or he had similar symptoms, but, obviously not
as severe as they were after the June 2011 accident.
Q. In what way were they not as severe?
A. Well, he indicates that the patient had an
aggravation, was worse after the accident, and had to
come in for treatment. That indicates that symptoms were
worse.
Q. Could also indicate that he was still suffering
symptoms from the April 2010 accident, couldn't it?
A. Yes. That's possible.
Q. Were you aware that Mr. Buenrostro had an MRI
in June of 20 IO? I'll show you what's been previously
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you knowQ. Did you review the actual films or just the
reports?
A. Just the reports. And the report does sound
like it's progressed, that it's worse on the 2014 film,
but he did have a lot of abnormalities on the 2010 MRI as
well.
Q. Okay. So with this additional information that
you received -- and, again, I'll ask you to make copies
of that -- is it still your opinion that Mr. Ignacio
Buenrostro's symptoms and the need for surgery are
causally related to the accident on June 27th of 2011?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you apportion any of the need for that
surgery to the earlier accident in April of2010?
A. Apportionment is very difficult because clearly
he had anatomic changes on his MRI scan prior to that.
And so for him, he's either had a permanent aggravation
of his preexisting condition or he's had, you know, a
causal injury that's made that worse. And so by either
of those definitions, you know, I think it's had a
problem. It's significantly worse after the accident; so
I was apportioning everything to that accident because
prior to that he kind of had a neck like most people have
that has to get treated once in a while.
Page 36
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marked as Exhibit-2 in this case.
A. At my first evaluation, I wasn't aware of this.
Q. Okay. And you were later?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And the MRI that you reviewed was one
that was taken on November 8th of 2014; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's the one -- the report at least is
the one I've marked as Exhibit-?; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Were you aware that we took the deposition of
the radiologist who read the November 8, 2018 -- excuse
me -- November 8, 2014, MRI?
A. Was I aware that you had a -- took his
deposition?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. We took his deposition, and he compared the
actual films from November 8, 2014, with the films from
the MRI on June 15th of 20 I 0. And he testified that the
images on November 8th of2014 are not significantly
different from the images on June 15th of 20 I 0.
Would that be significant to you in fonnulating
your causation opinion?
A. No, because I had a chance to review these and,
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Q. As far as you know, neither Ignacio nor Esther
have had surgery, correct?
3
A. As far as I know, they have not.
4
Q. Have you seen them again?
5
A. No, sir.
6
Q. So when you were provided records, you didn't
7 evaluate them again?
A. No.
8
Q. So now we're, what, a little over two years
9
10 since you saw them?
A. Yes.
11
12
Q. Okay. Given the conditions that you've
13 diagnosed in both of them, what would you expect their
14 present condition to be?
A. I would expect them to slowly progress and
15
16 deteriorate over time, meaning worse pain, worse
17 numbness, and worsening weakness. That waxes and wanes,
18 but overall is a progressive negative trend.
19
Q. In the case of Ignacio, you recommended the
20 three-level ACDF at C3-6. What is your full
21 nondiscounted fee for that surgery?
22
A. I don't know. I would have to go ask the
23 office what that amount is.
24
Q. When you do these surgeries for IMS, do you
25 discount your fee at all?
1

2

Q & A Reporting, Inc .

(9) Pages 33 - 36

BUENROSTRO v.
NESBITT

KADE T. HUNTSMAN
April 27, 2017
Page 37

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11

12

13

14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

A. Slightly.
Q. How much do you discount your fee?
MR. KELSON: I would object to the extent this
is collateral source and irrelevant for the current
litigation. It's confidential and proprietary.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) How much do you discount -A. I don't know exactly how much.
Q. Is the discount that you provide to IMS the
same or similar that you do to insurance companies like
Blue Cross?
MR. KELSON: Same objections.
THE WITNESS: I have different contracts with
different insurance carriers, and so the amount of a
discount that varying insurance companies get is
different. So Blue Cross, Cigna, Aetna, they all have
different rates and different discounts that I negotiate
with them. So none of them are the same; so I would say
that it's a different amount than Intermountain.
Q. Do you know whether the discount to IMS is a
greater discount or a smaller discount than what you give
to Blue Cross, Aetna, or Cigna?
MR. KELSON: Same objections.
THE WITNESS: I would make the assumption that
it's less, but I would have to actually look at the
amounts.
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MR. KELSON: Objection. It's irrelevant and
confidential and proprietary.
THE WITNESS: Same. I don't know exactly what
the amount is.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) And, again, with patients that
are referred through IMS, you discount that full
nondiscounted fee somewhat, but you don't know the amount
of the discount, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you don't know whether it's more or less
than the discount that you give to Blue Cross, Aetna,
Cigna, those?
MR. KELSON: Same objections.
THE WITNESS: Correct.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Ifl could just see those two
reports. I think we marked them as Exhibits -MR. BOULTON: 21 and 22.
THE WITNESS: You've got the one.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) I have 21. Let's talk about
21 for a second. At page 4, you estimated what the
surgery would cost in Esther Buenrostro's case. Where
did you get that information from?
A. Just my experience seeing patient bills and so
forth.
Q. Where did -- how many bills did you look at to
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Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Who in your office would be
most knowledgeable about the discounts in the full
nondiscounted fee that you have for various surgeries?
MR. KELSON: Same objections.
THE WITNESS: I would have to ask the coding
and billing and collecting office. I don't know that
there's any one person. There's a team of people that do
that, and I would have to ask one of them if they could
research that and get that information.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) But it would be somebody in
your billing office; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Who's the main person in your billing office?

A. I don't know.
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Q. When I say "your billing office," I assume
16 we're talking about Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic,
17 correct?
18
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. All of this evaluation, and if you had
19
2 o done the surgery that we're talking about, would have
21 been done through Salt Lake Orthopaedic Clinic?
A. Yes.
22
23
Q. In the case of Esther, you recommended the
24 two-level ACDF at C5-7. What is your full nondiscounted
2 5 fee for that surgery?
15
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come up with that estimate?
A. I don't know how many bills I've looked at
through the years, but -Q. In other words, if I wanted to see the bills
that you are relying upon to make that cost range, would
I be able to find them?
A. No.
Q. I mean, could you produce them?
A. No. We'd have to pull varying bills and see
what the average is, but I don't know exactly what that
amount is. That's my estimation.
Q. All right. So to come up with this amount, you
didn't go pull particular bills; this is just something
that you had off the top of your head; am I following
correctly?

A. Yes. With some experience.
Q. Well, I understand that. But, I mean, ifwe
wanted to see the source of this, I can't go have you
pull the same bills that you used; these are just numbers
that you kind of came up with over time; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you look at any of the bills from
any of the other providers?
A. To make this estimate?
Q. No. No. I'm sorry. I'm off on something
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different.
2
You say that the treatment described in the
3 enclosed medical records was reasonable, necessary, and
4 related to the June 28, 2011, auto collision. Did you
5 look at their bills as well?
6
A. No.
7
Q. So you didn't offer any opinion as to whether
8 their bills were reasonable and customary?
9
A. Correct.
10
Q. On Exhibit-22, which is Ignacio, you made an
11 estimate of the cost of surgery for the three-level ACDF.
12 Same basis as you described in Esther; this is just
13 information that you have kind of formulated over time,
14 but you couldn't go find specific bills that support
15 this; is that right?
16
A. Correct.
17
Q. And, again, in her case, you didn't look at any
18 of the bills from any of the other providers that saw
19 her?
2o
A. No, I did not.
21
Q. Okay. Thank you. I have no further questions
2 2 at this time.
23
MR. BOULTON: I have no questions.
24
MR. KELSON: It's my understanding you
25 generally don't read; is that correct?
l
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C E R T I F I C A T E
State of Utah

)
ss.
County of Salt Lake
)
I, Dawn Brunner-Hahn, a Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
do hereby certify:
That the deposition of Kade T. Huntsman, M.D.,
the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was taken
on April 27, 2017; that said witness was by me, before
examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause;
That the testimony of said witness was reported
by me in stenotype and thereafter transcribed into
typewriting and that a full, true, and correct
transcription of said testimony so taken and transcribed
is set forth in the preceding pages;
That the witness waived his/her right to review
the transcript, the Original transcript has been sealed
and returned to the attorney noticing the deposition.
I further certify that I am not of kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties of said
cause of action and that I am not interested in the event
thereof.
WITNESS MY BAND at Salt Lake City, Utah,
this 4th day of April, 2017.

16
17
18

19
20
21

22

Dawn Brunner-Hahn, RPR
Utah License No. 564205
Notary Public Commission Expires:
May 14, 2018
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THE WITNESS: That's correct.
(The deposition concluded at 7:55 a.m.)
(Exhibit-12, Exhibit-13, Exhibit-23, and
Exhjbit-24 were marked for identification.)
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THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAVIER VIGUERAS-AMEZCUA,
Plaintiff,

vs.

I

Casa No. 160903969

) Judge:

NOAH SHOEMAN,
Defendant.

l

Matthew Bates

THE 30(B) (6) DEPOSITION OP INTERMOUNTAIN SURGICAL BY AND

THROUGH ITS AGENT, ALAN TAYLOR MCDONALD
February 2, 2017

Page 3

PROCEEDINGS
ALAN TAYLOR MCDONALD,
3
having been first duly sworn to tell the truth,
4
was examined and testified as follows:
MR. COOPER: The record should reflect that
5
6 this is the time and place for taking the 30(b)(6) and
7 30(b )(4) deposition of lntermountain Surgical, LLC, being
8 taken pursuant to notice and may be used for all purposes
9 under the Utah civil rules.
1
2

EXAMINATION

10

11:09 a.m. - 1:22 p.m.

11 BY MR. COOPER:
Location:

LAW OFFICES OF LLOYD R. JONES & ASSOCIATES

230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Reporter: Dawn Brunner-Hahn, RPR
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah

12
13

Q. Would you state your name, address, and
position with lntermountain Surgical.

14

A. Alan Taylor McDonald. 11762 South State
Street, No. 315, Draper, Utah 84020. Chief executive
officer of Intermountain Surgical, LLC.

15
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17
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Q. And the address that you gave, that's the
address -- the office address of Intermountain Surgical,
correct?
A. Correct.

Q. I may,just because I've got into the habit of
it, refer to Intermountain Surgical as IMS. You'll
understand what I'm talking about if I do that?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Thank you.
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PAGE

EXAMINATION

BY MR. COOPER
BY MR. KENDELL
BY MR. COOPER

3
72
73

EXHIBITS
PAGE

NO.
52

Intermountain Surgical, LLC's Second
S~plemental Response to Defendant's
S poena Pursuant to January 11, 2017
Order (IMS 007-IMS 008)
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32

A. Yes.

Q. And you've had an opportunity to look at the
various subparts of it and consider those, correct?

8

A. Yes.

Q. Have you had sufficient opportunity to review

10

INDEX

17

If you would, tum to Exhibit-47. I think
these are all in order right now. Exhibit-47 is the
amended notice of deposition in this matter. Have you
seen that before today?

9

11

Scott T. Evans
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
2S7 East 200 South, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 323-5000
Scott.evans@chrisjen.com

15

20
21

6
7

FOR ALAN TAYLOR MCDONALD:

14

18
19

5

Gary L. Cooper
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor
Pocatello, Idaho 8320S-4229
(208) 235-1445
Gary@cooper-larsen.com

9

12
13

3

4

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

8

11

2

Jordan Kendell
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & CUTT
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 366-9100
Jkendell@egclegal.com

4
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that matter and -- so that you can come here and testify
about each of those issues?
A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. Did you -MR. EVANS: You received my objections?
MR. COOPER: I did.
MR. EVANS: So just subject to those

objections, yes.
MR. COOPER: You bet. And I understand, as we
get into this, that there may be objections to the scope
of those questions, and we'll deal with that when we come
to it.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Although this may be obvious,
would you just explain what there is about your position
at IMS that gives you the ability to respond to all of
these subissues?
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A. I've been the chief executive officer of IMS
since July 2012, and am probably the person most
knowledgeable in the business to answer the topics that
are contained here in this notice of deposition.
Q. Okay. What did you do to prepare for this
deposition, besides review this notice?
A. Reviewed - well, besides reviewing the notice,
I had discussions and conferences with my legal counsel.
Q. Okay. Did you consult with anybody else in the
organization in order to familiarize yourself with
background or facts so that you could answer questions
concerning IMS?
A. No.
Q. Did you review any documents in preparation for
the deposition?
A. Yes.
Q. What documents did you review?
A. Oh, I reviewed the invoice for the services
that were rendered to Mr. Vigueras-Amezcua. I reviewed
whatever documents had been produced in this matter, and
just basically the underlying documents to
Mr. Vigueras-Amezcua's surgical procedure.
Q. The documents that you reviewed, do you
understand that all of those have been supplied in
discovery to me and other counsel involved in this
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MR. COOPER: Well, remember, my question was
about Mr. Vigueras1s file. Are those documents part of
Mr. Vigueras's file?
MR. EVANS: No. No.
MR. COOPER: Then -MR. EVANS: Mr. Vigueras's file has been
produced.
MR. COOPER: That was my question, if I
remember correctly.
MR. EVANS: Yeah. Well, yes, kind of.
MR. COOPER: Well, I don't want to go back and
have it reread. Let me ask it again.
MR. EVANS: Okay.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) IMS maintains a file on
Mr. Vigueras?
A. Yes.
Q. And all of the documents in Mr. Vigueras's file
have been produced, as far as you know?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know when Intem10untain Surgical, LLC,
was formed?
A. I think it was - I think it was initially
formed in 2009.
Q. Who are the current owners of Intermountain
Surgical, LLC?
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matter?
A. Yes. Subject to the - to whatever my legal
counsel supplied.
Q. I'm not sure I understand that answer.
A. Well, ask me your question again.
Q. Okay. Do you believe that all of the documents
that you reviewed have been produced to me and other
counsel in this matter?
A. Yes. I believe so.
Q. Does IMS maintain a file on Mr. Vigueras?
A. Yes.
Q. Have all of the documents in that file been
produced?
MR. EVANS: Objection. Subject to the court's
order.
MR. COOPER: Well, here's where I'm going,
Scott. I'm not asking you to produce or talk about
something that was not produced as a result of the court
order, but I just want to understand if there are
documents that haven't been produced, just by way of
identity-MR. EVANS: I can say there are a couple of
documents that are internal accounting documents that
don't deal specifically with him, the patient, and the
court addressed that.
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MR. EVANS: I'm going to object, like I did
yesterday, but in this instance, the ownership of
Intermountain hasn't been identified as a subject matter,
and, really, the ownership oflntermountain is not really
relevant to any issue in this case.
MR. COOPER: I understand.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Go ahead.
MR. EVANS: So I'm going to instruct him not to
answer.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Okay. Do you know who the
owners oflntermountain Surgical, LLC, are?
A. Yes.
Q. How many owners are there?
A. One.
Q. Is -- or does Canyon Crest Surgical II, LLC,
have an ownership interest in IMS?
A. No.
Q. Does Dr. Huntsman have an ownership interest in
IMS?
A. No.
Q. Going back to January of 2016, so a year ago,
in January of 2016, did IMS have a license from the Utah
Department of Health to operate an ambulatory surgical
facility?
A. No.
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Q. Has it ever had such a license, to your
knowledge?
A. No.
Q. Can you just describe for me what the business
of Intermountain Surgical, LLC, is?
A. Yeah. IMS facilitates a healthcare
opportunity, particularly orthopedic surgical consults
and procedures for personal injury victims, or victims
who don't typically otherwise have access to high-end
healthcare because they have no health insurance.
Q. How does IMS identify potential clients, if you
will?
A. Typically attorneys who represent those
personal injury victims will contact Intermountain
Surgical seeking to access our network of physicians in
seeking -- in helping their clients seek quality medical
care.
Q. The network of physicians, can you explain what
you mean by that?
A. Yes. We have multiple orthopedic surgeons who
work with Intermountain Surgical and who perform the
surgical consults and, if necessary, the procedures for
personal injury victims that they see that are introduced
to them by Intermountain Surgical.
Q. So let me follow up on that to make sure I
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process?
A. Kristi Jones, my compliance manager.
Q. What is a compliance manager in this context?
A. An individual who essentially vets a case like
I just described.
Q. Does Kristi Jones have a staff, or does she do
all of this herself?
A. Yeah. She has staff. She does a lot of it
herself. She delegates some of it.
Q. How many employees does Intermountain Surgical
have?
A. Intermountain Surgical has three employees.
Q. And those are whom?
A. Tyson DowDell, James Henrichsen, and Luica
Becerra.
Q. You didn't include yourself or Kristi Jones.
Are they additional employees or are they employed by-well, that's my question. You didn't include them why?
A. Because they are not employees of Intermountain
Surgical.
Q. But you are, correct?
A. No.
Q. Who are you employed with?
A. Well, I am the CEO of Intermountain Surgical.
My wages are paid by a different company.
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understand.
In some cases -- and I recognize that there may
be variances to this -- but in some cases, an attorney
contacts IMS to determine if it might be interested in
financing the surgery for a client of theirs; am I
correct?
A. It's more they will contact us, understanding
that we have a network of qualified and quality
orthopedic surgeons who will see their clients with no
out-of-pocket costs up front to their clients.
Q. Does Intermountain Surgical vet these
referrals, or does it take everyone that's referred?
A. Yeah. We vet the referrals.
Q. In what way?
A. We ask the attorney about the underlying it's basically an intake process. In other words, we'll
ask the attorney about the underlying case, what
happened, what are the facts, and basically is there
insurance, ultimately, on the other end of this thing,
whether it's uninsured, underinsured, or bodily injury
coverage by a tortfeasor, and if the answer to those
questions is satisfactory, then we will go ahead and
green light a consult with one of the physicians that we
work with, that we contract with.
Q. Who at IMS is responsible for that vetting
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Q.

What company pays your wages?
MR. EVANS: Again, not on the list. Not
relevant. Instruct him not to answer.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) Does the same company that
pays your wages pay Kristi Jones' wages?
A. Yes.
Q. Why the disconnect there? I mean, why does
somebody -- another company pay your wages and those of
Kristi Jones?
MR. EVANS: Again, I'm not sure that -- it's
not on the list. It's not really relevant to anything in
the case. I don't think he -- I'm going to instruct him
not to answer.
Q. (BY MR. COOPER) What does Tyson DowDell do
for IMS?
A. Tyson's description is a -- is a market
manager, and Tyson markets to personal injury lawyers and
law firms, cultivates and maintains those relationships,
works as a liaison with our physicians and their
scheduling people, their staff, the staff at Canyon Crest
Surgical Center, and their scheduling people, et cetera,
to just make the Intermountain Surgical process go.
Q. James Hendricks, what's his position?
A. Same description.
Q. And Luica Becerra?
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1

A. Yes. I have a file.

2

A. She is an administrative assistant to both
1
James and Tyson.
2
3
3
Q. Based on your review of Mr. Vigueras's file, do
4 you know how Mr. Vigueras was referred to IMS?
4
5
A. No, not specifically.
5
6
Q. I'm going to hand you what's been marked as
6
7 Exhibit-12 in Mr. Vigueras's deposition. This is the
7
8 earliest contact between Mr. Vigueras and lntermountain
8
9 Surgical that I've been able to find. Do you know if
9
10 there's any earlier contact?
10
11
A. There would likely have been an earlier contact 11
12 which would precede this, which would be a request from 12
13 the law firm to Luica or James or Tyson that they
13
14 represent Mr. Vigueras. He has ongoing neck pain,
14
15 cervical pain. He hasn't responded to conservative care. 15
16 He has what appears to be a positive finding on his MRI, 16
17 and would Intermountain Surgical have a physician who 17
18 could see him, more or less. I'm kind of generalizing
18
19 the process. So there would likely have been some kind 19
20 of a contact between Intermountain Surgical and a
20
21 representative of Mr. Vigueras's law firm to initiate the 21
22
22 process.
23
Q. Okay. And the reason I asked that question is
23
24 in other cases, I've actually seen a communication
24
25 between the law office and lntermountain Surgical, and I 25

Q.

And if there were such communications, you
would expect it to be in that file?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So would you provide the full context of
that file to counsel so that he can review it, and if it
is something that can be produced, then presumably, he
will produce it; otherwise, you'll advise that there are
documents in there that are going to be objected to?
MR. EVANS: Right. And we have produced what
we believe is in the file.
MR. COOPER: Okay. And that is exhibit what?
MR. EVANS: Well, there's Intermountain
Surgical's first response back in October.
MR. COOPER: And I'm sorry, Scott, that's
attached to which exhibit?
MR. EV ANS: It's not attached to any of your
exhibits. I brought it.
MR. COOPER: So let me just see what you're
talking about.
MR. EV ANS: It may be attached to an exhibit.
I don't know. I just brought it.
MR. COOPER: Well, let's just check. So I
think that's Exhibit-46, Scott.
MR. EVANS: Okay. Yeah. Exhibit-46. And then

-
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think specifically with Ms. Becerra, in which there is a
list of criteria, if you will, that's contained in that
3 correspondence. Is there something similar in
4 Mr. Vigueras1s case?
5
A. Possibly. I mean, sometimes that's verbal, and
6 sometimes there's a fax or an e-mail.
7
Q. Okay. The other reason I'm asking it is I want
8 to make certain in this case that I have all of the
9 records that pertain to Mr. Vigueras. And at least my
10 recollection -- and sometimes I get confused because I
11 get these records from various locations -- but I don't
12 recall that this communication between Dr. Huntsman's
13 office and Intermountain Surgical came from Intermountain
14 Surgical. And so I still kind of question whether I got
15 the full file from Mr. Vigueras. Do you remember, from
16 looking at the file, whether there are communications,
17 like Exhibit- I 2, or communications from the law office
18 that communicated the criteria that was vetted before the
19 green light was given for Mr. Vigueras to have a consult?
20
A. I don't recall. I suppose I could check, but I
21 don't recall.
22
Q. Would you mind doing that? Provide that -- I
23 mean, you have those things available, correct? Excuse
24 me. I don't mean that you have that available because
25 you don't know, but you have the file available?
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there was November -MR. COOPER: But which document are you talking
about?
MR. EVANS: This contained the treatment files
or, you know -- this contained -- I mean, if you look at
it, it talks -- it has -MR. COOPER: I understand, but Exhibit-12 isn't
in there, is it?
MR. EV ANS: Exhibit-12?
MR. COOPER: The document we were just looking
at.
MR. EV ANS: Okay. And then there was the
supplement on November 1st. It's not in there. All I'm
saying is that we have produced what we believe was the
file, so if we can go back and -- what is that? Yeah.
If that's in our file, then we'll -- if that is in the
file, we'll produce it. That's the -- you can look at
all of them.
MR. COOPER: Well, the November 1st response is
Exhibit-44.
MR. EVANS: Uh-huh.
MR. COOPER: I don't see it in there.
MR. EVANS: What I'm saying is in addition to
what we produced, which we thought was the file, we'll go
back and look. As you well know, sometimes files are not
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HEALTH CARE FACILITY
LICENSING AND INSPECTION
ACT, TITLE 26, CHAPTER 21,
UTAH CODE
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act
U.C.A. 1953 T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs &Annos
Currentness
U.C.A. 1953 T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs & Annos, UT ST T. 26, Ch. 21, Refs & Annos
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-1. Title, UT ST§ 26-21-1

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-1
§ 26-21-1. Title

Currentness

This chapter is known as the "Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act."

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 3; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-1, UT ST§ 26-21-1
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-2. Definitions, UT ST§ 26-21-2

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2
§ 26-21-2. Definitions

Currentness
As used in this chapter:

( 1) "Abortion clinic" means a type I abortion clinic or a type II abortion clinic.

(2) "Activities of daily living" means essential activities including:

(a) dressing;

(b) eating;

(c) grooming;

(d) bathing;

(e) toileting;

(f) ambulation;

(g) transferring; and

(h) self-administration of medication.

(3) "Ambulatory surgical facility" means a freestanding facility, which provides surgical services to patients not requiring
hospitalization.

(4) "Assistance with activities of daily living" means providing of or arranging for the provision of assistance with
activities of daily living.

WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Vvorks.
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(5)(a) "Assisted living facility" means:

(i) a type I assisted living facility, which is a residential facility that provides assistance with activities of daily living
and social care to two or more residents who:

(A) require protected living arrangements: and

(B) are capable of achieving mobility sufficient to exit the facility without the assistance of another person; and

(ii) a type II assisted living facility, which is a residential facility with a home-like setting that provides an array
of coordinated supportive personal and health care services available 24 hours per day to residents who have been
assessed under department rule to need any of these services.

(b) Each resident in a type I or type II assisted living facility shall have a service plan based on the assessment, which
may include:

(i) specified services of intennittent nursing care;

(ii) administration of medication; and

(iii) support services promoting residents' independence and self sufficiency.

(6) "Birthing center" means a freestanding facility, receiving maternal clients and providing care during pregnancy,
delivery, and immediately after delivery.

(7) "Committee" means the Health Facility Committee created in Section 26-1-7.

(8) "Consumer" means any person not primarily engaged in the provision of health care to individuals or in the
administration of facilities or institutions in which such care is provided and who does not hold a fiduciary position, or
have a fiduciary interest in any entity involved in the provision of health care, and does not receive, either directly or
through his spouse, more than 1/10 of his gross income from any entity or activity relating to health care.

(9) "End stage renal disease facility" means a facility which furnishes staff-assisted kidney dialysis services, self-dialysis
services, or home-dialysis services on an outpatient basis.

(10) ••Freestanding" means existing independently or physically separated from another health care facility by fire walls
and doors and administrated by separate staff with separate records.
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(11) ··General acute hospital" means a facility which provides diagnostic, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services to both

inpatients and outpatients by or under the supervision of physicians.

(12) "Governmental unit" means the state, or any county, municipality, or other political subdivision or any department,
division, board, or agency of the state, a county, municipality, or other political subdivision.

(13)(a) "Health care facility" means general acute hospitals, specialty hospitals, home health agencies, hospices, nursing
care facilities, residential-assisted living facilities, birthing centers, ambulatory surgical facilities, small health care
facilities, abortion clinics, facilities owned or operated by health maintenance organizations, end stage renal disease
facilities, and any other health care facility which the committee designates by rule.

(b) "Health care facility" does not include the offices of private physicians or dentists, whether for individual or group
practice, except that it does include an abortion clinic.

(14) "Health maintenance organization" means an organization. organized under the laws of any state which:

(a) is a qualified health maintenance organization under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 300e-9; or

(b)(i) provides or otherwise makes available to enrolled participants at least the following basic health care services:
usual physician services, hospitalization, laboratory, x-ray, emergency, and preventive services and out-of-area
coverage;

(ii) is compensated, except for copayments, for the provision of the basic health services listed in Subsection (14)
(b)(i) to enrolled participants by a payment which is paid on a periodic basis without regard to the date the health
services are provided and which is fixed without regard to the frequency, extent, or kind of health services actually
provided; and

(iii) provides physicians' services primarily directly through physicians who are either employees or partners of such
organizations, or through arrangements with individual physicians or one or more groups of physicians organized
on a group practice or individual practice basis.

(l S)(a) "Home health agency" means an agency, organization, or facility or a subdivision of an agency, organization, or
facility which employs two or more direct care staff persons who provide licensed nursing services. therapeutic services
of physical therapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, medical social services, or home health aide services on a
visiting basis.

(b) "Home health agency" does not mean an individual who provides services under the authority of a private license.

(16) "Hospice" means a program of care for the terminally ill and their families which occurs in a home or in a health
care facility and which provides medical, palliative, psychological, spiritual, and supportive care and treatment.
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(17) "Nursing care facility" means a health care facility, other than a general acute or specialty hospital, constructed,
licensed, and operated to provide patient living accommodations, 24-hour staff availability, and at least two of the
following patient services:

(a) a selection of patient care services, under the direction and supervision of a registered nurse, ranging from
continuous medical, skilled nursing, psychological, or other professional therapies to intermittent health-related or
paraprofessional personal care services;

(b) a structured, supportive social living environment based on a professionally designed and supervised treatment
plan, oriented to the individual's habilitation or rehabilitation needs; or

(c) a supervised living environment that provides support, training, or assistance with individual activities of daily
living.

(18) "Person" means any individual, firm, partnership, corporation, company, association, or joint stock association,
and the legal successor thereof.

(19) .. Resident" means a person 21 years of age or older who:

(a) as a result of physical or mental limitations or age requires or requests services provicled in an assisted living facility;
and

(b) does not require intensive medical or nursing services as provided in a hospital or nursing care facility.

(20) "Small health care facility" means a four to 16 bed facility that provides licensed health care programs and services
to residents.

(21) .. Specialty hospital" means a facility which provides specialized diagnostic, therapeutic, or rehabilitative services in
the recognized specialty or specialties for which the hospital is licensed.

(22) "Substantial compliance" means in a department survey of a licensee, the department determines there is an absence
of deficiencies which would harm the physical health, mental health, safety, or welfare of patients or residents of a
licensee.

(23) "Type I abortion clinic" means a facility, including a physician's office, but not including a general acute or specialty
hospital, that:

(a) performs abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, during the first trimester of pregnancy; and
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(b) does not perform abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, after the first trimester of pregnancy.

(24) "Type II abortion clinic" means a facility, including a physician's office, but not including a general acute or specialty
hospital, that:

(a) performs abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, after the first trimester of pregnancy; or

(b) performs abortions, as defined in Section 76-7-301, during the first trimester of pregnancy and after the first
trimester of pregnancy.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1985, c. 21, § 11; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 4; Laws 1994, c. 47, § 1; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 45, eff.
April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 3, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 13, § 25, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 192, §
2, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 1, § 46, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2005, c. 31, § 1, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws 2011, c. 161,
§ 1, eff. July I, 2011.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2, UT ST§ 26-21-2
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-2.1. Services, UT ST§ 26-21-2.1

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2.1
§ 26-21-2.1. Services

Currentness
(1) General acute hospitals and specialty hospitals shall remain open and be continuously ready to receive patients 24

hours of every day in a year and have an attending medical staff consisting of one or more physicians licensed to practice
medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic
Medical Practice Act.

(2) A specialty hospital shall provide on-site all basic services required of a general acute hospital that are needed for the
diagnosis, therapy, or rehabilitation offered to or required by patients admitted to or cared for in the facility.

(3)(a) A home health agency shall provide at least licensed nursing services or therapeutic services directly through the
agency employees.

(b) A home health agency may provide additional services itself or under arrangements with another agency,
organization, facility, or individual.

Credits
Laws 1990, c. 114, § 5; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 4, eff. May 5, 1997.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-2.1, UT ST§ 26-21-2.1
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & A1mos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-3
§ 26-21-3.

Health Facility Committee--Members--Terms--Organization--Meetings
Currentness

(I) The Health Facility Committee created by Section 26-1-7 consists of 15 members appointed by the governor with
the consent of the Senate. The appointed members shall be knowledgeable about health care facilities and issues. The
membership of the committee is:

(a) one physician, licensed to practice medicine and surgery under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or
Title 58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, who is a graduate of a regularly chartered medical school;

(b) one hospital administrator;

(c) one hospital trustee;

(d) one representative of a freestanding ambulatory surgical facility;

(e) one representative of an ambulatory surgical facility that is affiliated with a hospital;

(f) two representatives of the nursing care facility industry;

(g) one registered nurse, licensed to practice under Title 58, Chapter 31 b, Nurse Practice Act;

(h) one professional in the field of intellectual disabilities not affiliated with a nursing care facility;

(i) one licensed architect or engineer with expertise in health care facilities;

(j) two representatives of assisted living facilities licensed under this chapter;

(k) two consumers, one of whom has an interest in or expertise in geriatric care; and

(I) one representative from either a home health care provider or a hospice provider.
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(2)(a) Except as required by Subsection (2)(b), members shall be appointed for a term of four years.

(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (2)(a), the governor shall, at the time of appointment or
reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of committee members are staggered so that
approximately half of the committee is appointed every two years.

(c) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired
term by the governor, giving consideration to recommendations made by the committee, with the consent of the Senate.

(d) A member may not serve more than two consecutive full terms or 10 consecutive years, whichever is less. However,
a member may continue to serve as a member until he is replaced.

(e) The committee shall annually elect from its membership a chair and vice chair.

(f) The committee shall meet at least quarterly, or more frequently as determined by the chair or five members of the
committee.

(g) Eight members constitute a quorum. A vote of the majority of the members present constitutes action of the
committee.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 6; Laws 1996, c. 243, § 67, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 5, eff.
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 21, § 31, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2007, c. 158, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 74, § 1,
eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2011, c. 366, § 29, eff. May 10, 2011.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-3, UT ST§ 26-21-3
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-4. Per diem and travel expenses of committee members, UT ST§ 26-21-4

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-4
§ 26-21-4.

Per diem and travel expenses of committee members
Currentness

A member may not receive compensation or benefits for the member's service, but may receive per diem and travel
expenses in accordance with:

(1) Section 63A-3-106;

(2) Section 63A-3-107; and

(3) rules made by the Division of Finance pursuant to Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-l 07.

Credits
Laws 1996, c. 243, § 68, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2010, c. 286, § 60, eff. May 11, 2010.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-4, UT ST§ 26-21-4
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Docunwnt
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§ 26-21-5. Duties of committee, UT ST§ 26-21-5

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-5
§ 26-21-5. Duties of committee

Currentness
The committee shall:

(I) with the concurrence of the department, make rules in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act:

(a) for the licensing of health-care facilities; and

(b) requiring the submission of architectural plans and specifications for any proposed new health-care facility or
renovation to the department for review;

(2) approve the information for applications for licensure pursuant to Section 26-21-9;

(3) advise the department as requested concerning the interpretation and enforcement of the rules established under this
chapter; and

(4) advise, consult, cooperate with, and provide technical assistance to other agencies of the state and federal government,
and other states and affected groups or persons in carrying out the purposes of this chapter.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 7; Laws 1991, c. 202, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 275, § 2; Laws 1992, c. 30, § 56; Laws
1993, c. 4, § 68; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 17; Laws 1995, c. 28, § 12, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997;
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 309, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2016, c. 74, § 6, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-5, UT ST§ 26-21-5
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End or Document
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§ 26-21-6. Duties of department, UT ST§ 26-21-6

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6
§ 26-21-6. Duties of department

Currentness
(I) The department shall:

(a) enforce rules established pursuant to this chapter;

(b) authorize an agent of the department to conduct inspections of health care facilities pursuant to this chapter;

(c) collect information authorized by the committee that may be necessary to ensure that adequate health care facilities
are available to the public;

(d) collect and credit fees for licenses is free revenue;

(e) collect and credit fees for conducting plan reviews as dedicated credits;

(f)(i) collect and credit fees for conducting clearance under Chapter 21, Part 2, Clearance for Direct Patient Access; and

(ii) beginning July 1, 2012:

(A) up to $105,000 of the fees collected under Subsection ( I )(t)(i) are dedicated credits; and

(B) the fees collected for background checks under Subsection 26-21-204(6) and Section 26-21-205 shall be
transferred to the Department of Public Safety to reimburse the Department of Public Safety for its costs in
conducting the federal background checks;

(g) designate an executive secretary from within the department to assist the committee in carrying out its powers and
responsibilities;

(h) establish reasonable standards for criminal background checks by public and private entities;

WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. ~Jo claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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(i) recognize those public and private entities that meet the standards established pursuant to Subsection ( 1)(h); and

(j) provide necessary administrative and staff support to the committee.

(2) The department may:

(a) exercise all incidental powers necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter;

(b) review architectural plans and specifications of proposed health care facilities or renovations of health care facilities
to ensure that the plans and specifications conform to rules established by the committee; and

(c) in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules as necessary to
implement the provisions of this chapter.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 8; Laws 1991, c. 202, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 4, § 69; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 18;
Laws 1997, c. 209, § 7, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 169, § I, eff. July 1, 1998; Laws 2012, c. 328, § 1, eff. May 8, 2012;
Laws 2016, c. 74, § 7, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6, UT ST§ 26-21-6
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-6.5. Licensing of an abortion clinic-Rulemaking authority--Fee, UT ST§ 26-21-6.5

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6.5
§ 26-21-6.5. Licensing of an abortion clinic--Rulemaking authority--Fee

Currentness
(1) Beginning on April I, 2012, a type I abortion clinic may not operate in the state without a license issued by the

department to operate a type I abortion clinic.

(2) A type II abortion clinic may not operate in the state without a license issued by the department to operate a type
II abortion clinic.

(3)(a) The department shall make rules establishing minimum health, safety, sanitary, and recordkeeping requirements
for:

(i) a type I abortion clinic; and

(ii) a type II abortion clinic.

(b) The rules established under Subsection (3)(a) shall take effect on April 1, 2012.

(4) Beginning on April 1, 2012, in order to receive and maintain a license described in this section, an abortion clinic shall:

(a) apply for a license on a form prescribed by the department;

(b) satisfy and maintain the minimum health, safety, sanitary, and recordkeeping requirements established under .
Subsection (3)(a) that relate to the type of abortion clinic licensed;

(c) comply with the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of Subsection 76-7-305.6 (4) and Section 76-7-313;

(d) comply with the requirements of Title 76, Chapter 7, Part 3, Abortion;

(e) pay the annual licensing fee; and
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(f) cooperate with inspections conducted by the department.

(5) Beginning on April I, 2012, the department shall, at least twice per year, inspect each abortion clinic in the state to
ensure that the abortion clinic is complying with all statutory and licensing requirements relating to the abortion clinic.
At least one of the inspections shall be made without providing notice to the abortion clinic.

(6) Beginning on April I, 2012, the department shall charge an annual license fee, set by the department in accordance
with the procedures described in Section 631-1-504, to an abortion clinic in an amount that will pay for the cost of the
licensing requirements described in this section and the cost of inspecting abortion clinics.

(7) The department shall deposit the licensing fees described in this section in the General Fund as a dedicated credit
to be used solely to pay for the cost of the licensing requirements described in this section and the cost of inspecting
abortion clinics.

Credits
Laws 2011, c. 161, § 2, eff. July 1, 2011.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-6.5, UT ST§ 26-21-6.5
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-7. Exempt facilities, UT ST§ 26-21-7

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-7
§ 26-21-7. Exempt facilities

Currentness

This chapter does not apply to:

(1) a dispensary or first aid facility maintained by any commercial or industrial plant, educational institution, or convent;

(2) a health care facility owned or operated by an agency of the United States;

(3) the office of a physician or dentist whether it is an individual or group practice, except that it does apply to an
abortion clinic;

(4) a health care facility established or operated by any recognized church or denomination for the practice of religious
tenets administered by mental or spiritual means without the use of drugs, whether gratuitously or for compensation, if
it complies with statutes and rules on environmental protection and life safety;

(5) any health care facility owned or operated by the Department of Corrections, created in Section 64-13-2; and

(6) a residential facility providing 24-hour care:

(a) that does not employ direct care staff;

(b) in which the residents of the facility contract with a licensed hospice agency to receive end-of-life medical care; and

(c) that meets other requirements for an exemption as designated by administrative rule.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. I 14, § 9; Laws 1995, c. 353, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1996; Laws 2004, c. 141, § 1, eff. May
3, 2004; Laws 2011, c. 161, § 3, eff. July 1, 2011.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-7, UT ST§ 26-21-7
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
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§ 26-21-8. License required-Not assignable or..., UT ST § 26-21-8

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-8
§ 26-21-8. License required--Not assignable or transferable--Posting--

Expiration and renewal--Time for compliance by operating facilities
Currentness
(l)(a) A person or governmental unit acting severally or jointly with any other person or governmental unit, may not
establish, conduct, or maintain a health care facility in this state without receiving a license from the department as
provided by this chapter and the rules adopted pursuant to this chapter.

(b) This Subsection (1) does not apply to facilities that are exempt under Section 26-21-7.

(2) A license issued under this chapter is not assignable or transferable.

(3) The current license shall at all times be posted in each health care facility in a place readily visible and accessible
to the public.

(4)(a) The department may issue a license for a period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date of issuance for
an abortion clinic and not to exceed 24 months from the date of issuance for other health care facilities that meet the
provisions of this chapter and department rules adopted pursuant to this chapter.

(b) Each license expires at midnight on the day designated on the license as the expiration date, unless previously
revoked by the department.

(c) The license shall be renewed upon completion of the application requirements, unless the department finds the
health care facility has not complied with the provisions of this chapter or the rules adopted pursuant to this chapter.

(5) A license may be issued under this section only for the operation of a specific facility at a specific site by a specific
person.

(6) Any health care facility in operation at the time of adoption of any applicable rules as provided under this chapter
shall be given a reasonable time for compliance as determined by the committee.

WESTLAW © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No cla:m lo original U.S. Government Works.
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Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 10; Laws 1993, c. 201, § I; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 8, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws
2003, c. 155, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2011, c. 161, § 4, eff. July l, 2011; Laws 2016, c. 74, § 8, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-8, UT ST§ 26-21-8
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Documtint
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§ 26-21-9. Application for license-Information required--Public records, UT ST§ 26-21-9

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9
§ 26-21-9. Application for license--Information required--Public records

Currentness

(1) An application for license shall be made to the department in a form prescribed by the department. The application

and other documentation requested by the department as part of the application process shall require such information
as the committee determines necessary to ensure compliance with established rules.

(2) Information received by the department in reports and inspections shall be public records, except the information
may not be disclosed if it directly or indirectly identifies any individual other than the owner or operator of a health
facility (unless disclosure is required by law) or if its disclosure would otherwise constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.

(3) Information received by the department from a health care facility, pertaining to that facility's accreditation by a
voluntary accrediting organization, shall be private data except for a summary prepared by the department related to
licensure standards.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1983, c. 132, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 11; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 27, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws
2011, c. 297, § 181, eff. May 10, 2011.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9, UT ST§ 26-21-9
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-9.5. Repealed by Laws 2012, c. 328, § 18, eff. May 8, 2012, UT ST§ 26-21-9.5

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9.5
§ 26-21-9.5. Repealed by Laws 2012, c. 328, § 18, eff. May 8, 2012

Currentness
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-9.5, UT ST §26-21-9.5
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-10. Repealed by Laws 1997, c. 209, § 18, eff. May 5, 1997, UT ST§ 26-21-10

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-10
§ 26-21-10. Repealed by Laws 1997, c. 209, § 18, eff. May 5, 1997

Currentness

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-10, UT ST§ 26-21-10
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of D01.:umcnt
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§ 26-21-11. Violations-Denial or revocation of license--Restricting ... , UT ST§ 26-21-11

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A.

1953 § 26-21-11

§ 26-21-11. Violations--Denial or revocation oflicense--Restricting or prohibiting new admissions--Monitor

Currentness
If the department finds a violation of this chapter or any rules adopted pursuant to this chapter the department may
take one or more of the following actions:

(1) serve a written statement of violation requiring corrective action, which shall include time frames for correction of
all violations;

(2) deny or revoke a license if it finds:

(a) there has been a failure to comply with the rules established pursuant to this chapter;

(b) evidence of aiding, abetting, or permitting the commission of any illegal act; or

(c) conduct adverse to the public health, morals, welfare, and safety of the people of the state;

(3) restrict or prohibit new admissions to a health care facility or revoke the license of a health care facility for:

(a) violation of any rule adopted under this chapter; or

(b) permitting, aiding, or abetting the commission of any illegal act in the health care facility;

(4) place a department representative as a monitor in the facility until corrective action is completed;

(5) assess to the facility the cost incurred by the department in placing a monitor;

(6) assess an administrative penalty as allowed by Subsection 26-23-6(1)(a); or

(7) issue a cease and desist order to the facility.

WESTLAVi/
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Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 13; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 9, eff. May 5, 1997.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-11, UT ST§ 26-21-11
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-11.1. Failure to follow certain health care claims ... , UT ST§ 26-21-11.1

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-11.1
§ 26-21-11.1. Failure to follow certain health care claims practices--Penalties

Currentness
(1) The department may assess a fine of up to $500 per violation against a health care facility that violates Subsection
31A-26-301.5(4).

(2) The department shall waive the fine described in Subsection (1) if:

(a) the health care facility demonstrates to the department that the health care facility mitigated and reversed any
damage to the insured caused by the health care facility's violation; or

(b) the insured does not pay the full amount due on the bill that is the subject of the violation, including any interest,
fees, costs, and expenses, within 120 days after the day on which the health care facility makes a report to a credit
bureau or uses the services of a collection agency in violation of Subsection 31A-26-301.5(4).

Credits
Laws 2017, c. 321, § 1, eff. May 9, 2017.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-11.1, UT ST§ 26-21-11.1
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-12. Issuance of new license after revocation-Restoration, UT ST§ 26-21-12

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A.

1953 § 26-21-12

§ 26-21-12. Issuance of new license after revocation--Restoration

Currentness
( 1) If a license is revoked, the department may issue a new license only after it determines by inspection that the facility
has corrected the conditions that were the basis of revocation and that the facility complies with all provisions of this
chapter and applicable rules.
(2) If the department does not renew a license because of noncompliance with the provisions of this chapter or the rules
adopted under this chapter, the department may issue a new license only after the facility complies with all renewal
requirements and the department determines that the interests of the public will not be jeopardized.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 14; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 10, eff. May 5, 1997.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-12, UT ST§ 26-21-12
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Documc-nt
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§ 26-21-13. License issued to facility in compliance or... , UT ST§ 26-21-13

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13
§ 26-21-13. License issued to facility in compliance or substantial compliance with chapter and rules

Currentness
{1) The department shall issue a standard license for a health care facility which is found to be in compliance with the
provisions of this chapter and with all applicable rules adopted by the committee.

(2) The department may issue a provisional or conditional license for a health care facility which is in substantial
compliance if the interests of the public will not be jeopardized.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 15.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13, UT ST§ 26-21-13
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-13.5. Intermediate care facilities for people with an ... , UT ST§ 26-21-13.5

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.CA. 1953 § 26-21-13.5
§ 26-21-13.5. Intermediate

care facilities for people with an intellectual disability--Licensing
Currentness

(l)(a) It is the Legislature's intent that a person with a developmental disability be provided with an environment and
surrounding that, as closely as possible, resembles small community-based, homelike settings, to allow those persons to
have the opportunity, to the maximum extent feasible, to exercise their full rights and responsibilities as citizens.

(b) It is the Legislature's purpose, in enacting this section, to provide assistance and opportunities to enable a
person with a developmental disability to achieve the person's maximum potential through increased independence,
productivity, and integration into the community.

(2) After July 1, 1990, the department may only license intermediate care beds for people with an intellectual disability
in small health care facilities.

(3) The department may define by rule "small health care facility" for purposes oflicensure under this section and adopt
rules necessary to carry out the requirements and purposes of this section.

(4) This section does not apply to the renewal of a license or the licensure to a new owner of any facility that was licensed
on or before July 1, 1990, and that licensure has been maintained without interruption.

Credits
Laws 1989, c. 48, § l; Laws 1993, c. 201, § 2; Laws 2011, c. 366, § 31, eff. May 10, 2011.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13.5, UT ST§ 26-21-13.5
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-13.6. Rural hospital-Optional service designation, UT ST§ 26-21-13.6

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13.6
§ 26-21-13.6. Rural hospital--Optional service designation

Currentness
(I) The Legislature finds that:

(a) the rural citizens of this state need access to hospitals and primary care clinics;

(b) financial stability of remote-rural hospitals and their integration into remote-rural delivery networks is critical to
ensure the continued viability of remote-rural health care; and

(c) administrative simplicity is essential for providing large benefits to small-scale remote-rural providers who have
limited time and resources.

(2) After July I, 1995, the department may grant variances to remote-rural acute care hospitals for specific services
currently required for licensure under general hospital standards established by department rule.

(3) For purposes of this section, "remote-rural hospitals" are hospitals that are in a county with less than 20 people per
square mile.

Credits
Laws 1995, c. 321, § 5, eff. May I, 1995.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-13.6, UT ST§ 26-21-13.6
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-14. Closing facility-Appeal, UT ST§ 26-21-14

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-14
§ 26-21-14. Closing facility--Appeal

Currentness
(1) If the department finds a condition in any licensed health care facility that is a clear hazard to the public health, the

department may immediately order that facility closed and may prevent the entrance of any resident or patient onto the
premises of that facility until the condition is eliminated.

(2) Parties aggrieved by the actions of the department under this section may obtain an adjudicative proceeding and
judicial review.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1987, c. 161, § 65; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 16.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-14, ur ST§ 26-21-14
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-15. Action by department for injunction, UT ST§ 26-21-15

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-15
§ 26-21-15. Action by department for injunction

Currentness
Notwithstanding the existence of any other remedy, the department may, in the manner provided by law, upon the advice
of the attorney general, who shall represent the department in the proceedings, maintain an action in the name of the
state for injunction or other process against any person or governmental unit to restrain or prevent the establishment,
conduct, management, or operation of a health care facility which is in violation of this chapter or rules adopted by
the committee.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 17.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-15, UT ST§ 26-21-15
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Dornment
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§ 26-21-16. Operating facility in violation of chapter a misdemeanor, UT ST§ 26-21-16

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-16
§ 26-21-16. Operating facility in violation of chapter a misdemeanor

Currentness
In addition to the penalties in Section 26-23-6, any person owning, establishing, conducting, maintaining, managing, or
operating a health care facility in violation of this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 18; Laws 1991, c. 241, § 18; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 11, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws
2009, c. 347, § 4, eff. May 12, 2009.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-16, UT ST§ 26-21-16
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-17. Department agency of state to contract for... , UT ST§ 26-21-17

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-17
§ 26-21-17. Department agency of state to contract for certification of facilities under Social Security Act

Currentness
The department is the sole agency of the state authorized to enter into a contract with the United States government for
the certification of health care facilities under Title XVIII and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 1 and any amendments
thereto.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1990, c. 114, § 19.

Footnotes
1

42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 et seq. and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 et seq.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-17, UT ST§ 26-21-17
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-18. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 114, § 25, eff. April 23, 1990, UT ST§ 26-21-18

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-18
§ 26-21-18. Repealed by Laws 1990, c. 114, § 25, eff. April 23, 1990

Currentness
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-18, UT ST§ 26-21-18
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Dornmcnt
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§ 26-21-19. Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act. .• , UT ST§ 26-21-19

West's Utah Code Annotated·
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annas)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-19
§ 26-21-19.

Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Act not amended
Currentness

The provisions of this chapter do not amend, affect, or alter the provisions of Title 31A, Chapter 28, Guaranty
Associations.

Credits
Laws 1981, c. 126, § 20; Laws 1985, c. 242, § 3.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-19, UT ST§ 26-21-19
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-20. Requirement for hospitals to provide statements of.•. , UT ST§ 26-21-20

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A.

1953 § 26-21-20

§ 26-21-20. Requirement for hospitals to provide statements of itemized charges to patients

Currentness

(1) For purposes of this section, "hospital" includes:

(a) an ambulatory surgical facility;

(b) a general acute hospital; and

(c) a specialty hospital.

(2) A hospital shall provide a statement of itemized charges to any patient receiving medical care or other services from
that hospital.

(3)(a) The statement shall be provided to the patient or the patient's personal representative or agent at the hospital's
expense, personally, by mail, or by verifiable electronic delivery after the hospital receives an explanation of benefits
from a third party payer which indicates the patient's remaining responsibility for the hospital charges.

(b) If the statement is not provided to a third party, it shall be provided to the patient as soon as possible and
practicable.

(4) The statement required by this section:

(a) shall itemize each of the charges actually provided by the hospital to the patient;

(b)(i) shall include the words in bold "THIS IS THE BALANCE DUE AFTER PAYMENT FROM YOUR
HEALTH INSURER"; or

(ii) shall include other appropriate language if the statement is sent to the patient under Subsection (3)(b); and

(c) may not include charges of physicians who bill separately.

WESTLAW «) 2017 Thomson Reuters. No clalrn to original U.S. Government Works.
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(5) The requirements of this section do not apply to patients who receive services from a hospital under Title XIX of
the Social Security Act. 1

(6) Nothing in this section prohibits a hospital from sending an itemized billing statement to a patient before the hospital
has received an explanation of benefits from an insurer. If a hospital provides a statement of itemized charges to a
patient prior to receiving the explanation of benefits from an insurer, the itemized statement shall be marked in bold:
"DUPLICATE: DO NOT PAY" or other appropriate language.

Credits
Laws 1989. c. 196. § 2; Laws 1990. c. 114, § 20; Laws 1997, c. 209, § 12. eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 86, § 28, eff. May
I, 2000; Laws 2009, c. 11, § I, eff. May 12, 2009.

Footnotes
1
42 U.S.C.A. § 1936 et seq.
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-20, UT ST§ 26-21-20
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document

V✓ ESTLA'.\i

@

·{? 2017 Thomson Reuters. ~o claim to c•riginal U.S. Guvcrnment Works.

2017 Thomson Reuters. 1·~0 cla:m to original U.S. Governmenl Works.

2

§ 26-21-21. Authentication of medical records, UT ST§ 26-21-21

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A.

1953 § 26-21-21

§ 26-21-21. Authentication of medical records

Currentness
Any entry in a medical record compiled or maintained by a health care facility may be authenticated by identifying the
author of the entry by:

(1) a signature including first initial, last name, and discipline; or

(2) the use of a computer identification process unique to the author that definitively identifies the author.

Credits
Laws 1992, c. 31, § 1.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-21, UT ST§ 26-21-21
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-22. Reporting of disciplinary information--lmmunity from liability, UT ST§ 26-21-22

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annas)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-22
§ 26-21-22. Reporting of disciplinacy information--Immunity from liability

Currentness
A health care facility licensed under this chapter which reports disciplinary infomrntion on a licensed nurse to the Division
of Occupational and Professional Licensing within the Department of Commerce as required by Section 58-31 b-702 is
entitJed to the immunity from liability provided by that section.

Credits
Laws 1998, c. 288, § 1, eff. July 1, 1998.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-22, UT ST§ 26-21-22
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-23. Licensing of a new nursing care facility--Approval for ... , UT ST§ 26-21-23

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-23
§ 26-21-23. Licensing of a new nursing care facility--Approval for a licensed bed

in an existing nursing care facility--Fine for excess Medicare inpatient revenue
Currentness
(I) Notwithstanding Section 26-21-2, as used in this section:

(a) "Medicaid" means the Medicaid program, as that term is defined in Section 26-18-2.

(b) "Medicaid certification" means the same as that term is defined in Section 26-18-501.

(c) ••Nursing care facility" and .. small health care facility":

(i) mean the fo!lowing facilities licensed by the department under this chapter:

(A) a skilled nursing facility;

(B) an intermediate care facility; or

(C) a small health care facility with four to 16 beds functioning as a skilled nursing facility; and

(ii) do not mean:

(A) an intermediate care facility for the intellectually disabled;

(B) a critical access hospital that meets the criteria of 42 U.S.C. 1395i-4(c)(2)(1998);

(C) a small health care facility that is hospital based; or

(D) a small health care facility other than a skilled nursing care facility with no more than 16 beds.

WESTLA.W © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

§ 26-21-23. Licensing of a new nursing care facility--Approval for... , UT ST§ 26-21-23

(d) .. Rural county" means the same as that term is defined in Section 26-18-501.

(2) Except as provided in Subsection (6) and Section 26-21-28, a new nursing care facility shall be approved for a health
facility license only if:

(a) under the provisions of Section 26-18-503 the facility's nursing care facility program has received Medicaid
certification or will receive Medicaid certification for each bed in the facility;

(b) the facility's nursing care facility program has received or will receive approval for Medicaid certification under
Subsection 26-18-503(5), if the facility is located in a rural county; or

(c)(i) the applicant submits to the department the information described in Subsection (3); and

(ii) based on that information, and in accordance with Subsection (4), the department determines that approval of
the license best meets the needs of the current and future patients of nursing care facilities within the area impacted
by the new facility.

(3) A new nursing care facility seeking licensure under Subsection (2) shall submit to the department the following
information:

(a) proof of the following as reasonable evidence that bed capacity provided by nursing care facilities within the county
or group of counties that would be impacted by the facility is insufficient:

(i) nursing care facility occupancy within the county or group of counties:

(A) has been at least 75% during each of the past two years for all existing facilities combined; and

(B) is projected to be at least 75% for all nursing care facilities combined that have been approved for licensure
but are not yet operational;

(ii) there is no other nursing care facility within a 35-mile radius of the new nursing care facility seeking licensure
under Subsection (2); and

(b) a feasibility study that:

(i) shows the facility's annual Medicare inpatient revenue, including Medicare Advantage revenue, will not exceed
49% of the facility's annual total revenue during each of the first three years of operation;

'NESTLA.W © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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(ii) shows the facility will be financially viable if the annual occupancy rate is at least 88%;

(iii) shows the facility will be able to achieve financial viability;

(iv) shows the facility will not:

(A) have an adverse impact on existing or proposed nursing care facilities within the county or group of counties
that would be impacted by the facility; or

(B) be within a three-mile radius of an existing nursing care facility or a new nursing care facility that has been
approved for licensure but is not yet operational;

(v) is based on reasonable and verifiable demographic and economic assumptions;

(vi) is based on data consistent with department or other publicly available data; and

(vii) is based on existing sources of revenue.

(4) When determining under Subsection (2)(c) whether approval of a license for a new nursing care facility best meets
the needs of the current and future patients of nursing care facilities within the area impacted by the new facility, the
department shall consider:

(a) whether the county or group of counties that would be impacted by the facility is underserved by specialized or
unique services that would be provided by the facility; and

(b) how additional bed capacity should be added to the long-term care delivery system to best meet the needs of current
and future nursing care facility patients within the impacted area.

(5) The department may approve the addition of a licensed bed in an existing nursing care facility only if:

(a) each time the facility seeks approval for the addition of a licensed bed, the facility satisfies each requirement for
licensure of a new nursing care facility in Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4); or

(b) the bed has been approved for Medicaid certification under Section 26-18-503 or 26-18-505.

(6) Subsection (2) does not apply to a nursing care facility that:

WESTLA\·V
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(a) has, by the effective date of this act, submitted to the department schematic drawings, and paid applicable fees, for
a particular site or a site within a three-mile radius of that site;

(b) before July 1, 2016:

(i) filed an application with the department for licensure under this section and paid all related fees due to the
department; and

(ii) submitted to the department architectural plans and specifications, as defined by the department by
administrative rule, for the facility;

(c) applies for a license within three years of closing for renovation;

(d) replaces a nursing care facility that:

(i) closed within the past three years; or

(ii) is located within five miles of the facility;

(e) is undergoing a change of ownership, even if a government entity designates the facility as a new nursing care
facility; or

(f) is a state-owned veterans home, regardless of who operates the home.

(7)(a) For each year the annual Medicare inpatient revenue, including Medicare Advantage revenue, of a nursing care
facility approved for a health facility license under Subsection (2)(c) exceeds 49% of the facility's total revenue for the
year, the facility shall be subject to a fine of $50,000, payable to the department.

(b) A nursing care facility approved for a health facility license under Subsection (2)(c) shall submit to the department
the information necessary for the department to annually determine whether the facility is subject to the fine in
Subsection (7)(a).

(c) The department:

(i) shall make rules, in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, specifying the
information a nursing care facility shall submit to the department under Subsection (7)(b);

(ii) shall annually determine whether a facility is subject to the fine in Subsection (7)(a);
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(iii) may take one or more of the actions in Section 26-21-11 or 26-23-6 against a facility for nonpayment of a fine
due under Subsection (7)(a); and

(iv) shall deposit fines paid to the department under Subsection (7)(a) into the Nursing Care Facilities Provider
Assessment Fund, created by Section 26-35a-106.

Credits
Laws 2007, c. 24, § 2, eff. Feb. 28, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 311, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2013, c. 60, § 3, eff. May 14,
2013; Laws 2016, c. 276, § 5, eff. March 25, 2016; Laws 2016, c. 357, § 1, eff. May 10, 2016; Laws 2017, c. 443, § 4, eff.
July 1, 2017.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-23, UT ST§ 26-21-23
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-24
§ 26-21-24. Prohibition against bed banking by nursing care facilities for Medicaid reimbursement

Currentness
(I) For purposes of this section:

(a) "bed banking" means the designation of a nursing care facility bed as not part of the facility's operational bed
capacity; and

(b) "nursing care facility" is as defined in Subsection 26-21-23(1).

(2) Beginning July 1, 2008, the department shall, for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement under Chapter 18, Part 1,
Medical Assistance Programs, prohibit the banking of nursing care facility beds.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 347, § 3, eff. Mar. 18, 2008.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-24, UT ST§ 26-21-24
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-25
§ 26-21-25.

Patient identity protection
Currentness

( 1) As used in this section:

(a) "EMTALA" means the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.

(b) "Health professional office" means:

(i) a physician's office; or

(ii) a dental office.

(c) "Medical facility" means:

(i) a general acute hospital;

(ii) a specialty hospital;

(iii) a home health agency;

(iv) a hospice;

(v) a nursing care facility~

(vi) a residential-assisted living facility;

(vii) a birthing center;

(viii) an ambulatory surgical facility;
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(ix) a smal1 health care facility;

(x) an abortion clinic;

(xi) a facility owned or operated by a health maintenance organization;

(xii) an end stage renal disease facility;

(xiii) a health care clinic; or

(xiv) any other health care facility that the committee designates by rule.

(2)(a) In order to discourage identity theft and health insurance fraud, and to reduce the risk of medical errors caused by
incorrect medical records, a medical facility or a health professional office shall request identification from an individual
prior to providing in-patient or out-patient services to the individual.

(b) If the individual who will receive services from the medical facility or a health professional office lacks the legal
capacity to consent to treatment, the medical facility or a health professional office shall request identification:

(i) for the individual who lacks the legal capacity to consent to treatment; and

(ii) from the individual who consents to treatment on behalf of the individual described in Subsection (2)(b)(i).

(3) A medical facility or a health professional office:

(a) that is subject to EMTALA:

(i) may not refuse services to an individual on the basis that the individual did not provide identification when
requested; and

(ii) shall post notice in its emergency department that informs a patient of the patient's right to treatment for an
emergency medical condition under EMTALA;

(b) may not be penalized for failing to ask for identification;

(c) is not subject to a private right of action for failing to ask for identification; and
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(d) may document or confirm patient identity by:

(i) photograph;

(ii) fingerprinting;

(iii) palm scan; or

(iv) other reasonable means.

(4) The identification described in this section:

(a) is intended to be used for medical records purposes only; and

(b) shall be kept in accordance with the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996.

Credits
Laws 2009, c. %, § 1, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2010, c. 218, § 15, eff. May 11, 2010.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-25, UT ST§ 26-21-25
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-26. General acute hospital to report prescribed controlled ... , UT ST§ 26-21-26

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-26
§ 26-21-26.

General acute hospital to report prescribed controlled substance poisoning or overdose
Currentness

(1) If a person who is 12 years ofage or older is admitted to a general acute hospital for poisoning or overdose involving

a prescribed controlled substance, the general acute hospital shall, within three business days after the day on which the
person is admitted, send a written report to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, created in Section
58-1-103, that includes:

(a) the patient's name and date of birth;

(b) each drug or other substance found in the person's system that may have contributed to the poisoning or overdose,
if known;

(c) the name of each person who the general acute hospital has reason to believe may have prescribed a controlled
substance described in Subsection ( I )(b) to the person, if known; and

(d) the name of the hospital and the date of admission.

(2) Nothing in this section may be construed as creating a new cause of action.

Credits
Laws 2010, c. 290, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2016, c. 99, § I, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-26, UT ST§ 26-21-26
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-27
§ 26-21-27.

Consumer access to health care facility charges
Currentness

Beginning January 1, 2011, a health care facility licensed under this chapter shall, when requested by a consumer:

(1) make a list of prices charged by the facility available for the consumer that includes the facility's:

(a) in-patient procedures;

(b) out-patient procedures;

(c) the 50 most commonly prescribed drugs in the facility;

(d) imaging services; and

(e) implants; and

(2) provide the consumer with information regarding any discounts the facility provides for:

(a) charges for services not covered by insurance; or

(b) prompt payment of billed charges.

Credits
Laws 2010, c. 68, § 2, eff. March 22, 2010.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-27, UT ST§ 26-21-27
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A.

1953 § 26-21-28

§ 26-21-28. Pilot program for managed care model with a

small health care facility operating as a skilled nursing facility
Currentness
(1) Notwithstanding the requirement for Medicaid certification under Chapter 18, Part 5, Long Term Care Facility--

Medicaid Certification, and Section 26-21-23, a small health care facility with four to 16 beds, functioning as a skilled
nursing facility, may be approved for licensing by the department as a pilot program in accordance with this section, and
without obtaining Medicaid certification for the beds in the facility.

(2)(a) The department shall establish one pilot program with a facility that meets the qualifications under Subsection (3).
The purpose of the pilot program is to study the impact of an integrated managed care model on cost and quality of care
involving pre- and post-surgical services offered by a small health care facility operating as a skilled nursing facility.

(b) The small health care facility that is operating as a skilled nursing facility and is participating in the pilot program,
shall, on or before November 30, 2020, issue a report to the Legislative Health and Human Services Interim Committee
on patient outcomes and cost of care associated with the pilot program.

(3) A small health care facility with four to 16 beds that functions as a skilled nursing facility may apply for a license
under the pilot program if the facility will:

(a) be located in:

(i) a county of the second class that has at least 1,800 square miles within the county; and

(ii) a city of the fifth class; and

(b) limit a patient's stay in the facility to no more than IO days.

Credits
Laws 2016, c. 357, § 2, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-28, UT ST§ 26-21-28
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-29
§ 26-21-29. Birthing centers--Regulatory restrictions

Currentness
( 1) For purposes of this section:

(a) "Certified nurse midwife" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 44a, Nurse Midwife Practice
Act.

(b) "Direct-entry midwife" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 77, Direct-Entry Midwife Act.

(c) ••Licensed maternity care practitioner" includes:

(i) a physician;

(ii) a certified nurse midwife;

(iii) a direct entry midwife;

(iv) a naturopathic physician; and

(v) other individuals who are licensed under Title 58, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act and
whose scope of practice includes midwifery or obstetric care.

(d) "Naturopathic physician" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 71, Naturopathic Physician
Practice Act.

(e) "Physician" means an individual who is licensed under Title 58, Chapter 67, Utah Medical Practice Act, or Title
58, Chapter 68, Utah Osteopathic Medical Practice Act.

(2) The Health Facility Committee and the department may not require a birthing center or a licensed maternity care
practitioner who practices at a birthing center to:
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(a) maintain admitting privileges at a general acute hospital;

(b) maintain a written transfer agreement with one or more general acute hospitals;

(c) maintain a collaborative practice agreement with a physician; or

(d) have a physician or certified nurse midwife present at each birth when another licensed maternity care practitioner
is present at the birth and remains until the maternal patient and newborn are stable postpartum.

(3) The Health Facility Committee and the department shall:

(a) pennit all types of licensed maternity care practitioners to practice in a birthing center; and

(b) except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), require a birthing center to have a written plan for the transfer ofa patient
to a hospital in accordance with Subsection (4).

(4) A transfer plan under Subsection (3)(b) shall:

(a) be signed by the patient; and

(b) indicate that the plan is not an agreement with a hospital.

(5) If a birthing center transfers a patient to a licensed maternity care practitioner or facility, the responsibility of the
licensed maternity care practitioner or facility, for the patient:

(a) does not begin until the patient is physically within the care of the licensed maternity care practitioner or facility;

(b) is limited to the examination and care provided after the patient is transferred to the licensed maternity care
practitioner or facility; and

(c) does not include responsibility or accountability for the patient's decision to pursue an out-of-hospital birth and
the services of a birthing center.

(6)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(c), a licensed maternity care practitioner who is not practicing at a birthing
center may, upon receiving a briefing from a member of a birthing center's clinical staff, issue a medical order for the
birthing center's patient without assuming liability for the care of the patient for whom the order was issued.
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(b) Regardless of the advice given or order issued under Subsection (6)(a), the responsibility and liability for caring
for the patient is that of the birthing center and the birthing center's clinical staff.

(c) The licensed maternity care practitioner giving the order under Subsection (6)(a) is responsible and liable only for
the appropriateness of the order, based on the briefing received under Subsection (6)(a).

(7) The department shall hold a public hearing under Subsection 63G-3-302(2)(a) for a proposed administrative rule,
and amendment to a rule, or repeal of a rule, that relates to birthing centers.

Credits
Laws 2016, c. 73, § 1, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-29, UT ST§ 26-21-29
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-100
§ 26-21-100. Reserved

Currentness
Reserved

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 2, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-100, UT ST§ 26-21-100
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.CA.

1953 § 26-21-201

§ 26-21-201. Definitions

Currentness
As used in this part:

(1) "Clearance" means approval by the department under Section 26-21-203 for an individual to have direct patient
access.

(2) "Covered body" means a covered provider, covered contractor, or covered employer.

(3) "Covered contractor" means a person that supplies covered individuals, by contract, to a covered employer or covered
provider.

(4) "Covered employer" means an individual who:

(a) engages a covered individual to provide services in a private residence to:

(i) an aged individual, as defined by department rule; or

(ii) a disabled individual, as defined by department rule;

(b) is not a covered provider; and

(c) is not a licensed health care facility within the state.

(5) "Covered individual":

(a) means an individual:

(i) whom a covered body engages; and
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(ii) who may have direct patient access;

(b) includes:

(i) a nursing assistant, as defined by department rule;

(ii) a personal care aide, as defined by department rule;

(iii) an individual licensed to engage in the practice of nursing under Title 58, Chapter 31 b, Nurse Practice Act;

(iv) a provider of medical, therapeutic, or social services, including a provider of laboratory and radiology services;

(v) an executive;

(vi) administrative staff, including a manager or other administrator;

(vii) dietary and food service staff;

(viii) housekeeping and maintenance staff; and

(ix) any other individual, as defined by department rule, who has direct patient access; and

(c) does not include a student, as defined by department rule, directly supervised by a member of the staff of the
covered body or the student's instructor.

(6) .. Covered provider" means:

(a) an end stage renal disease facility;

(b) a long-term care hospital;

(c) a nursing care facility;

(d) a small health care facility;

(e) an assisted living facility;
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(f) a hospice;

(g) a home health agency; or

(h) a personal care agency.

(7) "Direct patient access" means for an individual to be in a position where the individual could, in relation to a patient

or resident of the covered body who engages the individual:

(a) cause physical or mental harm;

(b) commit theft; or

(c) view medical or financial records.

(8) "Engage" means to obtain one's services:

(a) by employment;

(b) by contract;

(c) as a volunteer; or

(d) by other arrangement.

(9) "Long-term care hospital":

(a) means a hospital that is certified to provide long-term care services under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395tt;
and

(b) does not include a critical access hospital, designated under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395i-4(c)(2).

(10) "Patient" means an individual who receives health care services from one of the following covered providers:

(a) an end stage renal disease facility;
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(b) a long-term care hospital;

(c) a hospice;

(d) a home health agency; or

(e) a personal care agency.

(11) .. Personal care agency" means a health care facility defined by department rule.

(12) "Resident" means an individual who receives health care services from one of the following covered providers:

(a) a nursing care facility;

(b) a small health care facility;

(c) an assisted living facility; or

(d) a hospice that provides living quarters as part of its services.

(13) "Residential setting" means a place provided by a covered provider:

(a) for residents to live as part of the services provided by the covered provider; and

(b) where an individual who is not a resident also lives.

(14) "Volunteer" means an individual, as defined by department rule, who provides services without pay or other
compensation.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 3. eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-201, UT ST§ 26-21-201
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-202
§ 26-21-202. Clearance required

Currentness
( 1) A covered provider may engage a covered individual only if the individual has clearance.

(2) A covered contractor may supply a covered individual to a covered employer or covered provider only if the individual
has clearance.

(3) A covered employer may engage a covered individual who does not have clearance.

(4)(a) Notwithstanding Subsections (1) and (2), if a covered individual does not have clearance, a covered provider may
engage the individual or a covered contractor may supply the individual to a covered provider or covered employer:

(i) under circumstances specified by department rule; and

(ii) only while an application for clearance for the individual is pending.

(b) For purposes of Subsection (4)(a), an application is pending if the following have been submitted to the department
for the individual:

(i) an application for clearance;

(ii) the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and

(iii) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9).

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 4, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-202, UT ST§ 26-21-202
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-203
§ 26-21-203. Department authorized to grant, deny, or

revoke clearance--Department may limit direct patient access
Currentness
(1) As provided in Section 26-21-204, the department may grant, deny, or revoke clearance for an individual, including
a covered individual.

(2) The department may limit the circumstances under which a covered individual granted clearan~e may have direct
patient access, based on the relationship the factors under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(a) and other mitigating factors may
have to patient and resident protection.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 5, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-203, UT ST§ 26-21-203
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.CA. 1953 § 26-21-204
§ 26-21-204. Clearance

Currentness
(1) The department shall determine whether to grant clearance for each applicant for whom it receives:

(a) the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and

(b) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9).

(2) The department shall establish a procedure for obtaining and evaluating relevant information concerning covered
individuals, including fingerprinting the applicant and submitting the prints to the Criminal Investigations and Technical
Services Division of the Department of Public Safety for checking against applicable state, regional, and national criminal
records files.

(3) The department may review the following sources to determine whether an individual should be granted or retain
clearance, which may include:

(a) Department of Public Safety arrest, conviction, and disposition records described in Title 53, Chapter IO, Criminal
Investigations and Technical Services Act, including information in state, regional, and national records files;

(b) juvenile court arrest, adjudication, and disposition records, as allowed under Section 78A-6-209;

(c) federal criminal background databases available to the state;

(d) the Department of Human Services' Division of Child and Family Services Licensing Information System described
in Section 62A-4a-1006;

(e) child abuse or neglect findings described in Section 78A-6-323;

(f) the Department of Human Services' Division of Aging and Adult Services vulnerable adult abuse, neglect, or
exploitation database described in Section 62A-3-311.1;
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(g) registries of nurse aids described in 42 C.F.R. Sec. 483.156;

(h) licensing and certification records of individuals licensed or certified by the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing under Title 58, Occupations and Professions; and

(i) the List of Excluded Individuals and Entities database maintained by the United States Department of Health and
Human Services' Office of Inspector General.

(4) The department shall adopt rules that:

(a) specify the criteria the department will use to determine whether an individual is granted or retains clearance:

(i) based on an initial evaluation and ongoing review of infom1ation under Subsection (3); and

(ii) including consideration of the relationship the following may have to patient and resident protection:

(A) warrants for arrest;

(B) arrests;

(C) convictions, including pleas in abeyance;

(D) pending diversion agreements;

(E) adjudications by a juvenile court of committing an act that if committed by an adult would be a felony or
misdemeanor, if the individual is over 28 years of age and has been convicted, has pleaded no contest, or is subject
to a plea in abeyance or diversion agreement for a felony or misdemeanor, or the individual is under 28 years
of age; and

(F) any other findings under Subsection (3); and

(b) specify the personal identification infom1ation that must be submitted by an individual or covered body with an
application for clearance, including:

(i) the applicant's Social Security number; and

(ii) except for applicants under 18 years of age, fingerprints.
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(5) For purposes of Subsection (4)(a), the department shall classify a crime committed in another state according to
the closest matching crime under Utah law, regardless of how the crime is classified in the state where the crime was
committed.

(6) The Department of Public Safety, the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Department of Human Services, the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, and any other state agency or political subdivision of the state:

(a) shall allow the department to review the infom1ation the department may review under Subsection (3); and

(b) except for the Department of Public Safety, may not charge the department for access to the infonnation.

(7) The department shall adopt measures to protect the security of the information it reviews under Subsection (3) and
strictly limit access to the information to department employees responsible for processing an application for clearance.

(8) The department may disclose personal identification information specified under Subsection (4)(b) to the Department
of Human Services to verify that the subject of the information is not identified as a perpetrator or offender in the
information sources described in Subsections (3)(d) through (0.

(9) The department may establish fees, in accordance with Section 631-1-504, for an application for clearance, which
may i~clude:

(a) the cost of obtaining and reviewing information under Subsection (3);

(b) a portion of the cost of creating and maintaining the Direct Access Clearance System database under Section
26-21-209; and

(c) other department costs related to the processing of the application and the ongoing review of information pursuant
to Subsection (4)(a) to determine whether clearance should be retained.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 6, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-204, UT ST§ 26-21-204
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-205. Department of Public Safety--Retention of... , UT ST§ 26-21-205

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A.1953 § 26-21-205
§ 26-21-205. Department of Public Safety--Retention ofinformation--Notification of Department of Health

Currentness
The Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division within the Department of Public Safety shall:

(1) retain, separate from other division records, personal information, including any fingerprints, sent to it by the
Department of Health pursuant to Subsection 26-21-204(3)(a); and

(2) notify the Department of Health upon receiving notice that an individual for whom personal information has been
retained is the subject of:

(a) a warrant for arrest;

(b) an arrest;

(c) a conviction, including a plea in abeyance; or

(d) a pending diversion agreement.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 7, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-205, UT ST§ 26-21-205
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Docum~nt
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§ 26-21-206. Covered providers and covered contractors ... , UT ST § 26-21-206

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-206
§ 26-21-206. Covered providers and covered contractors required to apply for clearance of certain individuals

Currentness
(1) As provided in Subsection (2), each covered provider and covered contractor operating in this state shall:

(a) collect from each covered individual it engages, and each individual it intends to engage as a covered individual,
the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and

(b) submit to the department an application for clearance for the individual, including:

(i) the personal identification information; and

(ii) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9).

(2) Clearance granted for an individual pursuant to an application submitted by a covered provider or a covered
contractor is valid until the later of:

(a) two years after the individual is no longer engaged as a covered individual; or

(b) the covered provider's or covered contractor's next license renewal date.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 8, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-206, UT ST§ 26-21-206
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-207. Covered providers required to apply for clearance ... , UT ST§ 26-21-207

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-207
§ 26-21-207. Covered providers required to apply for clearance for certain individuals

other than residents residing in residential settings--Certain individuals other
than residents prohibited from residing in residential settings without clearance
Currentness
( 1) A covered provider that provides services in a residential setting shall:

(a) collect the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b) for
each individual 12 years of age or older, other than a resident, who resides in the residential setting; and

(b) submit to the department an application for clearance for the individual, including:

(i) the personal identification information; and

(ii) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9).

(2) A covered provider that provides services in a residential setting may allow an individual 12 years of age or older,
other than a resident, to reside in the residential setting only if the individual has clearance.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 9, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-207, UT ST§ 26-21-207
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-208. Application for clearance by individuals, UT ST§ 26-21-208

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-208
§ 26-21-208. Application for

clearance by individuals

Currentness
(1) An individual may apply for clearance by submitting to the department an application, including:

(a) the personal identification information specified by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(b); and

(b) any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9).

(2) Clearance granted to an individual who makes application under Subsection (1) is valid for two years unless the
department determines otherwise based on its ongoing review under Subsection 26-21-204(4)(a).

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 10, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-208, UT ST§ 26-21-208
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-209. Direct Access Clearance System ... , UT ST§ 26-21-209

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annas)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-209
§ 26-21-209. Direct Access Clearance System database--Contents--Use

Currentness
(1) The department shall create and maintain a Direct Access Clearance System database, which:

(a) includes the names of individuals for whom the department has received:

(i) an application for clearance under this part; or

(ii) an application for background clearance under Section 26-8a-310; and

(b) indicates whether an application is pending and whether clearance has been granted and retained for:

(i) an applicant under this part; and

(ii) an applicant for background clearance under Section 26-Sa-3 l 0.

(2)(a) The department shall allow covered providers and covered contractors to access the database electronically.

(b) Data accessible to a covered provider or covered contractor is limited to the information under Subsections (1)
(a)(i) and (l)(b)(i) for:

(i) covered individuals engaged by the covered provider or covered contractor; and

(ii) individuals:

(A) whom the covered provider or covered contractor could engage as covered individuals; and

(B) who have provided the covered provider or covered contractor with sufficient personal identification
information to uniquely identify the individual in the database.
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(c)(i) The department may establish fees, in accordance with Section 631-1-504, for use of the database by a covered
contractor.

(ii) The fees may include, in addition to any fees established by the department under Subsection 26-21-204(9), an
initial set-up fee, an ongoing access fee, and a per-use fee.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 11, eff. May 8, 2012; Laws 2015, c. 307, § 4, eff. July 1, 2015.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-209, UT ST§ 26-21-209
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-210. No civil liability, UT ST§ 26-21-210

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-210
§ 26-21-210. No civil liability

Currentness
A covered body is not civilly liable for submitting to the department infom1ation required under this part or refusing to
employ an individual who does not have clearance to have direct patient access under Section 26-21-203.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 328, § 12, eff. May 8, 2012.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-210, UT ST§ 26-21-210
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-211. Repealed pursuant to§ 631-1-226, eff. July 1, 2013, UT ST§ 26-21-211

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Clearance for Direct Patient Access
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-211
§ 26-21-211. Repealed pursuant to§

63!-1-226,

eff. July 1,

2013

Currentness
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-211, UT ST§ 26-21-211
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-301. Title, UT ST§ 26-21-301

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-301
§ 26-21-301. Title

Currentness

This part is known as the .. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act."

Credits
Laws 2016, c. 141, § I, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-301, UT ST§ 26-21-301
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-302
§ 26-21-302. Definitions

Currentness
As used in this pa rt:

(1) "Facility" means an assisted living facility.

(2) "Legal representative" means an individual who is legally authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of
another individual.

(3)(a) "Monitoring device" means:

(i) a video surveillance camera; or

(ii) a microphone or other device that captures audio.

(b) "Monitoring device" does not include:

(i) a device that is specifically intended to intercept wire, electronic, or oral communication without notice to or the
consent of a party to the communication; or

(ii) a device that is connected to the Internet or that is set up to transmit data via an electronic communication.

(4) "Resident" means an individual who receives health care from a facility.

(5) "Room" means a resident's private or shared primary living space.

(6) "Roommate" means an individual sharing a room with a resident.

Credits
Laws 2016, c. 141, § 2, eff. May 10, 2016.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-302, UT ST§ 26-21-302
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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§ 26-21-303. Monitoring device-Installation, notice, and ... , UT ST§ 26-21-303

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act
U.C.A.1953 § 26-21-303
§ 26-21-303. Monitoring device--Installation, notice, and consent--Liability

Currentness
( 1) A resident or the resident's legal representative may operate or install a monitoring device in the resident's room if
the resident and the resident's legal representative, if any, unless the resident is incapable of informed consent:

(a) notifies the resident's facility in writing that the resident or the resident's legal representative, if any:

(i) intends to operate or install a monitoring device in the resident's room; and

(ii) consents to a waiver agreement, if required by a facility;

(b) obtains written consent from each of the resident's roommates, and their legal rep:esenta tive, if any, that specifically
states the hours when each roommate consents to the resident or the resident's legal representative operating the
monitoring device; and

(c) assumes all responsibility for any cost related to installing or operating the monitoring device.

(2) A facility shall not be civilly or criminally liable to:

(a) a resident or resident's roommate for the operation of a monitoring device consistent with this part; and

(b) any person other than the resident or resident's roommate for any claims related to the use or operation of a
monitoring device consistent with this part, unless the claim is caused by the acts or omissions of an employee or agent
of the facility.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, an individual may not, under this part, operate a monitoring device
in a facility without a court order:

(a) in secret; or
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(b) with an intent to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication without notice to or the consent of a party
to the communication.

Credits
Laws 2016, c. 141, § 3, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-303, UT ST§ 26-21-303
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Domment
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§ 26-21-304. Monitoring device-Facility admission, patient... , UT ST§ 26-21-304

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 26. Utah Health Code
Chapter 21. Health Care Facility Licensing and Inspection Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 3. Assisted Living Facility Surveillance Act
U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-304
§ 26-21-304. Monitoring device--Facility admission, patient discharge, and posted notice

Currentness
( 1) A facility may not deny an individual admission to the facility for the sole reason that the individual or the individual's
legal representative requests to install or operate a monitoring device in the individual's room.

(2) A facility may not discharge a resident for the sole reason that the resident or the resident's legal representative
requests to install or operate a monitoring device in the individual's room.

(3) A facility may require the resident or the resident's legal representative to place a sign near the entrance of the resident's
room that states that the room contains a monitoring device.

Credits
Laws 2016, c. 141, § 4, eff. May 10, 2016.

U.C.A. 1953 § 26-21-304, UT ST§ 26-21-304
Current through the 2017 First Special Session.
End of Document
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ADDENDUM6

UTAH R. CIV. P.26
(ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES)

RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE ... , UT R RCP Rule 26

West's Utah Code Annotated
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
Part V. Depositions and Discovery
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26

RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY
Currentness

(a) Disclosure. This rule applies unless changed or supplemented by a rule governing disclosure and discovery in a practice
area.

(a)(l) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party shall, without waiting for a discovery
request, serve on the other parties:

(a)(l)(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of:

(a)(l )(A)(i) each individual likely to have discoverable information supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for
impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information; and

(a)(l)(A)(ii) each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and, except for an adverse party, a summary of the
expected testimony;

(a)(l)(B) a copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored infom1ation, and tangible things in the
possession or control of the party that the party may offer in its case-in-chief, except charts, summaries and demonstrative
exhibits that have not yet been prepared and must be disclosed in accordance with paragraph (a)(5);

(a)(l)(C) a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable documents or evidentiary material on
which such computation is based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered;

(a)(l)(D) a copy of any agreement under which any person may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment or to
indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment; and

(a)(l)(E) a copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.

(a)(2) Timing of initial disclosures. The disclosures required by paragraph (a)(l) shall be served on the other parties:

(a)(2)(A) by the plaintiff within 14 days after filing of the first answer to the complaint; and
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(a)(2)(B) by the defendant within 42 days after filing of the first answer to the complaint or within 28 days after that
defendant's appearance, whichever is later.

(a)(3) Exemptions.

(a)(3)(A) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the requirements of paragraph (a)(l) do not
apply to actions:

(a)(3)(A)(i) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative agency;

(a)(3)(A)(ii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C;

(a)(3)(A)(iii) to enforce an arbitration award;

(a)(3)(A)(iv) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, Chapter 4, Determination of Water Rights.

(a)(3)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under paragraph (a)(l) are subject to discovery under
paragraph (b).

(a)(4) Expert testimony.

(a)(4)(A) Disclosure of expert testimony. A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties
the following information regarding any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rule 702 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence and who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony: (i) the expert's name and qualifications, including a list
of all publications authored within the preceding IO years, and a list of any other cases in which the expert has testified
as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary of the opinions to which the
witness is expected to testify, (iii) all data and other infom1ation that will be relied upon by the witness in fonning those
opinions, and (iv) the compensation to be paid for the witness's study and testimony.

(a)(4)(B) Limits on expert discovery. Further discovery may be obtained from an expert witness either by deposition or
by written report. A deposition shall not exceed four hours and the party taking the deposition shall pay the expert's
reasonable hourly fees for attendance at the deposition. A report shall be signed by the expert and shall contain a complete
statement of all opinions the expert will offer at trial and the basis and reasons for them. Such an expert may not testify
in a party's case-in-chief concerning any matter not fairly disclosed in the report. The party offering the expert shall pay
the costs for the report.

(a)(4)(C) Timing for expert discovery.

WESTLAV\I © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

2

RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCLOSURE ... , UT R RCP Rule 26

(a)(4)(C)(i) The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered shall serve on
the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the close of fact discovery.
Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall
occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is served on the other parties.
If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery of the expert shall be permitted.

(a)(4)(C)(ii) The party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered shall
serve on the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later of (A) the
date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i) is due, or (B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the
expert's deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i). Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may
serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28
days after the election is served on the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery
of the expert shall be permitted.

(a)(4)(C)(iii) If the party who bears the burden of proof on an issue wants to designate rebuttal expert witnesses it shall
serve on the other parties the infom1ation required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the later of (A) the
date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii) is due, or (B) receipt of the written report or the taking of the
expert's deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii). Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may
serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report
pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28
days after the election is served c n the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery
of the expert shall be permitted.

(a)(4)(D) Multiparty actions. In multiparty actions, all parties opposing the expert must agree on either a report or a
deposition. If all parties opposing the expert do not agree, then further discovery of the expert may be obtained only by
deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30.

(a)(4)(E) Summary of non-retained expert testimony. If a party intends to present evidence at trial under Rule 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence from any person other than an expert witness who is retained or specially employed to provide
testimony in the case or a person whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony,
that party must serve on the other parties a written summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to
testify in accordance with the deadlines set forth in paragraph (a)(4)(C). A deposition of such a witness may not exceed
four hours.

(a)(5) Pretrial disclosures.

(a)(5)(A) A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties:

(a)(5)(A)(i) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness, unless solely
for impeachment, separately identifying witnesses the party will call and witnesses the party may call;
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(a)(5)(A)(ii) the name of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by transcript of a deposition and a copy
of the transcript with the proposed testimony designated; and

(a)(5)(A)(iii) a copy of each exhibit, including charts, summaries and demonstrative exhibits, unless solely for
impeachment, separately identifying those which the party will offer and those which the party may offer.

(a)(5)(B) Disclosure required by paragraph (a)(5) shall be served on the other parties at least 28 days before trial. At least
14 days before trial, a party shall serve and file counter designations of deposition testimony, objections and grounds for
the objections to the use of a deposition and to the admissibility of exhibits. Other than objections under Rules 402 and
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, objections not listed are waived unless excused by the court for good cause.

(b) Discovery scope.

(b)(l) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any party
if the discovery satisfies the standards of proportionality set forth below. Privileged matters that are not discoverable
or admissible in any proceeding of any kind or character include all information in any form provided during and
created specifically as part of a request for an investigation, the investigation, findings, or conclusions of peer review,
care review, or quality assurance processes of any organization of health care providers as defined in the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act for the purpose of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to improve the
quality of medical care, or for the purpose of peer review of the ethics, competence, or professional conduct of any health
care provider.

(b)(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if:

(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the complexity of the
case, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues;

(b)(2)(B) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden or expense;

(b)(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of the case;

(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative;

(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source that is more convenient, less burdensome or less
expensive; and

(b)(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to obtain the information by discovery or
otherwise, taking into account the parties' relative access to the information.
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(b)(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing proportionality and relevance. To ensure
proportionality, the court may enter orders under Rule 37.

(b)(4) Electronically stored information. A party claiming that electronically stored information is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost shall describe the source of the electronically stored information, the nature
and extent of the burden, the nature of the information not provided, and any other information that will enable other
parties to evaluate the claim.

(b)(5) Trial preparation materials. A party may obtain otherwise discoverable documents and tangible things prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain substantially
equivalent materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials, the court shall protect against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party.

(b)(6) Statement previously made about the action. A party may obtain without the showing required in paragraph (b)
(5) a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a person not a
party may obtain without the required showing a statement about the action or its subject matter previously made by
that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order under Rule 37. A statement previously made
is (A) a written statement signed or approved by the person making it, or (B) a stenographic, mechanical, electronic, or
other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement by the person
making it and contemporaneously recorded.

(b)(7) Trial preparation; experts.

(b)(7)(A) Trial-preparation protection for draft reports or disclosures. Paragraph (b)(5) protects drafts of any report or
disclosure required under paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.

(b)(7)(B) Trial-preparation protection for communications between a party's attorney and expert witnesses. Paragraph
(b)(5) protects communications between the party's attorney and any witness required to provide disclosures under
paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent that the communications:

(b)(7)(B)(i) relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony;

(b)(7)(B)(ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions
to be expressed; or

(b)(7)(B)(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forn1ing the opinions
to be expressed.
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(b)(7)(C) Expert employed only for trial preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, by interrogatories or otherwise,
discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial. A party may
do so only:

(b)(7)(C)(i) as provided in Rule 35(b); or

(b)(7)(C)(ii) on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain facts or opinions
on the same subject by other means.

(b)(8) Claims ofprivilege or protection of trial preparation materials.

(b )(8)(A) Information withheld. If a party withholds discoverable information by claiming that it is privileged or prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the
documents, communications, or things not produced in a manner that, without revealing the information itself, will
enable other parties to evaluate the claim.

(b)(8)(B) Information produced. If a party produces infom1ation that the party claims is privileged or prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial, the producing party may notify any receiving party of the claim and the basis for
it. After being notified, a receiving party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information and any
copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may promptly
present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving party disclosed the
information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the
information until the claim is resolved.

(c) Methods, sequence and timing of discovery; tiers; limits on standard discovery; extraordinary discovery.

(c)(l) Methods ofdiscovery. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral
examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon
land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; requests for admission;
and subpoenas other than for a court hearing or trial.

(c)(2) Sequence and timing of disco1 ery. Methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party
is conducting discovery shall not delay any other party's discovery. Except for cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a
party may not seek discovery from any source before that party's initial disclosure obligations are satisfied.
1

(c)(3) Definition of tiers for standard discovery. Actions claiming $50,000 or less in damages are pem1itted standard
discovery as described for Tier I. Actions claiming more than $50,000 and less than $300,000 in damages are permitted
standard discovery as described for Tier 2. Actions claiming $300,000 or more in damages are permitted standard
discovery as described for Tier 3. Absent an accompanying damage claim for more than $300,000, actions claiming nonmonetary relief are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 2.
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(c)(4) Definition of damages. For purposes of determining standard discovery, the amount of damages includes the total
of all monetary damages sought (without duplication for alternative theories) by all parties in all claims for relief in the
original pleadings.

(c)(5) Limits on standard fact discovery. Standard fact discovery per side (plaintiffs collectively, defendants collectively,
and third-party defendants collectively) in each tier is as follows. The days to complete standard fact discovery are
calculated from the date the first defendant's first disclosure is due and do not include expert discovery under paragraphs
(a)(4)(C) and (D).
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or non-
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3
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(c)(6) Extraordinary discovery. To obtain discovery beyond the limits established in paragraph (c)(5), a party shall file:

(c)(6)(A) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these
rules, a stipulated statement that extraordinary discovery is necessary and proportional under paragraph (b)(2) and that
each party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget; or

(c)(6)(B) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these
rules, a request for extraordinary discovery under Rule 37(a).

(d) Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response by an organization; failure to disclose; initial and
supplemental disclosures and responses.

(d)(l) A party shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or reasonably
available to the party.
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(d)(2) If the party providing disclosure or responding to discovery is a corporation, partnership, association, or
governmental agency, the party shall act through one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons,
who shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or reasonably available
to the party.

(d)(3) A party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because the party has not completed investigating
the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or responses or because another
party has not made disclosures or responses.

(d)(4) If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use
the undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows
good cause for the failure.

(d)(S) If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect in some important way, the party must
timely serve on the other parties the additional or correct information if it has not been made known to the other
parties. The supplemental disclosure or response must state why the additional or correct information was not previously
provided.

(e) Signing discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every disclosure, request for discovery, response to a request for
discovery and objection to a request for discovery shall be in writing and signed by at least one attorney of record or
by the party if the party is not represented. The signature of the attorney or party is a certification under Rule 11. If a
request or response is not signed, the receiving party does not need to take any action with respect to it. If a certification
is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may take any action authorized by
Rule 11 or Rule 37(b).

(f) Filing. Except as required by these rules or ordered by the court, a party shall not file with the court a disclosure, a
request for discovery or a response to a request for discovery, but shall file only the certificate of service stating that the
disclosure, request for discovery or response has been served on the other parties and the date of service.

Credits
[Effective May 2, 2005; amended effective November I, 2007; November 1, 2008; November 1, 2011; March 6, 2012;
April 1, 2013; May 1, 2015.]

Editors' Notes
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES
Disclosure requirements and timing. Rule 26(a)(l). The 2011 amendments seek to reduce discovery costs by requiring
each party to produce, at an early stage in the case, and without a discovery request, all of the documents and physical
evidence the party may offer in its case-in-chief and the names of witnesses the party may call in its case-in-chief, with
a description of their expected testimony. In this respect, the amendments build on the initial disclosure requirements
of the prior rules. In addition to the disclosures required by the prior version of Rule 26(a)( I), a party must disclose
each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and a summary of the witness's expected testimony, a copy of all
documents the party may offer in its case-in-chief, and all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.
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Not all information will be known at the outset of a case. If discovery is serving its proper purpose, additional witnesses,
documents, and other information will be identified. The scope and the level of detail required in the initial Rule 26(a)( I)
disclosures should be viewed in light of this reality. A party is not required to interview every witness it ultimately may
call at trial in order to provide a summary of the witness's expected testimony. As the information becomes known, it
should be disclosed. No summaries are required for adverse parties, including management level employees of business
entities, because opposing lawyers are unable to interview them and their testimony is available to their own counsel.
For uncooperative or hostile witnesses any summary of expected testimony would necessarily be limited to the subject
areas the witness is reasonably expected to testify about. For example, defense counsel may be unable to interview a
treating physician, so the initial summary may only disclose that the witness will be questioned concerning the plaintifrs
diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. After medical records have been obtained, the summary may be expanded or refined.
Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the summary of the witness's expected testimony should be just that--a summary.
The rule does not require prefiled testimony or detailed descriptions of everything a witness might say at trial. On the
other hand, it requires more than the broad, conclusory statements that often were made under the prior version of Rule
26(a)(l )(e.g., "The witness will testify about the events in question" or "The witness will testify on causation."). The
intent of this requirement is to give the other side basic information concerning the subjects about which the witness is
expected to testify at trial, so that the other side may determine the witness's relative importance in the case, whether
the witness should be interviewed or deposed, and whether additional documents or information concerning the witness
should be sought. This information is important because of the other discovery limits contained in the 2011 amendments,
particularly the limits on depositions.
Likewise, the documents that should be provided as part of the Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures are those that a party reasonably
believes it may use at trial, understanding that not all documents will be available at the outset of a case. In this regard, it is
important to remember that the duty to provide documents and witness inforn1ation is a continuing one, and disclosures
must be promptly supplementl!d as new evidence and witnesses become known as the case progresses.
The amendments also require parties to provide more information about damages early in the case. Too often, the subject
of damages is deferred until late in the case. Early disclosure of damages information is important. Among other things,
it is a critical factor in determining proportionality. The committee recognizes that damages often require additional
discovery, and typically are the subject of expert testimony. The Rule is not intended to require expert disclosures at the
outset of a case. At the same time, the subject of damages should not simply be deferred until expert discovery. Parties
should make a good faith attempt to compute damages to the extent it is possible to do so and must in any event provide
all discoverable information on the subject, including materials related to the nature and extent of the damages.
The penalty for failing to make timely disclosures is that the evidence may not be used in the party's case-in-chief. To make
the disclosure requirement meaningful, and to discourage sandbagging, parties must know that if they fail to disclose
important information that is helpful to their case, they will not be able to use that information at trial. The courts will
be expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.
The 2011 amendments also change the time for making these required disclosures. Because the plaintiff controls when
it brings the action, plaintiffs must make their disclosures within 14 days after service of the first answer. A defendant is
required to make its disclosures within 28 days after the plaintiffs first disclosure or after that defendant's appearance,
whichever is later. The purpose of early disclosure is to have all parties present the evidence they expect to use to prove
their claims or defenses, thereby giving the opposing party the ability to better evaluate the case and determine what
additional discovery is necessary and proportional.
The time periods for making Rule 26(a)(l) disclosures, and the presumptive deadlines for completing fact discovery, are
keyed to the filing of an answer. If a defendant files a motion to dismiss or other Rule 12(b) motion in lieu ofan answer,
these time periods normally would be not begin to run until that motion is resolved.
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Finally, the 2011 amendments eliminate two categories of actions that previously were exempt from the mandatory
disclosure requirements. Specifically, the amendments eliminate the prior exemption for contract actions in which the
amount claimed is $20,000 or less, and actions in which any party is proceeding pro se. In the committee's view, these
types of actions will benefit from the early disclosure requirements and the overall reduced cost of discovery.

Expert disclosures and timing. Rule 26(a)(3). Expert discovery has become an ever-increasing component of discovery
cost. The prior rules sought to eliminate some of these costs by requiring the written disclosure of the expert's opinions
and other background information. However, because the expert was not required to sign these disclosures, and because
experts often were allowed to deviate from the opinions disclosed, attorneys typically would take the expert's deposition
to ensure the expert would not offer "surprise" testimony at trial, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the overall
cost. The amendments seek to remedy this and other costs associated with expert discovery by, among other things,
allowing the opponent to choose either a deposition of the expert or a written report, but not both; in the case of
written reports, requiring more comprehensive disclosures, signed by the expert, and making clear that experts will not
be allowed to testify beyond what is fairly disclosed in a report, all with the goal of making reports a reliable substitute
for depositions; and incorporating a rule that protects from discovery most communications between an attorney and
retained expert. Discovery of expert opinions and testimony is automatic under Rule 26(a)(3) and parties are not required
to serve interrogatories or use other discovery devices to obtain this information.
Disclosures of expert testimony are made in sequence, with the party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for
which expert testimony will be offered going first. Within seven days after the close of fact discovery, that party must
disclose: (i) the expert's curriculum vitae identifying the expert's qualifications, publications, and prior testimony; (ii)
compensation information; (iii) a brief summary of the opinions the expert will offer; and (iv) a complete copy of the
expert's file for the case. The file should include all of the facts and data that the expert has relied upon in forming the
expert's opinions. If the expert has prepared summaries of data, spreadsheets, charts, tables, or similar materials, they
should be included. If the expert has used software programs to make calculations or otherwise summarize or organize
data, that information and underlying formulas should be provided in native form so it can be analyzed and understood.
To the extent the expert is relying on depositions or materials produced in discovery, then a list of the specific materials
relied upon is sufficient. The committee recognizes that experts frequently will prepare demonstrative exhibits or other
aids to illustrate the expert's testimony at trial, and the costs for preparing these materials can be substantial. For that
reason, these types of demonstrative aids may be prepared and disclosed later, as part of the Rule 26(a)(4) pretrial
disclosures when trial is imminent.
Within seven days after this disclosure, the party opposing the retained expert may elect either a deposition or a written
report from the expert. A deposition is limited to four hours, which is not included in the deposition hours under Rule
26(c)(5), and the party taking it must pay the expert's hourly fee for attending the deposition. If a party elects a written
report, the expert must provide a signed report containing a complete statement of all opinions the expert will express
and the basis and reasons for them. The intent is not to require a verbatim transcript of exactly what the expert will say
at trial; instead the expert must fairly disclose the substance of and basis for each opinion the expert will offer. The expert
may not testify in a party's case in chief concerning any matter that is not fairly disclosed in the report. To achieve the goal
of making reports a reliable substitute for depositions, courts are expected to enforce this requirement. If a party elects
a deposition, rather than a report, it is up to the party to ask the necessary questions to "lock in" the expert's testimony.
But the expert is expected to be fully prepared on all aspects of his/her trial testimony at the time of the deposition and
may not leave the door open for additional testimony by qualifying answers to deposition questions.
The report or deposition must be completed within 28 days after the election is made. After this, the party who does
not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered must make its corresponding disclosures
and the opposing party may then elect either a deposition or a written report. Under the deadlines contained in the
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rules, expert discovery should take less than three months to complete. However, as with the other discovery rules, these
deadlines can be altered by stipulation of the parties or order of the court.
The amendments also address the issue of testimony from non-retained experts, such as treating physicians, police
officers, or employees with special expertise, who are not retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or
whose duties as an employee do not regularly involve giving expert testimony. This issue was addressed by the Supreme
Court in Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, wherein the court held that reports under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(3) are not
required for treating physicians.
There are a number of difficulties inherent in disclosing expert testimony that may be offered from fact witnesses. First,
there is often not a clear line between fact and expert testimony. Many fact witnesses have scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge, and their testimony about the events in question often will cross into the area of expert testimony.
The rules are not intended to erect artificial barriers to the admissibility of such testimony. Second, many of these
fact witnesses will not be within the control of the party who plans to call them at trial. These witnesses may not be
cooperative, and may not be willing to discuss opinions they have with counsel. Where this is the case, disclosures will
necessarily be more limited. On the other hand, consistent with the overall purpose of the 2011 amendments, a party
should receive advance notice if their opponent will solicit expert opinions from a particular witness so they can plan their
case accordingly. In an effort to strike an appropriate balance, the rules require that such witnesses be identified and the
information about their anticipated testimony should include that which is required under Rule 26(a)(l)(A)(ii), which
should include any opinion testimony that a party expects to elicit from them at trial. If a party has disclosed possible
opinion testimony in its Rule 26(a)(l)(A)(ii) disclosures, that party is not required to prepare a separate Rule 26(a)(4)(E)
disclosure for the witness. And if that disclosure is made in advance of the witness's deposition, those opinions should be
explored in the deposition and not in a separate expert deposition. Otherwise, the timing for disclosure e of non-retained
expert opinions is the same as that for retained experts under Rule 26(a)(4)(C) and depends on whether the party has the
burden of proof or is responding to another expert. Rules 26(a)(4)(E) and 26(a)(l)(A)(ii) are not intended to elevate form
over substance--all they require is that a party fairly inform its opponent that opinion testimony may be offered from a
particular witness. And because a party who expects to offer this testimony normally cannot compel such a witness to
prepare a written report, further discovery must be done by interview or by deposition.
Finally, the amendments include a new Rule 26(b)(7) that protects from discovery draft expert reports and, with limited
exception, communications between an attorney and an expert. These changes are modeled after the recent changes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are intended to address the unnecessary and costly procedures that often were
employed in order to protect such information from discovery, and to reduce "satellite litigation" over such issues.

Scope of discovery-Proportionality. Rule 26(b). Proportionality is the principle governing the scope of discovery. Simply
stated, it means that the cost of discovery should be proportional to what is at stake in the litigation.

In the past, the scope of discovery was governed by "relevance" or the "likelihood to lead to discovery of admissible
evidence." These broad standards may have secured just results by allowing a party to discover all facts relevant to the
litigation. However, they did little to advance two equally important objectives of the rules of civil procedure--the speedy
and inexpensive resolution of every action. Accordingly, the former standards governing the scope of discovery have
been replaced with the proportionality standards in subpart (b)(l).
The concept of proportionality is not new. The prior rule permitted the Court to limit discovery methods if it determined
that "the discovery was unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contains a similar provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). This method oflimiting discovery,
however, was rarely invoked either under the Utah rules or federal rules.
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Under the prior rule, the party objecting to the discovery request had the burden of proving that a discovery request
was not proportional. The new rule changes the burden of proof. Today, the party seeking discovery beyond the scope
of '"standard" discovery has the burden of showing that the request is •·relevant to the claim or defense of any party"
and that the request satisfies the standards of proportionality. As before, ultimate admissibility is not an appropriate
objection to a discovery request so long as the proportionality standard and other requirements are met.
The 2011 amendments establish three tiers of standard discovery in Rule 26(c). Ideally, rules of procedure should be
crafted to promote predictability for litigants. Rules should limit the need to resort to judicial oversight. Tiered standard
discovery seeks to achieve these ends. The "one-size-fits-all" system is rejected. Tiered discovery signals to judges,
attorneys, and parties the amount of discovery which by rule is deemed proportional for cases with different amounts
in controversy.
Any system of rules which permits the facts and circumstances of each case to inform procedure cannot eliminate
uncertainty. Ultimately, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a discovery request is proportional. The
proportionality standards in subpart (b)(2) and the discovery tiers in subpart (c) mitigate uncertainty by guiding that
discretion. The proper application of the proportionality standards will be defined over time by trial and appellate courts.
Standard and extraordinary discovery. Rule 26(c). As a counterpart to requiring more detailed disclosures under Rule
26(a), the 2011 amendments place new limitations on additional discovery the parties may conduct. Because the
committee expects the enhanced disclosure requirements will automatically permit each party to learn the witnesses and
evidence the opposing side will offer in its case-in-chief, additional discovery should serve the more limited function of
permitting parties to find witnesses, documents, and other evidentiary materials that are ham1ful, rather than helpful,
to the opponent's case.
Rule 26(c) provides for three separate "tiers" of limited, "standard" discovery that are presumed to be proportional to
the amount and issues in controversy in the action, and that the parties may conduct as a matter ofright. An aggregation
of all damages sought by all parties in an action dictates the applicable tier of standard discovery, whether such damages
are sought by way of a complaint, counterclaim, or otherwise. The tiers of standard discovery are set forth in a chart that
is embedded in the body of the rule itself. "Tier 1" describes a minimal amount of standard discovery that is presumed
proportional for cases involving damages of $50,000 or less. "Tier 2" sets forth larger limits on standard discovery that
are applicable in cases involving damages above $50,000 but less than $300,000. Finally, "Tier 3" prescribes still greater
standard discovery for actions involving damages in excess of $300,000. Deposition hours are charged to a side for the
time spent asking questions of the witness. In a particular deposition, one side may use two hours while the other side
uses only 30 minutes. The tiers also provide presumptive limitations on the time within which standard discovery should
be completed, which limitations similarly increase with the amount of damages at issue. A statement of discovery issues
will not toll the period. Parties are expected to be reasonable and accomplish as much as they can during standard
discovery. A statement of discovery issues may result in additional discovery and sanctions at the expense of a party who
unreasonably fails to respond or otherwise frustrates discovery. After the expiration of the applicable time limitation,
a case is presumed to be ready for trial. Actions for non-monetary relief, such as injunctive relief, are subject to the
standard discovery limitations of Tier 2, absent an accompanying monetary claim of $300,000 or more, in which case
Tier 3 applies. The committee determined these standard discovery limitations based on the expectation that for the
majority of cases filed in the Utah State Courts, the magnitude of available discovery and applicable time parameters
available under the three-tiered system should be sufficient for cases involving the respective amounts of damages.
Despite the expectation that standard discovery according to the applicable tier should be adequate in the typical case, the
201 I amendments contemplate there will be some cases for which standard discovery is not sufficient or appropriate. In
such cases, parties may conduct additional discovery that is shown to be consistent with the principle of proportionality.
There are two ways to obtain such additional discovery. The first is by stipulation. If the parties can agree additional
discovery is necessary, they may stipulate to as much additional discovery as they desire, provided they stipulate the
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additional discovery is proportional to what is at stake in the litigation and counsel for each party certifies that the party
has reviewed and approved a budget for additional discovery. Such a stipulation should be filed before the close of the
standard discovery time limit, but only after reaching the limits for that type of standard discovery available under the
rule. If these conditions are met, the Court will not second-guess the parties and their counsel and must approve the
stipulation.
The second method to obtain additional discovery is by a statement of discovery issues. The committee recognizes
there will be some cases in which additional discovery is appropriate, but the parties cannot agree to the scope of such
additional discovery. These may include, among other categories, large and factually complex cases and cases in which
there is a significant disparity in the parties' access to information, such that one party legitimately has a greater need
than the other party for additional discovery in order to prepare properly for trial. To prevent a party from taking
advantage of this situation, the 2011 amendments allow any party to request additional discovery. As with stipulations
for extraordinary discovery, a party requesting extraordinary discovery should do so before the close of the standard
discovery time limit, but only after the party has reached the limits for that type of standard discovery available to
it under the rule. By taking advantage of this discovery, counsel should be better equipped to articulate for the court
what additional discovery is needed and why. The requesting party must demonstrate that the additional discovery is
proportional and certify that the party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget. The burden to show the need
for additional discovery, and to demonstrate relevance and proportionality, always falls on the party seeking additional
discovery. However, cases in which such additional discovery is appropriate do exist, and it is important for courts to
recognize they can and should permit additional discovery in appropriate cases, commensurate with the complexity and
magnitude of the dispute.

Protective order language moved to Rule 37. The 2011 amendments delete in its entirety the prior language of Rule
26(c) governing motions for protective orders. The substance of that language is now found in Rule 37. The committee
determined it was preferable to cover requests for an order to compel, for a protective order, and sanctions in a single
rule, rather than two separate rules.
Consequences of failure to disclose. Rule 26(d). If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely its discovery responses,
that party cannot use the undisclosed witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial, absent proof that nondisclosure was harmless or justified by good cause. More complete disclosures increase the likelihood that the case will
be resolved justly, speedily, and inexpensively. Not being able to use evidence that a party fails properly to disclose
provides a powerful incentive to make complete disclosures. This is true only if trial courts hold parties to this standard.
Accordingly, although a trial court retains discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given case, the
usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence.

LEGISLATIVE NOTE
(1) The amended language in paragraph (b)(l) is intended to incorporate long-standing protections against discovery
and admission into evidence of privileged matters connected to medical care review and peer review into the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. These privileges, found in both Utah common law and statute, include Sections 26-25-3, 58-13-4,
and 58-13-5, UCA, 1953. The language is intended to ensure the confidentiality of peer review, care review, and quality
assurance processes and to ensure that the privilege is limited only to documents and infom1ation created specifically
as part of the processes. It does not extend to knowledge gained or documents created outside or independent of the
processes. The language is not intended to limit the court's existing ability, if it chooses, to review contested documents
in camera in order to determine whether the documents fall within the privilege. The language is not intended to alter
any existing law, rule, or regulation relating to the confidentiality, admissibility, or disclosure of proceedings before the
Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. The Legislature intends that these privileges apply to all
pending and future proceedings governed by court rules, including administrative proceedings regarding licensing and
reimbursement.
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(2) The Legislature does not intend that the amendments to this rule be construed to change or alter a final order
concerning discovery matters entered on or before the effective date of this amendment.
(3) The Legislature intends to give the greatest effect to its amendment, as legally permissible, in matters that are pending
on or may arise after the effective date of this amendment, without regard to when the case was filed.

Notes of Decisions (225)
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 26, UT R RCP Rule 26
Current with amendments received through September 1, 2017
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